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Articles
TRADITIONAL LABOR LAW SCHOLARSHIP AND THE
CRISIS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW: A
REPLY TO PROFESSOR FINKIN
KARL E. KLARE*
"Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous
insights, and the established society seems to be apprehen-
sive of the subversive contents of memory. Remembrance
is a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a mode of
'mediation' which breaks, for short moments, the omni-
present power of the given facts."**
"[The historian] knows the end of the story, and so is
under a strong compulsion to see events as a steady and
direct march to that end. The history of labor during the
New Deal seems to be a subject especially prone to this
.kind of treatment. We have tended to write as if only one
set of results were possible. And this, of course, has a
deadly effect on the interpretive potential of the sub-
ject."***
© Copyright 1985 by Karl E. Klare.
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University. Heartfelt thanks are owed to many
friends for their generous scholarly assistance and critical advice on this project and also
for their unforgettable loyalty: Jim Atleson, Fred Block, James Green, Haggai Hurvitz,
Alan Hyde, Duncan Kennedy, Howard Lesnick, Staughton Lynd, Ruth Milkman, Gary
Minda, Dan Schaffer, Jack Schlegel, Bill Simon, Chris Tomlins, and Paul Weiler. I prof-
ited from the able research assistance of Greg Campbell and David Kelly. I am grateful
to the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for financial support while work-
ing on this Article. I am solely responsible for the views expressed in this Article and for
any errors that it may contain.
** H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 98 (1964).
* D. BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 136 (1980).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Readers of Maryland Law Review were no doubt surprised and
puzzled to find in the Winter, 1984 issue a lengthy article' devoted
to establishing the proposition that two earlier pieces published
elsewhere,2 one quite long ago, are undeserving of serious attention
(F:86). Curiously, the author of this broadside provided no hint as
to why the debate was worth the effort. Thus it falls to me, one of
the authors attacked, to supply the background that gives meaning
to this seemingly pedantic controversy. Despite Professor Finkin's
assiduous efforts to cast it exclusively in technical and arcane aca-
demic terms, the debate is really between competing visions of the
scope and purposes of labor law scholarship, of the past and future
of American collective bargaining, and of the nature of industrial
democracy.
Part I of this Article provides the background of the debate,
situating it in the context of the current crisis of collective bargain-
ing law. In Part II, I restate some of the central substantive themes
and methodological concerns of Judicial Deradicalization, and provide
a critical assessment of the essay in light of subsequent work. In the
sections that follow, I address three major areas of substantive de-
bate. My purpose in these three sections is to draw a clearer portrait
of the "critical" approach and how it differs from Professor Finkin's
traditionalism. Along the way I refute his criticisms of my scholar-
ship. Part III focuses on the problem of "congressional intent" and
demonstrates how Professor Finkin has fundamentally misstated the
position he set out to criticize. Part IV addresses the theme of "con-
tractualism" and includes further observations on the questions of
statutory intent and the uses of legislative history. Part V discusses
worker participation. Part VI is a brief description of, and rejoinder
to, Professor Finkin's polemical techniques. In Part VII, I briefly
conclude that the need for innovative approaches to industrial de-
mocracy justifies efforts to rethink and revise our most basic as-
sumptions about labor law.
1. Finkin, Revisionism In Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984). Professor Finkin's
article will be cited throughout by the letter "F," followed by the cited page. Thus 43
MD. L. REV. 23, 46 would be cited simply as F:46.
2. The two articles are: Stone, The Post- War Paradigm In American Labor Law, 90 YALE
L.J. 1509 (1981); and Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). For convenience,
my article will be referred to as Judicial Deradicalization and will be cited by the letter "K,"
followed by the cited page number.
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I. BACKGROUND
Labor unions in the United States now face their toughest chal-
lenge and hardest times since the industrial organizing campaigns of
the Great Depression.3 Unions confront declining membership and
organizational strength; persistently adverse trade and economic
trends; strong pressures to surrender hard-won past achievements
in concession bargaining; escalating employer resistance to unioni-
zation; a hostile political and public opinion climate; and a labor law
system that many unionists increasingly perceive as an obstacle to
collective bargaining. While many unions have begun to respond
with innovative approaches to organizing and bargaining,4 most
supporters acknowledge the depth of the crisis and the difficulty of
the tasks ahead if the labor movement is to regain its momentum
and influence.
Friends of collective bargaining, both inside and outside the la-
bor movement, now generally agree that labor law has significantly
contributed to the labor movement's current crisis. There is dis-
pute, of course, about precisely how the legal process affects the
politics of industrial relations and about how weighty the law-re-
lated factors have been in comparison to others. Some regard the
structure of labor law as a decisive factor in labor's decline.5 To cite
one of the gloomiest diagnoses, a House Subcommittee whose
members declare themselves to "believe as strongly as ever in the
system of collective bargaining," 6 recently concluded that "[l]abor
3. See generally BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, UNIONS TODAY: NEW TACTICS TO TACKLE
TOUGH TIMES (1985).
4. Id. The AFL-CIO has recently adopted a major policy report on new strategies
to expand and revitalize the labor movement. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1985, at 8, col. 4.
5. See, e.g., Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769-70 (1983) (employer coercive tactics are "a ma-
jor factor" in decline of unionized sector; legal system "must bear a major share of the
blame for providing employers with the opportunity and the incentives to use these
tactics").
6. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE COMM. ON EDUC.
AND LABOR, THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAw-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS, H.R.
REP. No. 98, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FAILURE]. The record
of the hearings upon which this report is based is reprinted in Oversight Hearings on
the Subject "Has Labor Law Failed,"Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Manage-
ment Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor and the Manpower and Housing Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 21, 25 & 26,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings]. The Subcommittee drew heavily on the
data and conclusions of a growing academic literature depicting the current crisis of
American labor law. See generally R. FREEMAN &J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 230-
38 (1984) (legal and illegal employer tactics are a major cause of declining union electo-
ral success); Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation,
31 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 17 (1982) ("[A]damant refusal by employers to accept collective
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law has failed,"'7 "the law has ceased to accomplish its purpose, '
indeed, "the evidence is clear that the law does not encourage col-
lective bargaining . . . . [r]ather it has become an impediment."9
Others, myself included, have portrayed the influence of law in
more indirect, noninstrumental terms, though I have also argued
that labor law imposes substantial limitations on unions in organiz-
ing employees, in voicing their needs, and in participating with man-
agement in making the industrial decisions that affect workers' lives.
But despite this divergence of interpretive and evaluative emphasis,
most observers sympathetic to collective bargaining are in accord
that, at the very least, the legal system has been an important source
of labor's present exigencies.
This, then, is a time that requires the utmost imagination and
creativity from those who believe in industrial democracy and col-
lective bargaining, including academics. Now, more than ever, la-
bor law scholars must be open to a searching reexamination of our
assumptions and methods, even the most basic. This should prop-
erly be a period of experimentation and rebirth in labor law scholar-
ship, not complacent adherence to old verities. We should welcome
bargaining has bent the National Labor Relations Act from its original premises and
purposes. . . . [T]he legal rules developed by the Board and the courts do not express
or implement the premises and purposes of the statute."); Weiler, supra note 5, at 1770
(core weaknesses of statutory scheme provide employers with opportunity and incentive
to use coercive tactics to defeat unionization).
7. FAILURE, supra note 6, at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2. So severe is the crisis that prominent, thoroughly knowledgeable labor
union leaders and attorneys have spoken in favor of repeal or overhaul of the Act. See
FAILURE, supra note 6, at 2. And in a highly publicized recent interview, AFL-CIO Presi-
dent Lane Kirkland "called federal labor laws a 'dead letter' that give labor little protec-
tion, and said that workers may be 'better off with the law of the jungle.' " Wall St. J.,
Aug. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 2.
For the most part, critics place the blame on post-Wagner Act developments, par-
ticularly the Taft-Hartley Act, Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120,
61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982)), see, e.g., Oversight
Hearings, supra note 6, at 107-109 (statement ofJames Kane) (scoring Taft-Hartley's de-
parture from sound principles of Wagner Act); recent decisional law under conservative
appointees, see, e.g., NATIONAL LABOR COMMI'rEE OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
WHITE PAPER ON THE REAGAN LABOR BOARD, Oversight Hearings, supra note 6, at 583; Hear-
ings on the Nomination of Rosemary Collyer as NLRB General Counsel before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of Thomas R. Donahue, AFL-
CIO Secretary-Treasurer), reprinted in Daily Labor Report, May 24, 1984, at D2 (anti-
labor bias of Dotson Board); and lawful and unlawful employer resistance to unioniza-
tion, see generally sources cited supra note 6, rather than flaws in our model of collective
bargaining. While Judicial Deradicalization has much in common with such criticisms, it
differs insofar as it argues that we can discern some doctrinal and philosophical roots of
the present dilemmas of labor law and the labor movement in the earliest years of the
Wagner Act.
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a root-and-branch reevaluation of the structure and implicit values
of collective bargaining law, institutions, and practices. Particularly
is this so in light of the recent emergence of a vigorous conservative
academic attack upon collective bargaining.'0
Labor law scholars have responded to the challenge by develop-
ing or extending a variety of promising approaches in recent years.
Eloquent and distinguished voices have alerted the academic com-
munity to the depth of the problem, the need to reexamine prevail-
ing assumptions, and the need for fresh law reform alternatives,
sometimes informed by comparativist perspectives." Others have
deployed the tools of empirical sociology and econometrics so as to
gain a deeper understanding of the gap between law-on-the-books
and law-in-action as a basis for proposing fundamental reforms in
the legal structure of collective bargaining.'
2
A third group, of which I am part, has concentrated on uncover-
ing the latent value structure and political and social assumptions
built into contemporary labor law.'" The idea is that a clearer view
of the history and implicit values in labor law will release the schol-
arly and political imagination, permitting us, as appropriate, either
to reconceive the nature of industrial democracy or to renew com-
mitments to older but enduring collective bargaining concepts. The
approach draws heavily upon recent achievements in social theory
and social history. Within this group, there is a progressive political
orientation, with an emphasis on democratic, rank-and-file partici-
pation. Some in this third group are associated with the Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) movement, but it should be clearly noted that
others are not.' 4
10. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 6.
12. For example, Weiler, supra note 5, relies extensively on empirical studies of the
union certification process in building a case for a proposed reform. See also R. FREEMAN
&J. MEDOFF, supra note 6. A classic, if highly controversial contribution to the genre, is
J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976). James Atleson has long brought a masterly command of the literature
of industrial sociology to his analyses of labor law problems. See, e.g., Atleson, Work
Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34
OHIO ST. LJ. 750 (1973).
13. Several times herein I have borrowed the rubric "values and assumptions" from
Jim Atleson's title, J. ATLESON, VALUES & ASSuMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983).
14. The following sources indicate the variety and depth of the emerging "critical"
approach to labor law scholarship. Note, however, that these authors disagree strongly
among themselves on a variety of issues, and CLS scholarship is only one strand of the
"critical" approach. SeeJ. ATLESON, supra note 13; Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market: A
Comment onJudicial Inventiveness, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 88 (1985); Cloke, Political Loyalty, Labor
19851
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Despite the exciting prospects offered to labor law scholarship
by the use of empirical techniques, comparative perspectives, and
the "critical" approach, old habits of mind die slowly. Traditional
modes of doctrinal analysis exercise a great inertial force, which
continues to shape much research in labor law. Moreover, many
academics see no need for a fundamental reorientation of the field
or for the importation of "outside" disciplines. At a time when in-
dustrial relations realities are rapidly diverging from the under-
standings and arrangements upon which the system of collective
bargaining law was erected,"5 and when an ever optimistic but be-
leaguered labor movement faces the distinct possibility of long-term
decline, much labor law scholarship consigns itself to ever more re-
fined embroidery upon the well-worn doctrinal fabric. Creative doc-
trinal scholarship is terribly important, to affected employees,
unions, employers, and their advocates, but the nearly exclusive
doctrinal preoccupation of much mainstream scholarship must ulti-
mately limit and marginalize its contribution to any process of reex-
amination and reconstitution of the system. The fact is that the
labor movement's "legal problems" are not simply legal in nature;
Democracy and the Constitution, 5 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 159 (1976); Feinman,
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Goldberg, Affirmative Action in Union Govern-
ment: The Landrum-Griffin Act Implications, 44 OHIO ST. LJ. 649 (1983); Hyde, Beyond Col-
lective Bargaining: The Politicization of Labor Relations Under Government Contract, 1982 Wis.
L. REV. 1; Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984); Hyde, Eco-
nomic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1981); Kelman, American Labor Law and Legal Formalism: How "Legal Logic" Shaped and
Vitiated the Rights of American Workers, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1983); Lesnick, The Con-
sciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor Law, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 833 (1983);
Lesnick, The Structure of Post-War Labor Relations: Response, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 142 (1982-83) (contribution to colloqium); Lynd, Government Without Rights: The
Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483 (1981); Lynd, Investment Decisions
and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1979); Minda, Book Review, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474 (1984) (reviewing J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN
LABOR LAw (1983)); Nockelby, Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations in the Nine-
teenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510
(1980); presser, Subjects of Bargaining under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political Imagi-
nation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 475 (1983);Seitz, Legal, Legislative and Managerial Responses to the
Organization of Supervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 199 (1984).It is regrettable that Professor Finkin takes no note of this new literature, even
though his critique of Professor Stone's and my work will inevitably be taken by some to
reflect on the entire body of scholarship.
15. For one view of this problem, see Kochan, McKersie, & Katz, U.S. Industrial Rela-
tions in Transition: A Summary Report, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N, Proceed-
ings of the Thirty-Seventh Ann. Mtg. 261-76 (1985).
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they are inseparable from the economic and political matrix in
which they are unfolding.
Surprisingly, Professor Finkin raises the banner of a particularly
narrow and rarified version of doctrinalism. As self-appointed
guardian of this moribund orthodoxy, he is understandably reticent
about the broader context and political roots of contemporary labor
law debate. His article betrays no hint of awareness that American
collective bargaining is in difficulty, let alone crisis. Professor Finkin
is a knowledgeable observer of the labor relations scene, so surely
he is thoroughly informed about these matters. Yet for some reason
he seems intent here on defending an adamantinely traditional ap-
proach to legal scholarship.' 6
His approach has two hallmarks.' 7 First is the commitment to
the autonomy of legal reasoning. All agree that legal reasoning is a
technical, specialized mode of argumentation that is to some degree
distanced from explicitly moral and ideological controversy such as
is found, for example, in political philosophy. But Finkin's rigid tra-
ditionalist view embraces the much stronger claim that legal reason-
ing is an objective, relatively determinate, and self-contained
analytical method that is radically distinct from open-ended ethical
and political discourse.'" Discussion that can be counted as a con-
tribution to "professional knowledge" therefore necessarily takes
place only within a tightly confined universe of discourse. The sorts
of questions Professor Finkin's approach asks, and therefore the
kinds of solutions he is capable of deriving, are rigidly structured by
a conventional conceptual idiom and a standardized repertoire of
formulaic arguments. An inevitable consequence is the tendency to
ignore or suppress the moral and political value judgments that are
16. While it sometimes appears that Professor Finkin sees himself as speaking for the
mainstream of the discipline, see, e.g., F:86-87 (purporting to state the opinion of labor
lawyers toward the Klare and Stone articles), his professed faith in the power and per-
suasiveness of conventional legal reasoning techniques is so extreme that I doubt his
position is very representative. Indeed, his polemical stance impels him to advance posi-
tions that are in conflict with views he himself has published elsewhere, for example, on
the question of strike replacements. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. Still, his
article does reflect many assumptions that I suspect are widely shared among judges and
labor lawyers regarding the labor movement and industrial relations system, the limits
of democracy in organizations like corporations and unions, and the nature of legal rea-
soning and legal scholarship. This gives his critique a special interest as an object of
study.
17. For related perspectives see Jim Atleson's unpublished manuscript, Making
Sense of the Last 50 Secondary Boycott Decisions, or How I Spent My Summer Vacation
(1985) (on file with author). See also Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RESEARCH L. &
Soc. 25 (1980).
18. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 564 (1983).
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always a part of legal analysis. Perhaps the advocate must adhere
closely to the traditional canon of stereotyped arguments and write
as though those arguments inexorably command the preferred out-
come, but it is not clear why scholarly inquiry should be similarly
restricted.
Second is the view that law is autonomous. Law influences be-
havior according to its stated terms. When it doesn't, there is an
"anomaly" to be corrected. The world is assumed to be as it is
presented in legal discourse. The only values of legitimate scholarly
concern are entirely given by the overt policies of constitutions, stat-
utes, and case law. It is no part of the scholar's job to reflect criti-
cally upon these authoritative values or to distill from abstract
categories like "industrial peace" and "freedom of contract" their
contextualized, historical meanings. Such views are closely con-
nected with the predominant attitude toward history found in Amer-
ican legal thought, namely that society moves along a relatively
determined, evolutionary path of progressive adaptation to social
needs.' 9
By contrast, I argue that while legal rules and decisions may
embody enduring values, they take their meanings from the social
contexts in which they are deeply embedded. Like all history, legal
history is both structured and discontinuous. 20 It follows no pre-
given evolutionary path, but rather is comprised of endless conflicts
and choices of a moral and political nature which coalesce partially
to constitute and give meaning to social life. Accordingly, critical
reflection upon the values expressed in law and upon the choices
and foregone possibilities latent in past historical contexts is emi-
nently part of the scholar's task.
Despite its strident and ungenerous tone, Professor Finkin's cri-
tique provides me a gratifying opportunity to return to my first la-
bor law article, originally drafted a decade ago. Judicial
Deradicalization was one of the earliest efforts to provide a theoretical
overview of labor law from the emerging "critical" perspective. 2' It
19. See generally Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Gordon, Histories]; Gordon, Historicism In Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017
(1981).
20. See Unger, supra note 18, at 663.
21. Other labor lawyers who shared their own work and assisted with mine were then
developing similar approaches, and their contribution, as well as that of the Critical
Legal Studies community generally, was essential to anything I was able to accomplish.
They are gratefully acknowledged above, see supra notes * & 14; see also K:265 n.*.
It has become fashionable to poke fun at CLS scholars for citing each other's
work, see, e.g., Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 465, 465 n.l
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is only recently that academic labor law has begun to acknowledge
the depth and seriousness of the crisis in collective bargaining. It is
now academically respectable to call attention to the derailment of
the federal labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining.22 This
was less true ten years ago. We were then still bathed in the evanes-
cent glow of the golden age of doctrinal scholarship in labor law,
and few voices called for the fundamental reorientation that now
seems very much on the agenda. Likewise, the concept of workplace
participation I extolled, and which Professor Finkin belittles, has
emerged in recent years as a central concern in industrial relations
and collective bargaining, albeit with somewhat different connota-
tions.23 I take heart from the fact that mainstream scholarship and
industrial relations developments now echo themes that co-workers
and I focused on years ago.
As an experimental piece, Judicial Deradicalization understanda-
bly has its limitations, and I will be candid with the reader about
them. I have attempted to correct some of the shortcomings in my
subsequent work24 and others are addressed here. Nonetheless, I
(1984), as though mainstream scholars did not habitually round up the usual sources.
The practice of recognizing one's intellectual debts not only fulfills a duty but acknowl-
edges the fact that valuable scholarly approaches often emerge through complex, indis-
tinct processes of exchange and collaboration. It is hard to understand why mainstream
academics would make a point of criticizing CLS for embracing the ideal of scholarly
community.
22. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982 & Supp.
1984) [hereinafter referred to as "NLRA," "Wagner Act," or "the Act"] ("It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate [obstructions to commerce]
. ..by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
23. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
24. Professor Finkin targets judicial Deradicalization in isolation, taking no note of the
evolution of my views in subsequent work or of the cognate literature. See infra notes 53-
55.
The ordinary author's privilege to define the scope of his or her discussion is
partially qualified in this case for two reasons. By its title and sweeping claims, Professor
Finkin's article is postured as a general refutation of revisionism in labor law. Second,
he charges me with failing to define, develop or clarify certain key concepts. See infra
note 325 and accompanying text. Many such concepts were in fact defined in the origi-
nal article. For example, Professor Finkin says, "At no point.., do [Klare and Stone]
explain what they mean by 'ideology' " (F:84 n.278). ("Ideology" is Finkin's word for
the key methodological concepts in Judicial Deradicalization.) This criticism is without
foundation. The effort of the entire article is to develop these concepts, and, in any
event, the follow-up articles provide further and more precise refinement. I do not un-
derstand how Finkin can claim that Stone and I have "breathed no hint" of pursuing any
alternative "sociopolitical theory." F: 85 n.278. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying
text.
SinceJudicial Deradicalization, I have published seven major and some minor arti-
cles that expand upon its themes. I do not pretend that these articles resolve all the
difficulties of the early piece, but they do seek to clarify, refine, or qualify the theoretical
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
hope to show that Judicial Deradicalization and, more importantly, the
theoretical approach of which it is an example, has much of value to
contribute as labor law scholarship faces the future. By contrast, I
argue implicitly that the extreme doctrinal traditionalism Professor
Finkin endorses is hardly the sure and serviceable guide he assumes
it to be.
While this divergence of views on the needs and potential paths
of labor law scholarship provides the authentic core of this debate, it
remains that Professor Finkin has cast the controversy in terms of
criticisms of the scholarly merits of the two "critical" articles (F:86).
Accordingly, in addition to restating and updating the views ex-
pressed in Judicial Deradicalization, it is incumbent upon me to re-
spond to these charges. 25
Simply put, it is my purpose to show that Professor Finkin's crit-
icisms regarding the legal footing and historical evidence for the po-
sitions I advanced are just dead wrong. Even within the four
corners of conventional legal analysis, he is unable to sustain a con-
vincing argument on a single non-trivial point of legal or historical
research actually in contention between us. His charges regarding
my scholarship are without foundation. Professor Finkin is an able
scholar whose work in other contexts I very much respect. The ex-
planation for his poor showing on this occasion is that he has viewed
my work through the lens of a series of unexamined and conven-
tional assumptions about labor law and labor history. This has in-
duced a myopic perspective that in turn causes him systematically to
misstate and misrepresent my position. Much of Finkin's critique is
built upon misattribution to me of views I did not advance. Had I
actually espoused a fraction of the positions Finkin ascribes to me,
my article might deserve the scorn he heaps upon it. But I did not.
Accordingly, while his "countervailing" evidence and arguments are
model, define or redefine key terms, and provide further examples. See generally Kiare,
The Bitter and the Sweet: Reflections on the Supreme Court's Yeshiva Decision, SOCIALIST REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 99 [hereinafter cited as Klare, Yeshiva Decision]; Contracts Jurisprudence
and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Klare, Con-
tracts]; Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Klare, Critical Theory]; Labor Law as Ideology: Toward A New
Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Klare, Ideology]; Law-Making As Praxis, TELOS, Summer 1979, at 123 [hereinafter cited
as Klare, Law-Making]; The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Klare, Public/Private]; The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the
Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives From Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV.
157 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Klare, Quest].
25. I have focused almost entirely on Professor Finkin's criticisms of my article, con-
fidently leaving it to Professor Stone's able pen to respond to his criticisms of her work.
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usually (although not always) accurate enough, they are often wholly
irrelevant to the point at issue because he has not grasped or faith-
fully portrayed my claim.
There is a final note before embarking on the debate. I appre-
ciate Professor Finkin's frustration with a novel, not fully worked-
out approach that questions and challenges so many aspects of the
world view informing his work. Notwithstanding this, however, the
mordantly personal focus and nasty tone of his critique are deeply
regrettable and particularly inappropriate in light of his inability to
make out a case on the merits. To put it bluntly, his article contains
numerous cheap shots and ad hominem arguments. At first I was
sorely tempted to reply in a personalized and polemical (though
hopefully more substantial) vein. However, I have endeavored
throughout to stay on the merits, and I have restricted myself to a
brief rejoinder on the subject of Professor Finkin's polemical tech-
niques in order to clear the record.26 The labor law community,
particularly those who believe in collective bargaining, will be best
served by generous, tolerant, and mutually respecting dialogue be-
tween competing perspectives. It is a pity that Professor Finkin
could not approach the debate in that spirit. I hope now to reclaim
the opportunity his critique originally presented to inaugurate such
a dialogue between the "critical" and other perspectives.
II. A RESTATEMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL
DERADICALIZA TION
A. Major Substantive Themes27
Judicial Deradicalization focused on the earliest years of Wagner
Act 28 interpretation in an effort to determine whether any connec-
tions could be drawn between the then brewing crises of labor law
and the labor movement, and long-forgotten choices and decisions
made nearly a half-century ago.
In essence, Judicial Deradicalization is an intellectual history of
the Supreme Court's Wagner Act cases during the period from con-
stitutional validation of the statute in 193729 until the beginning of
World War II.3° The case analysis is set against the backdrop of
26. See infra text accompanying notes 317-43.
27. As will appear, I have subsequently recast some of the formulations contained in
this overview of Judicial Deradicalization.
28. NLRA, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
167 (1982)).
29. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
30. The last case from this period treated in detail is Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
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political and jurisprudential issues that arose during the Great
Depression.
I began with a portrayal of certain enigmas posed by the Wag-
ner Act itself. The story of how the NLRA came to be enacted-the
industrial problems that gave rise to the need for legislation, the
contribution of earlier legislation and the experiences of the labor
agencies under section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA)" and Public Resolution 44,2 the role of Senator Wagner
and other influentials-is well-known,3 3 and I spent little time on it.
Yet this often-told, "textbook" version does not begin to grapple
with fundamental questions of the political, as distinct from the
purely legislative, history of the Wagner Act. As William
Leuchtenburg aptly put it:
The Wagner Act was one of the most drastic legislative in-
novations of the decade . . . . No one, then or later, fully
understood why Congress passed so radical a law with so
little opposition and by such overwhelming margins. A bill
which lacked the support of the administration until the
very end, and which could expect sturdy conservative op-
position, it moved through Congress with the greatest of
ease. One observer later wrote: "We who believed in the
Act were dizzy with watching a 200-to-I shot come up from
the outside."-3 4
What were the politics of the Wagner Act? What political
forces sustained it through the early years of bitter employer and
judicial opposition? What worker aspirations did it stir? What fears
in management? By what process did business turn from outright,
sometimes violent disobedience of the law, toward grudging recog-
nition that industrial unionism and collective bargaining had arrived
to stay? And how did employers and unions adjust to the new in-
dustrial relations system? These are the broad background ques-
313 U.S. 177 (1941). During the period treated, the Supreme Court decided over 30
Wagner Act cases, which I discussed. Of these, Finkin treats only four.
31. Pub. L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 198 (1933), declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
32. 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., as implemented by Exec. Order No. 6763, (June 29, 1934),
Sept. 1934 CSA 83, reprinted in Presidential Executive Orders, Oct. 14, 1933 to December 18,
1934 (microfilm).
33. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1950);
J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1974); D. Sipe, A
Moment of the State: The Enactment of the National Labor Relations Act 1935 (1981)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa.).
34. W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT & THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, at
151-52 (1963) (citation omitted).
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tions with which my article was concerned and which the
conventional Wagner Act histories do not fully answer.
To be sure, any understanding of how the New Deal contrib-
uted to the emergence of the postwar labor relations system turns
ultimately on large issues of politics, economics, and working class
organization and culture, that is, problems of social history that I
noted to be well beyond the scope of my paper (K:268). My goal
was to focus on a small piece of the puzzle, namely, the contribution
of law, if any, to the emergence of contemporary patterns in labor
relations and working class politics (K:268). My inquiry was fueled
by the thought that, whereas the 1935 Act made an enormous con-
tribution to industrial democracy, it is also true that the labor law
system that has evolved in the subsequent half-century places
distinct limitations on industrial democracy and on the growth of
the labor movement itself.
The collective bargaining system, I argued, presents two con-
tradictory aspects. In its democratic aspect, collective bargaining
provides an institutional framework for employees to aggregate
their voices and experience their collective power, to participate in
influencing the decisions that affect their industrial lives, and to en-
hance their working conditions and pride and dignity on-the-job. In
this aspect, I extolled the Wagner Act as an extraordinary historical
achievement of and for working people. 35 But I also argued that
other features of the evolving collective bargaining system have an
"institutionalizing" aspect that limits and channels workplace con-
flict. In this facet, the legal and institutional structure of collective
bargaining puts limitations on worker participation in workplace
(and union) governance, regulates and formalizes employee con-
certed activity, and legitimates hierarchy and management control
regarding both day-to-day and long-term decisionmaking. The
question was whether the mind-set reflected in the initial Wagner
Act jurisprudence contributed in any way to the cramped and re-
strictive aspects of the emerging model of industrial democracy.
This question prompted inquiry into the nature of the indus-
trial relations system contemplated within legal discourse during the
early Wagner Act years. Four main issues surfaced.
1. What relationship between public and private power was
deemed appropriate under the new statutory scheme? I called this
the issue of "contractualism" because it often appeared in cases in
which contractual rights were given primacy over statutory rights.
35. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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My argument was that the contractualist trend unfolded at the ex-
pense of participatory and concerted activity rights of employees.
An example is NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co.,36 holding unpro-
tected certain strike activity during the term of a collective bargain-
ing contract. The Act's protection of employee concerted activity
37
was held subordinate to the employer's interest in enforcing its
contract.
2. What model of workplace democracy emerged in Wagner
Act thinking? In particular, what degree of direct, day-to-day, rank-
and-file participation was contemplated in the new system of indus-
trial relations? I argued that, though the Act's sponsors conceived
industrial democracy primarily in traditional representational terms,
many American workers whose shopfloor concerted activity was es-
sential to enforcing the Wagner Act had broader aspirations. Re-
garding the debate with Professor Finkin, the key issue relating to
worker participation has to do with the proper assessment of the
1930's sit-down strikes, and with the emergence within NLRAjuris-
prudence of a distinction between "responsible" and "illegitimate"
forms of worker militancy. I argued that the condemnation of cer-
tain forms of rank-and-file activity, in moral and political-even
more importantly than legal-terms, was in tension with workers'
efforts to gain control over the decisions that affect their industrial
lives.
3. The third issue concerned the new role of government. In-
creased federal oversight of business is generally understood to be
one of the lasting consequences of the New Deal, and everyone
agrees that, under the NLRA, government undertook an unprece-
dented role in labor relations. What most people take for granted
today was not so easily explained or accepted fifty years ago, partic-
ularly in the business community. The New Deal revolutionized
American thinking about the proper role and responsibilities of gov-
ernment. This conceptual transformation was not primarily the
work of theorists. It emerged in a variety of "practical" ways-new
legislation, shifts in party allegiances, adjustments in business prac-
tice, and so on. I argued that the early Wagner Act cases, specifi-
cally those articulating the so-called "public right doctrine, '"38
constituted an important example of this "practical political
36. 306 U.S. 332 (1939). See infra notes 204-20 and accompanying text.
37. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) ("Employees shall have the right to self-
organization . . . and to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .. ").
38. The concept is defined and discussed at K:310-18.
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theorizing" through which significant elites in American society ad-
justed their thinking to modern governmental reality, thereby to
some extent bringing that reality about.
Moreover, I argued that this public right doctrine, the notion
that a neutral government stands above the "private" conflict of
management and labor, had philosophical and practical implications
that undermined the growth of labor militancy. As Professor Sum-
mers has eloquently shown, the predominant modern posture of
governmental neutrality is a departure from the 1935 congressional
goal of affirmatively encouraging collective bargaining and, hence,
union growth. 39 Though it is easy to see this departure in Taft-
Hartley,4° I attempted to trace the roots of the development to the
late 1930's.
4. I found in the early cases a tendency to handcuff the Board
in remedying unfair labor practices and at the same time to permit
employers to deploy their economic power in ways that inhibit em-
ployee concerted activity. These tendencies have had a pronounced
and destructive impact on the fortunes of organized labor in the
postwar period. The growth of union organization and collective
bargaining are essential preconditions to the emergence of more ad-
vanced forms of industrial democracy and of more politically and
socially conscious union militancy. The high points of CIO social
unionism coincided with the period of the most rapid and wide-
spread growth in unionization. The same forces, including legal
constraints, that have kept the labor movement a beseiged minority
in American life tend to reinforce the more conservative, business-
unionist orientation within labor.
As I was careful to note,'4 the labor movement scored impres-
sive victories in the legal arena during the late 1930's, and NLRA
protection was essential to turning around numerous losing battles
in auto, steel, and elsewhere. On the other hand, the four trends I
discerned-the preference for private contractual (or property)
rights over employee statutory rights; for formalized, representa-
tional workplace democracy over a more direct, participatory de-
mocracy; for governmental neutrality rather than a public
39. See Summers, supra note 6, at 17.
40. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV.
1, 4 (1947) ("The [Taft-Hartley] amendments represent an abandonment of the policy
of affirmatively encouraging the spread of collective bargaining. ... ). Note, how-
ever, that Congress in 1947 did not delete the language of NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1982), declaring it to be the policy of the United States to "encourag[e] the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining."
41. See, e.g., K:318-19.
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commitment to collective bargaining; and the incipient legal re-
straints on union growth-introduced a countervailing pressure
within the law. Together these mutually reinforcing trends were
symptomatic of caution and conservativism rather than openness
and experimentation in industrial jurisprudence.
Moreover, I argued that the legal outcomes embodying these
developments were not clearly commanded by the text or legislative
history42 of the Act. In broad outline, many of these rulings were
plausible or even straightforward readings of the congressional in-
tent. But they were not for the most part required or even necessarily
suggested by the statute's history. Choices--political choices-had
to be made and were made in the early interpretation of the Act.
Stripped to essentials, my dispute with Professor Finkin turns on
whether these trends in fact occurred; if so, whether they were le-
gally and politically inevitable; and whether they were desirable
from the standpoint of industrial democracy.
The controversy is significant because these components of la-
bor jurisprudence did not abruptly disappear in 1941. In later arti-
cles I argued that values and assumptions found in the early Wagner
Act cases cast a long shadow over postwar legal and industrial rela-
tions thinking and practice. While not their "cause" in any deter-
ministic sense, this world-view certainly lent intellectual and moral
support to the "institutionalizing" and restrictive aspects of contem-
porary collective bargaining. Reconstruction of the mindset will
shed light on certain fundamental and continuing difficulties in the
labor law system.
A few examples will suffice to underscore the point. I have al-
ready noted the durable potency of the "public right doctrine"
evoked in Professor Summer's comments on governmental neutral-
ity toward collective bargaining. Likewise, I have argued elsewhere
that modern legal doctrine places significant and unwarranted limi-
tations on employee participation in enterprise governance. 43
It is now widely believed, at least on the union side, that limita-
tions on the scope and structure of NLRA remedies make the Board
unable effectively to combat the spiraling increase in employer
42. In preparing this Article I have relied upon NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (1949) (facsimile
reprint by Wm. S. Hein & Co., n.d.) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. This
compilation is divided into two "volumes" each with two "parts."
43. See, e.g., Klare, Yeshiva Decision, supra note 24, at 111-20; Klare, Critical Theory,
supra note 24, at 78-79; Klare, Ideology, supra note 24, at 454-55, 459-65. Professor Atle-
son explores the hierarchical attitudes implicit in this area of the law in J. ATLESON, supra
note 13, at 11-35, 50-53, 84-96.
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unfair labor practices. Indeed, the ill-fated 1978 Labor Reform
Bill44 was inspired in part by widespread concern that the Board's
ineffectual remedial powers have directly contributed to the break-
down of the certification and first-contract bargaining processes.
The jurisprudential foundations of the cramped scope of Board
remedies can be traced to the notion established in the early Wag-
ner Act cases that Labor Act remedies are to be "remedial, not puni-
tive." 45 That is, remedies are fashioned with an eye toward making
unfair labor practice victims whole, not, or not also, toward maxi-
mum deterrence of misconduct. 46 Professor Weiler has recently ar-
gued that in addition to the baneful practical consequences
stemming from remedies limitations, the timid attitudes and in-
stincts basic to this area of the law have imposed unconscious inhibi-
tions on the thinking of would-be reformers. 47
Finally, the postwar period has witnessed a systematic trend to-
ward curtailment of employees' rights to engage in concerted activ-
ity. Most notable are the statutory prohibitions of secondary
boycotts and recognitional picketing introduced, respectively, in
1947 and 1959.48 To these curbs must be added a long, and to my
mind, tragic list of Board and judge-made exceptions to employee
section 7 rights.49 To be sure, these complex and varied develop-
ments cannot be hinged solely to the jurisprudential themes I cited
in Judicial Deradicalization. Nonetheless, there are connections to be
drawn, as the discussions of Sands Manufacturing and NLRB v. Fan-
steel Metallurgical Corp.50 hopefully will show.5' In these cases the
Supreme Court adumbrated early intellectual underpinnings for the
erosive process through which section 7 rights have been devalued
and sacrificed to other, private interests, such as employers'
44. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., ist. Sess. (1977).
45. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 208 (1941) (opinion of Stone, J.);
accord Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
46. Consistent with this emphasis, the Court held, for example, that amounts a
worker inexcusably fails to earn are deductible from back pay awards to employees dis-
charged in violation of the Act. See Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 197-98. I argued at K:334
that this rule undercuts effective enforcement of the Act.
47. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1787-1804.
48. NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982)(secondary boycotts) (inserted in
the Act by 61 Stat. 141 (1947)); NLRA § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1982) (inserted
by 73 Stat. 544 (1959)).
49. As I have elsewhere argued, much of the case law of § 7 is concerned with how
employees lose its protection. See Klare, Public/Private, supra note 24, at 1403 n.196; infra
notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
50. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
51. See infra notes 204-208 & 245-58 and accompanying text.
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interests as property owners. Likewise, the ideal of freedom of con-
tract was powerfully invoked to undermine the statutory plan to
restructure the economic and institutional context in which labor-
management bargaining takes place, with consequences that con-
tinue today to impede collective bargaining. 52
B. Methodological Issues53
Judicial Deradicalization was a rough hewn and experimental ef-
fort to pursue an approach to the sociology of law called the "theory
of legal consciousness.- 54 The article itself was a preliminary effort
to work out the concept.5 5 Additionally, I drew connections be-
52. See infra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
53. Professor Finkin largely ignores the theoretical concerns and methodological
issues to which my article was addressed and thereby provides a misleading and
unbalanced portrayal of its contents. Indeed, at times he reveals uncertainty as to what
my methodological objectives were. He says, on the one hand, that I do not "suggest
anything out of the ordinary with respect to how one decides what historical facts are, or
how one analyzes a case .... ." (F:24; cf. F:25 ("traditional framework")). Yet
elsewhere he states that I use an approach to legal analysis that is "fundamentally
different" from the conventional one (F:45).
At points, Finkin acknowledges his insecure grasp on the methodological
concerns at issue. Over 60 pages into his critique, he casually reveals some doubt as to
whether he has employed an appropriate epistemological framework in assessing my
work (F:84-85 n.278). He writes: "If something of the latter [i.e., the development of a
.comprehensive sociopolitical theory'] is what Klare and Stone have in mind, then it is
conceivable that their writings would not be amenable" to the standards of truth he
employs. Id. (referring to a positivist epistemology described at F:84-85). I read this as
an admission that'Professor Finkin is not really sure he has understood what this debate
is about or how it fits into contemporary controversies in legal and social theory. He
certainly makes no attempt to situate the debate in the context of the pertinent
theoretical literature. See supra notes 14 & 24; infra notes 54, 55 & 58. The stridency of
his attacks on my scholarship seem particularly inappropriate in this light.
54. See, e.g., K:268-70, 292. There were at the time few examples of scholarship pur-
suing this approach. I cited Duncan Kennedy's pathbreaking unpublished manuscript,
The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought, 1865-1940 (1975), see K:278 n.43, and
placed a copy on file with MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW. A portion has since been published,
see Kennedy, Toward An Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical
Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, 3 RESEARCH L. & Soc. 3 (1980). I also relied on
published and unpublished work by Morton Horwitz and Roberto Unger. A quite dis-
tinct source of my ideas was the tradition of "Western Marxism," the study of which had
been my field of specialty prior to law school. See K:268 n.12, 321 n.199, 335 n.276 &
337 nn.279-80 (citing sources); id. 321 n.200 (citing my book on the subject, THE UN-
KNOWN DIMENSION: EUROPEAN MARXISM SINCE LENIN (D. Howard & K. Klare eds.
1972)).
55. In the years since, a number of scholars have developed the concept and related
approaches. It is not suggested that they were influenced by my article or the sources I
cited. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Frug, The City As A
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Gabel, supra note 17; Gabel, Intention and
Structure In Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L.
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tween the new Labor Act decisions and the jurisprudential debates
engendered by the emergence of Legal Realism. 56 That is, a central
purpose of my article was to study the contribution of the NLRA
cases to the development of modern public law thinking generally.
The idea of "legal consciousness" was suggested as a way to get
beyond the primary available modes of explaining legal decisions,
namely formalism and instrumentalism. In essence, "formalism"
explains legal outcomes in terms of deduction from or "reasoned
elaboration" of rules. "Instrumentalism" explains legal outcomes
in terms of the desire to serve or defend specified social interests,
values or purposes. I argued that neither pristine reason, nor
unadorned political interest, nor even an ad hoc combination of the
two, adequately explains legal outcomes, or at any rate, not the out-
comes in these cases. Rather, logic and interest were filtered or
"mediated" through the justices' emerging understanding of labor
relations and of New Deal politics. I tried to reconstruct their con-
ceptual universe or world-view: their assumptions, hidden and
overt, about work, organization, and the nature and function of law;
their political values; their sense of industrial justice. At a certain
point, a vision of this kind can take on a life of its own, shaping the
way decisionmakers and other actors in the legal process view their
choices and, to some extent, determining case outcomes that do not
make sense in conventional legal terms (K:292).5"
REV. 601 (1977); Gordon, Histories, supra note 19; Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979); Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 24, at 18; Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2
LAw & INEQUALITY 1 (1984); Presser, supra note 14; Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984). Additionally, I continued to
develop the concept in my own work. See, e.g., Klare, Public/Private, supra note 24; Klare,
Contracts, supra note 24, at 876 n.2 (defining "legal consciousness"); Klare, Law-Making,
supra note 24.
56. See, e.g., K:275-80, 309-10, 325-36.
57. I defined these terms at K:275-79 and in Klare, Contracts, supra note 24, at 877
n.3, 878 n.4 & 881 n.20.
58. See also Klare, Contracts, supra note 24, at 876 n.2. One of the best presentations
of this argument has been written by one of my strongest critics. See Trubek, supra note
55, at 588-600.
One of the reasons why Professor Finkin's critique is so misleading is that he
largely disregards the differences between our respective methodologies, and he simply
tests my claims according to analytical criteria internal to his approach. See supra note
53. His interest is in examining the cases in light of the traditional tools of legal reason-
ing-deduction from precedent, analysis of legislative intent, application of "policy con-
siderations;" and so on. Thus, for example, he is preoccupied with whether legal
arguments are "holding" or "dictum" (see, e.g., F:36). And at one point he takes the
extreme view that it is inappropriate to assess a highly important Supreme Court opin-
ion in light of the background social and political realities because the latter were not
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It is important to emphasize that the effort to reconstruct the
"consciousness" or world-view expressed in labor law would bejus-
tified even were I to concede (I do not) that legal values and dis-
course have no detectable influence on non-legal culture, that is,
even if the ideological power of legal ideas is strictly internal to legal
culture itself. This is because, so I argued, legal consciousness
structures the field of significant decisionmaking and thereby chan-
nels the outcomes of the legal process.
However, I additionally asserted that the Court's outlook on la-
bor matters had significance beyond the legal arena. This argument
was perhaps the least refined and most problematical of my article,
and it continues to be the focus of sophisticated criticism of my
work.5 9 Judicial Deradicalization has been read as arguing that the vi-
sion of collective bargaining embedded in the law directly im-
pressed itself upon the consciousness of actors in the field-
managers, union officials, workers-resulting in the cooptation of
labor militancy. It is as though some readers thought I had sug-
gested or implied that miners and auto workers regularly sit around
during lunch breaks discussing advance sheets of United States Re-
ports. I suggested nothing so crude.60 Nonetheless, my article was
perhaps less clear than it ought to have been on whether and how
particular elite ideologies spread to and permeate other areas of
elite culture and, eventually in some cases, working class culture as
well.
My claims were less simplistic than the crude reading they
discussed in the petitioner's brief (F:30). What Professor Finkin cannot decipher with
the tools of "legal reasoning," he refers to the catch-all explanatory category of "lawyer-
ing." For example, he purports to explain the important and problematical policy
choice made in NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939), by reference to the claim
that the employer "out-lawyered" the Board (F:40). On the issue of lawyering, see infra
note 102 and accompanying text. Sands Mfg. is explored infra, notes 204-20 and accom-
panying text.
I would assume that my claims should be tested, at least as an initial matter, in
light of the methodological framework I set for myself. I was interested in an entirely
different layer of meaning in case law than Professor Finkin, namely what it teaches
about the underlying attitudes and consciousness of significant legal actors. From this
point of view, "dictum" may be as important as "holding"; myth may be as important as
insight; the unsaid may be as important as the written or spoken word. This approach is
not entirely unfamiliar in American legal scholarship, and it is also attuned to major
twentieth century developments in social thought, e.g., psychoanalysis, cultural anthro-
pology, phenomenology, structuralism, and Marxism.
59. See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 55, at 610-15.
60. Therefore I do not think that those readers are correct in deriving from the criti-
cal approach a simple "transmission belt" model of the dissemination of legal ideas. See,
e.g., id. at 613-14.
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received. 6 ' They seem to me still defensible when accurately stated.
Several theories about how legal ideas and values are disseminated
to and influence the broader political culture were implicit in the
article. I suggested, first, that along with countless other instances
of "practical theorizing," judicial thinking influenced the prevailing
mentality of political elites, perhaps including the high-ranking labor
leaders who had moved into working relationships with the
Roosevelt Administration by the early 1940's.62 Also, by contrast to
radical political theories grounded on the notion of class power,
images of governmental neutrality developed in labor law indirectly
provided intellectual underpinnings for the emerging "pluralist"
theory through which significant postwar thinkers made sense of
their times.63 Second, I argued that "legal world views" influence
the outcomes in cases, shaping the development of the law and
thereby influencing the politics of and balance of forces in the work-
place (K:292). The philosophical underpinnings of case law may
long outlive its particular context.64 Thirdly, a highly "legalized"
labor relations system has evolved under the NLRA, which demands
the constant attention of union officials to legal issues and cases.
Legal images of collective bargaining may combine and coalesce
into an integrated, convincing set of beliefs about entitlement, obli-
gation, and equity in the workplace. These beliefs may then be in-
ternalized and absorbed by labor leaders at all levels, influencing
their actions. To the extent that this is true, that is, to the extent that
legal discourse informs or encourages widely held beliefs that ex-
isting institutions are either necessary or desirable, legal discourse
"legitimates" established arrangements and constrains efforts to
61. See, e.g., K:268 (denying direct causal links between court cases and changes in
social order; suggesting more indirect and complex relationship between legal culture
and social outcomes).
62. With his characteristic grace, Bob Gordon has "restated" this aspect of my posi-
tion as follows:
Klare wouldn't claim to have done anything more than to explore a fractional
contribution to the formation of conventional ways of thinking among the elites
about "the labor problem." The Justices borrowed from, and thus hardened by
their authoritative example, some of the prevailing mentalities of their time. In
conjunction with hundreds of other acts of consciousness-formation, these set
the agenda for the ways in which many decision-makers in that generation
framed issues having to do with labor. If one wanted to expand on Klare's
work, one could look for other manifestations of the mentality he describes on
the Court in other institutional settings, as well as for deviating and opposing
mentalities.
Gordon, Histories, supra note 19, at 113 n. 124.
63. See K:310-18.
64. See, e.g., infra notes 245-60 and accompanying text.
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forge alternative practices and institutions .65
C. A Retrospective Assessment of Judicial Deradicalization
As I will shortly demonstrate, Professor Finkin proved unable
to identify the weaknesses and limitations of my article. This does
not mean that I am not acutely aware of them. My paper no doubt
contained many difficulties, although not the sort of basic research
error Finkin charges. Not surprisingly for a first trial, the theoretical
model was not fully thought out or tested. I did not adequately
identify the "transition mechanisms" between legal discourse and
the broader political culture. I have been slow to demonstrate how
law-generated or law-influenced visions of industrial democracy
have had an impact on the thinking and instincts of labor leaders
and/or rank-and-file activists. Based upon anecdotal historical and
sociological evidence and upon my experiences as a practicing labor
lawyer, I continue to believe that the theory is helpful, that it taps
into an important social reality, and that it sheds light on significant
legal issues. Nonetheless, Judicial Deradicalization itself did not at-
tempt to substantiate some of the more problematical hypotheses it
advanced in this area.
At points I blurred the distinction between the "ideological"
and "practical" dimensions of the unfolding case law, thereby exag-
gerating the historical impact of law and the legal process. My de-
scription of the emerging "legal consciousness" was insufficiently
rich and textured even as intellectual history, let alone as social his-
tory. I downplayed crucial legal developments outside the Supreme
Court, e.g., at the Board and in collective bargaining. I did not ade-
quately develop the interplay between legal and other intellectual
currents, e.g., management thinking (both academic and opera-
tional), the views of labor leaders, political theory, and so on.
In broader terms, I can now see that I exaggerated the impor-
tance of the theory of "corporate liberalism," a perspective on
American history that influenced me some years ago. As a result, I
did not fully absorb the meaning and importance of either new de-
velopments in labor history or advances in business history. I did
not even appreciate some of the implications of my own method,
which soon after Judicial Deradicalization would lead me to abandon
the neo-Marxist theory of "relative autonomy."66 These omissions
65. See Klare, Public/Private, supra note 24, at 1358-59, 1415-22; Trubek, supra note
55, at 595-600.
66. See K:269 n.13. I later criticized the "relative autonomy" formulation as residu-
ally deterministic, see generally Klare, Law-Making, supra note 24, at 125-28, and began to
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combined to introduce an unfortunate ambiguity into the central
terms "radical" and "deradicalize." This reflected an undeveloped
aspect of my thinking, not just my written expression, and I will try
to resolve the ambiguity here.
67
In addition to these problems, two substantive points about the
Wagner Act require clarification. I did not advance these positions,
but may have failed to disclaim them with sufficient emphasis,
thereby opening the article to misreading. One point has to do with
my attack on "contractualism"; it is dealt with in detail in a later
section.
6 8
Second, some readers came away with the impression that I was
insufficiently appreciative of the Wagner Act and the achievements
of modern collective bargaining. It has taken me a long time to give
any credence to this objection, since I believe and said that the Wag-
ner Act was an incalculable forward step toward industrial democ-
racy. I extolled the Wagner Act as an extraordinary political
achievement of "imaginative, courageous" workers who risked so
much to make industrial unionism a reality, and I said that the Wag-
ner Act and collective bargaining allowed "millions of workers [to]
experience[] a new sense of participation and dignity" (K:266).69
Nonetheless, I have learned to appreciate the need in writing about
the NLRA from a critical perspective to be more explicit about cer-
tain essentials I sometimes took for granted. I hope this reflects a
maturation of my thinking as well as my writing. In the years since
Judicial Deradicalization I have consistently and explictly offset my crit-
icisms with a recognition of the achievements of collective bargain-
ing. For example, I have described the Wagner Act as "a major
advance in the moral development of the American people,"' 70 and
"an exceptional historic achievement."' 7' I have written that
work with the notion of social life as a "constructed totality," see Klare, Critical Theory,
supra note 24, at 65-67; Klare, Law-Making, supra note 24, at 128-33. Discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of this reply.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18.
69. Seen in this light, Professor Finkin's baseless canard that Stone and I "deni-
grate[] an achievement of American workers. . . [and] denigrate as well the perception
and intelligence of the men and women who comprise the system" (F:89-90) (citation
omitted) is deplorable. True, I criticized the limitations of the existing system, but only
because I believe in collective bargaining and industrial democracy, not because I am
cynical about it. As Finkin apparently does not understand, it is perfectly possible to
believe in collective bargaining without uncritically celebrating every aspect of the status
quo.
70. Klare, Critical Theory, supra note 24, at 82.
71. Id.
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"working people have indelibly imprinted the law of labor relations
with their aspirations, values, and struggles," 72 and that labor law
has therefore been imbued by popular struggle with "enduring and
emancipatory values." 73 In recent work I have been at pains to de-
scribe the law of collective bargaining as a complex balance of
emancipatory as well as conservatizing tendencies.
7 4 Professor
Finkin's claim that I believe "the system is all wrong" (F:89) is sim-
ply without foundation.
III. THE INTENT OF THE WAGNER ACT
Professor Finkin elected not to engage me on the terrain of the-
oretical controversy or methodological debate. Had he done so, he
might have made out a case. But this would have required an ex-
plicit theorizing effort inconsistent with his goal of defending an
unexamined doctrinal traditionalism. Instead, he stakes his case on
the narrower ground of claimed errors in my legal and historical
interpretation. To readers who are unfamiliar with Judicial Deradical-
ization, his critique may have a surface convincingness, but any such
plausibility quickly evaporates when his description of my position is
compared with the views I actually advanced. This is particularly
true with respect to the basic issue of congressional intent in enact-
ing the Wagner Act.
A. The Lawyer's Concept of Statutory Intent
According to Professor Finkin, I believe that Congress in-
tended, in the lawyer's sense of the word, to impose sweeping, radi-
cal changes on the American economic order and that a radical
interpretation of the Act is compelled by the legislative history. In
other words, Finkin takes some of the values I believe in, such as
greater worker control over the labor process, and says that I claim
these were the values Congress held in 1935. Supposedly I go on to
claim that the Supreme Court violated and frustrated this "correct"
or "true" meaning of congressional intent to inaugurate a sweeping
worker takeover of industry. For example, Finkin says that in my
view "[t]he Wagner Act was radical, and the Supreme Court dis-
torted it for co-optative, reformist ends" (F:55). And he sums up his
case by saying: "Klare's piece rests entirely on an unsupported (and
72. Id. at 65.
73. Id. at 66.
74. See, e.g., Kare, Yeshiva Decision, supra note 24, at 99-100, 124-25; Klare, Critical
Theory, supra note 24, at 73-76; Klare, Ideology, supra note 24, at 453-55; Klare, Quest, supra
note 24, at 166.
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unsupportable) assumption about the supposed radicalism of the
Wagner Act" (K:85).75
The only thing that is unsupportable is Professor Finkin's de-
scription of my article. I did not claim that Congress "intended" a
radical interpretation of the Act. It baffles me that Finkin imagines
he can convince anyone that an author such as myself, with intellec-
tual roots in the neo-Marxist tradition, would begin analysis on the
assumption that Congress tried to overthrow capitalism in 1935.
After all, one of the stated purposes of my article was to develop a
theory of the role of the legal process in preserving or reproducing capi-
talist social relations (see K:338-39). The intellectual framework and
neo-Marxist tenor of the article run counter to the naive view of
Congress's supposed socialist aspirations that Finkin places over my
signature.
Moreover, my words plainly contradict Professor Finkin's ver-
sion. True, I said that one could plausibly derive an anti-capitalist
interpretation of the Act, but this was a reference to employers 'percep-
tions and worst fears (K:266-67, 285), which I described as exagger-
ated (K:267).76  I continue to believe that such employer
75. This line appears throughout Professor Finkin's article. When it falls, as it must,
so does much of the rest of his critique. Variations on the basic strawman are:
a. Klare posits a world where the workplace is governed by "par-
ticipatory democracy," where decisions about work processes are made by
spontaneous worker self-activity; in short, a utopian, anti-hierarchical world of
work in which neither bosses nor union officials have much, if any, power of
control. The Wagner Act, Klare argues, could have been read to usher in this
world. But this reading, which he claims would be consistent with the Act's
intendment, was thwarted by decisions of the Court . ...
(F:25).
b. F:36-37 (Finkin speculates on what a "truly radical, anti-capitalist
reading" of the Act would be).
c. F:44-45 (Finkin attributes to me the view that the legislative history
favors a "radical interpretation" and therefore expresses surprise when he
finds that I actually took the view that the legislative history was inconclusive).
d. F:47 (Klare supposedly believes that Congress's intentions were
only ostensibly reformist but in fact embraced the aspirations of the most radi-
cal elements of the working class).
At one point Professor Finkin's characterization of my views veers off into the
absurd. Without citation, he attributes to me the view that the proper procedure for
statutory interpretation would be for the Court to "turn[] to the unarticulated yearnings
of a radical element within the working class," (F:45), and then to "attribute[] to the
statute the desires of that group, apparently for no better reason than that the group
desired it-and that Klare approves of its aspirations" (F:45-46). Professor Finkin is
simply making this up as he goes along. I never said anything of the kind. The absurdity
of the claim is compounded when Professor Finkin later attributes to me the view that
business attitudes should govern statutory interpretation (F:46 n.93).
76. See also K:288 n.74 (business rhetoric "sometimes quite exaggerated"). Note that
there are actually two points here: that employers harbored such fears, and that the fears
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perceptions had a basis in the Act as seen within their frame of refer-
ence, and Finkin adduces no evidence to the contrary. His article is
marked throughout by a confusion between what Congress intended
and what employers feared.
As for Congress's political intentions, I never suggested they
were other than liberal reformist. In fact, I criticized conventional
historiography, perhaps incorrectly, for underestimating the con-
servative implications of New Deal reform.7 7 Regarding Congress's
"intent" in the lawyer's sense of the term, I did not say that it was
"radical" but rather that it was unclear on many of the key issues that
arose later on.
B. Intent vs. Potential: The Troublesome Concept of "Radical" Change
None of this is even slightly inconsistent with arguing, as I did,
that the statute was potentially "radical" in its impact. As will ap-
pear, there are several distinct meanings of the word "radical," and
perhaps it would be helpful at this juncture to clarify its various
connotations.
The first and perhaps most prosaic is that "radical" simply
means "large," "important," or "profound" changes. Everyone
seems to agree that the NLRA was "radical" in this sense,78 includ-
ing Professor Finkin.79 A second meaning is the one Finkin attrib-
had a basis. Professor Finkin denies both points. As to the former, the evidence, includ-
ing his own, is incontrovertibly against him. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying
text. The latter is the more controversial point, discussed at infra, notes 183-89 and ac-
companying text.
77. K:267, 273-74, 275 n.33 ("profoundly conservative implications of New Deal la-
bor law reform").
78. Many authors use the phrase this way to capture changes the Wagner Act helped
bring about and about which there is no real dispute, for example, the unprecedented
role of the federal government in regulating labor relations and the rise of industrial
unionism. For example, James MacGregor Burns described the Wagner Act as "the
most radical legislation passed during the New Deal, in the sense that it altered funda-
mentally the nation's politics by vesting massive economic and political power in organ-
ized labor." F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
18 (1974) (quotingJames MacGregor Burns). Cf. W. GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE
TO THE AFL xvii (1960) (describing emergence of mass-production unionism as a "fun-
damental, almost revoluntionary change in the power relationships of American
society").
79. F:47 (NLRA "can be considered 'epochmaking' (or 'radical') in the sense that,
for the first time, the law firmly allied government with the right to form unions and
engage in collective bargaining in the private sector at large"). Interestingly, main-
stream thinkers firmly cling to this position, while simultaneously arguing that the Wag-
ner Act merely summed up and codified long developing principles of public policy
upon which which a national "consensus" had emerged. See infra text accompanying
notes 147-48.
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utes to me. In this sense, "radical" means consciously antagonistic
to and designed to overthrow the established order. For example,
in Finkin's strawman, a "radical" interpretation would be one seeing
the NLRA as aimed to replace capitalist property and work relations
with participatory workplace democracy, in a word, to transform
capitalism into a totally different social system (see F:25).
Before turning to the sense in which I used the phrase "radi-
cal," it is worth noting a curious feature of Professor Finkin's under-
standing of the term. His analysis indicates that he is committed to
the view that there is a kind of objective logic built into statutory
interpretation. He seems to assume that there is a true "conven-
tional" or "liberal" interpretation (or zone of such interpretations)
for every legal problem, and also a true "radical" interpretation.
(Presumably there is a true "conservative" interpretation as well,
although we don't hear much about that.) And, of course, Finkin
believes that one of these interpretations is "correct." Thus, he re-
peatedly applies himself to the task of figuring out (before demolish-
ing) what the "truly radical, 'anticapitalist' reading" of the Act would
be.8 0 That is, Finkin embraces precisely the sort of reductionism
that I identified as a weakness in both conventional legal formalism
and in Marxist sociology."'
The notion that there is a sole "true" interpretation of a legal
problem from each political perspective is repugnant to all that I
wrote. Finkin's view that there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween political ideology and legal interpretation, a position errone-
80. F:37 (emphasis added).
81. A striking illustration of the reductionist approach appears in Judge Posner's re-
cent opinion in NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983). One issue there
was whether certain employees were "supervisors" within the meaning of the Act. See
NLRA § 2(3), (11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (1982) (defining supervisors and excluding
them from Act's protections). In the course of resolving that question, Judge Posner
defended the statutory exemption by arguing that, if supervisors were not excluded,
"[w]e might become a nation of worker-controlled firms." 705 F.2d at 1465. He adds
that "[slyndicalism is not the theory of the amended National Labor Relations Act."
The objectivist fallacy here is that, even assuming Judge Posner is correct on the last
point, it does not inexorably follow from "capitalist" or "non-syndicalist" premises that
supervisors may not engage in collective bargaining. Supervisors and managerial per-
sonnel bargain collectively in several capitalist legal systems. The "non-radical" Wag-
ner Act Congress itself did not think to exclude supervisors explicitly, and the Supreme
Court actually upheld supervisory bargaining in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947).
A similarly superficial appeal to the supposedly objective logic of institutional
systems appears in NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.)
(employer speech found by NLRB to be coercive is held lawful on the ground that it
merely embodied objective analysis of allegedly predictable consequences of unioniza-
tion in a competitive market).
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ously attributed to me, typifies what Roberto Unger has called
"objectivism" or the "logic of social types." This is the idea of "an
inherent and distinct legal structure to each type of social organiza-
tion."8 2 ("Reductionism," such as, e.g., the view that a particular
social order like capitalism requires a legal order of a certain type, is
a species of "objectivism.") This is the position the Critical Legal
Studies movement has attacked, not supported. One of the key
premises of Judicial Deradicalization is that social structure does not
entirely predetermine the nature of particular legal and institutional
arrangements in the workplace. What I most hoped to show was the
enormous degree of openness and flexibility (and hence of possibil-
ity) in particular institutional contexts such as labor law battles.
In contrast to the objectivist view (that social life is the working
out of a "deep logic" or a set of metaprinciples of social organiza-
tion), the theoretical perspective informingJudicial Deradicalization is
that the social system is a construction of the countless institutional
and personal contexts we create and inhabit. Though these con-
texts are, of course, framed and patterned by prevailing political and
cultural forces, it is likewise true that the accumulation of these par-
ticularized social contexts gives shape and meaning to social life.83
This perspective is connected to the third meaning of "radical,"
the primary one employed in my article. Its initial focus is the
countless "small" contexts of daily life, including struggles for
power in the workplace. To put a fine point on it, the issue was not
whether the workers would take ownership of the means of produc-
tion. The issue was much more concrete, focused, and nuanced:
Would workers gain some measure of control over and humanize
the conditions of their industrial lives, such as the speed of the line,
discipline and lay-off decisions, when strikes would be called, how
they would be settled, and so on? "Radical" in this context means
challenging rather than reinforcing the basic assumptions and
power relations of workplace institutions and social relationships. It
means, in particular, questioning and undermining rather than forti-
fying the hierarchical assumptions that inform the organization of
work. It means empowering workers by unfreezing existing social
contexts, relationships and organizational forms and opening pos-
sibilities for workers to participate in examining and revising the in-
stitutional structures within which they work and govern
82. Unger, supra note 18, at 568.
83. See generally id. at 663-65 (describing as basic axes of reconstruction of social the-
ory the shaped character of social life and the denial of metastructure of historical
development).
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themselves.84 It means engaging workers in, and nurturing their in-
herent capacities for, democratic self-governance on-the-job. I be-
lieve that given its political context, the Wagner Act had "radical
potential," in this sense of the word.8 5
Needless to say, Congress did not "intend" such changes. It
will come as no surprise that, judging from what they said, Senator
Wagner and his associates did not think in these terms. But they did
achieve passage of a statute that fundamentally challenged and in-
vited further challenge to the prevailing assumptions about manage-
rial control and prerogative in the workplace. One can easily agree
with Finkin that neither Congress nor the AFL harbored any "in-
tent" to radically restructure capitalist labor relations, and yet still
believe that Congress did something that was then perceived, with rea-
son, as a drastic and fundamental challenge to business power,
something that helped to set in motion processes of change that
might well have overflowed the narrower banks contemplated by
those who enacted the NLRA. "Unanticipated consequences" and
the "clash of world views" surrounding institutional change are not
concepts that play a large role in conventional statutory interpreta-
tion, but they are familiar tools of the historian.8
6
C. Lawyer's Legislative Intent Revisited
This returns us to the question of legislative intent in the tech-
nical sense. As stated, my argument was not that the legislative his-
tory of the NLRA was "radical" but that it was unclear. Indeed on
many crucial issues, specifically including those I addressed, Con-
gress did not express an "intent" or did so in a vague, contradictory,
or ambiguous manner. Moreover, the Act embodied many different
stated purposes, some of which could and did come into conflict in
the subsequent decision of cases. Because of this, political choices
had to be and were made in interpreting the Act, and the accumula-
tion of such choices over the long run imparted one rather than an-
other political direction to labor law (see K:291-92).
Perhaps an analogy will illuminate my claim. Consider the
84. See generally id. at 648-75.
85. Over the years, some colleagues have suggested that the title I selected was un-
necessarily confusing. Their thought is that "deradicalize" has a conspiratorial flavor
evoking a Court plot or conscious plan to frustrate congressional intent. Obviously I
had in mind an entirely different meaning, the notion that the Court's decisions lessened
or diminished the "radical potential" connoted in the third meaning in the text.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 183-89.
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interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87 Clearly,
Congress intended to bring an end to race discrimination in em-
ployment, 88 but important ambiguities lurked within this general
consensus. Was Title VII intended to provide relief to entire social
groups disadvantaged by the institutional system of race discrimina-
tion, or just to proven victims of identifiable discriminatory employ-
ment pratices? Did Congress intend to permit "race conscious"
remedies, such as hiring or layoff quotas, or was "color blind" ad-
ministration of the statute intended? Did Congress intend to shelter
or to condemn otherwise "bona fide" seniority systems that perpet-
uate past race discrimination? These and related issues of "statu-
tory interpretation"--e.g., the scope of class actions, allowable
presumptions and burdens of proof-rapidly emerged as crucial
battlegrounds that would in part determine how broad an impact
Title VII would have on present and future generations of employ-
ees. The Courts of Appeals, particularly in the South, were sympa-
thetic to the egalitarian ideals of the statute and courageous enough
to give it a broad interpretation. In resolving a myriad of particular
issues within the statutory scheme, these courts fashioned a tough
jurisprudence designed to advance black employees as a group. In
particular, the Courts of Appeals deciding the issues ruled unani-
mously that seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of pre-Act
race discrimination are not "bona fide" within the meaning of Title
VII,89 and that race conscious remedies may be appropriate under
Title VII.9 ° The legislative history, in which proponents of the bill
were heard to assure Congress that a "color blind" statute
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
88. The extent of congressional commitment in 1964 to end employment discrimi-
nation against women is less clear. Some have pointed out that the "prohibition against
sex discrimination was added as a floor amendment, in an apparent attempt to defeat
passage of the bill." M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN A
NUTSHELL 125 (2d ed. 1981). But feminists have argued that the sex discrimination pro-
hibition in fact reflects a decades-long struggle to obtain equal employment opportunity
for women. Race discrimination is the focus of the example in the text because it
presents a case of supposedly unambiguous congressional intent.
89. See cases cited in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
378 n.2 (1977) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing six courts of appeals so holding; deplor-
ing Court's departure from this body of law). In my view, the early seniority decisions
were correct in according priority to the claims of affirmative action over vested seniority
rights, but I recognize that the issue is an extremely complicated one admitting of no
quick conclusions. An analysis of the problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
90. See cases cited in Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct., 2576, 2606 n.10
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 10 courts of appeals so holding); id. at 2606
("[Tihe Courts of Appeals are unanimously of the view that race-conscious affirmative
relief can . . . be 'appropriate' under § 706(g) of Title VII.").
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protecting vested seniority rights was intended, might have
thwarted these decisions, but thoughtful judges found other legal
and social policy considerations more weighty. That Title VII has
played so important a role in the "peaceful social revolution"'" that
has occurred since 1965, particularly in the South, is in no small
measure due to their efforts.92
This emerging body of far-reaching civil rights doctrine, which
Professor Blumrosen has called "southern jurisprudence, ' 93 was
confirmed by two important developments at the national level. In
its watershed Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 94 decision, the Supreme Court
added its imprimatur to wide-ranging equal employment enforce-
ment, oriented toward dismantling institutional barriers to racial
equality as well as halting individual acts of discrimination.95 Sec-
ond, in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,96 amend-
ing Title VII, Congress itself appeared to extend its blessing to the
vigorous enforcement concepts emerging in judge-made law, 97 par-
ticularly the notion that Title VII relief may appropriately extend to
so-called "non-victims" (i.e., minority group members who were not
themselves direct victims of discrimination by the defendant-em-
ployer).9 s However, in more recent years, the Supreme Court has
challenged and undermined numerous civil rights principles
91. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of Employment
Discrimination, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 313, 333 (1984).
92. This story has been most recently told by Professors Blumrosen, id. at 340-46,
and Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas After Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of the Mo-
ralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20 HARV. C.R.-L. L.
REV. 339, 352-53, 395-400 (1985). For discussions of the implementation of Title VII
and its treatment in the courts, see generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
589-665 (2d ed. 1980); Freeman, supra note 55.
93. See Blumrosen, supra note 91, at 340-50.
94. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
95. Among other things, Griggs holds that Title VII forbids employment practices
that have an adverse impact on the employment opportunity of minority group members
(unless such practices are justified by business necessity). The plaintiff need not show
that the employer intended to discriminate. Id. at 432.
96. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 107 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1982)).
97. See Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 24-25. Professors Fallon and Weiler point to an analysis accompanying
the final bill that states: "it was assumed that the present case law as developed by the
courts would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII." Id.
(citing 118 CONG REC. 7166 (1972)). See also Spiegelman, supra note 92, at 400-06.
98. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2609 (1984) (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting) ("The legislative history of [the 1972 amendments] strongly supports the
view that Congress endorsed the remedial use of race under Title VII."); cf. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 391 (1977) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) ("In [enacting the 1972 amendments] Congress made very clear that it
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evolved in the lower courts. 99 These new interpretations coalesce
into a markedly more restrictive and cramped vision of the role of
equal employment law and, from my point of view, they may be ex-
pected to have permanently damaging consequences for civil
rights.' 0 0
The key point for present purposes is that much of the Court's
new approach is said to be based on the "intent" of Congress, now
suddenly understood with greater clarity than in the first decade of
Title VII.'l The legislative history has not changed in recent years,
but the prevailing political winds are different, and so the Court has
reinterpreted it. The Court did not suddenly discover new quota-
tions about color-blindness or non-victim relief in the legislative
record. All that has occurred is that existing but very pliable legisla-
tive materials are now given a different meaning or significance by
judges less committed to a vision of Title VII as aimed at the prob-
lem of institutional and systemic barriers to progress toward racial
justice.
The Title VII analogy suggests several points of present rele-
vance. The legislative history of major enactments, at least in em-
ployment law, is often open-textured and leaves enormous latitude
for politically significant interpretations. The legislative record may
establish a general direction, but judges and other decisonmakers
must choose from among numerous channels and tributaries in
plotting a course. Many such choices may have been entirely un-
foreseen by the enacting Congress. The tacks adopted are simply
approved of the lower court decisions invalidating seniority systems that perpetuate
discrimination.").
99. See, e.g., Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (stating in dictum that Title VII make-whole
relief is available only to actual victims of illegal discrimination); American Tobacco Co.
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) (otherwise "bona fide" seniority systems that perpetu-
ate post-Act discrimination do not violate Title VII); General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 450
U.S. 1036 (1982) (vacating judgment that endorsed a liberal standard in civil rights class
actions); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (tightening
plaintiff's burden of proof); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977) (otherwise "bona fide" seniority systems that perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion do not violate Title VII).
100. I should note that there are important exceptions to the more restrictive ap-
proach of recent years. For example, the Court has validated voluntary affirmative ac-
tion designed to advance the interests of minority employees as a group. See United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (upholding constitutionality of congressionally mandated "set-aside" reserving
fixed percentages of government contracts for minority businesses).
101. Thus, for example, the Stotts Court rests its conclusion that make-whole relief is
available only to actual victims of illegal discrimination largely on a brief review of the
legislative history of the 1964 Act. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90.
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not inevitable or predetermined by legislative design. Thereforeju-
dicial attitudes or world-views play a role in the judicial choices that
fix the course of the law. The choices add up, the accumulated in-
terpretations lend shape and spirit to the law; they give meaning and
content to its general terms. Over the long run, the accumulated
interpretations often impart a distinct political character to that part
of the law, either nurturing and encouraging or restricting and fore-
closing the most egalitarian, redistributive, change-oriented potenti-
alities of the statutes. Interpreting courts play an exceptionally
important role in defining the political character of statutory law,
justifying my effort in Judicial Deradicalization to identify the political
and philosophical underpinnings of the early Wagner Act cases.
In contrast to this view of the open-textured nature of legisla-
tive history, the logic of Professor Finkin's substantive position im-
pels him to adopt an "inevitablist" or "predestination" theory of
statutory construction. By this I mean the explicit or tacit view that
the way labor law has unfolded in case law is, in broad outline, the
only way it could have unfolded consistent with congressional com-
mand. Finkin sets out to refute the view, wrongly imputed to me,
that the legislative history of the Wagner Act compelled a radical
interpretation. He cannot do this by merely arguing, as I in fact did,
that the legislative history is unclear. This would concede my point
about open texture and therefore the political nature of statutory
interpretation. Accordingly, Professor Finkin is constrained to deny
ambiguity in the legislative history and to show what is patently
false, namely that the legislative history not only permitted or sug-
gested but compelled the interpretations that were actually adopted by
the Court. Finkin thereby boxes himself into defending the com-
mon wisdom that the way things turned out is, more or less, the only
way they could have turned out. As we shall see, to sustain this ex-
ercise Finkin is obliged to give tacit approval to some very anti-labor
decisions.
Professor Finkin's "inevitablism" makes his scholarship pro-
foundly apologetic for the status quo. His blindness to potential al-
ternatives in the past occludes his capacity to imagine alternatives
for the future. An irony of this is that, while Finkin prides himself
on his respect for "the lawyer's diligence and skill" (F:91)," °2
because he can only envision one major path of statutory develop-
102. In the same passage, Finkin charges that I denigrate lawyering (F:90-91). This
claim is totally unsupportable. Finkin evidently does not know of my long-standing
commitment to clinical legal education. See, e.g., Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the
1980's: What's Left? 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (1982) (AALS plenary address calling.
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ment on substantial issues, he cannot give genuine meaning to case
law conflict over basic questions of industrial democracy. For this
reason, his theoretical framework unwittingly consigns labor lawyers
to a marginal, tinkering role.
D. Summary
My position on "legislative intent" is the opposite of the one
Professor Finkin attributes to me. In his version, there is a "conven-
tional" or "moderate" interpretation of the Act, based on a rela-
tively clear and coherent set of pre-existing ideas, experiences, and
legislative signals, and, alternatively, we could concoct a "radical"
interpretation to track the aspirations of extremist working class ele-
ments. He claims I argued that Congress intended the latter, in-
stead of the former, as the basis for statutory interpretation. Finkin
therefore imagines he has refuted me by showing that Congress did
not in fact intend a radical transformation of labor relations, but
among other things, for vast expansion of clinical teaching in American law schools).
And one of my articles seeks, in part, to draw conclusions about labor lawyering from my
general theoretical model. See Klare, Yeshiva Decision, supra note 24, at 108-20. (As it
happens, my example was a case in which Professor Finkin submitted an important ami-
cus brief on behalf of the side I support. Finkin appeared in the Yeshiva case as counsel
for the American Association of University Professors as amicus curiae before the Sec-
ond Circuit. He was joined on that brief by David Feller, a gifted advocate whose appel-
late victories have made a huge mark on labor law.)
My criticism of Professor Finkin's approach is that he treats "lawyering" as a
catch-all, unanalyzable category, surrounded by ineffable mysteries of craft. By contrast,
I sought to develop an analytical framework that might allow us to understand, e.g., why
the Board and union lost Yeshiva in the Supreme Court even though, in my view, their
cause was just, drew upon exceptional lawyering talents, and was supported by the perti-
nent legal authorities. My argument was that ultimately the deep ideological themes in
labor law may be more significant than prevailing doctrine in the decision of cases. See
Klare, Yeshiva Decision, supra note 24, at 108-11.
Perhaps this approach will prove unfruitful. Nonetheless, in terms of its motives
and intentions it seems to me a more respectful treatment of lawyering than any offered
in Finkin's piece. For example, Finkin purports to "explain" the Board's defeat in the
landmark case of NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939), by offering his "impres-
sion that the Board was simply out-lawyered" (F:40). Employer-counsel's allegedly su-
perior advocacy there consisted of two things. One was to cite in their brief a single,
quite inconclusive page in the legislative history. It is hard to take this point seriously,
particularly since neither Professor Finkin, the parties, nor the Court focused on other,
contrary passages in the legislative history that are arguably more directly on point. See
infra text accompanying notes 214-17. Counsel's second stroke was to spin out a power-
ful "contractualist" argument to defeat the employees' statutory claims. The lawyering
skill here was to identify the Court's developing ideological emphasis and to package the
case accordingly. That is, Finkin's evidence on this point confirms my position and un-.
dermines his own effort to subsume the political questions latent in the cases under the
rubric of supposedly apolitical technical or lawyering issues.
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adhered to the familiar, moderate views ordinarily cited in legal
argument.
This is pure nonsense, for which reason evidence that Congress
did not have radical intentions is simply beside the point. I said that
a liberal, reformist Congress passed an ambiguous statute with a
legislative history that left many unanswered questions. That em-
ployers feared the worst and that things said in Congress gave
credence to some of their fears, however implausible they may seem
today. That in terms of concrete legal issues (as opposed to grand
political design), the Act was open to a variety of plausible interpre-
tations which, as the decisions added up, could give varying political
hues to labor law. And that, had some rather than other paths of
interpretation been followed, the possibilities for enhancing and
deepening workplace democracy might have been increased.
IV. PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE ORDERING, AND THE PREDESTINATION
THEORY OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
10 3
A. Introduction
By all accounts, one of the purposes of the Wagner Act was to
alter the institutional and legal context in which labor bargaining
occurs. The statutory scheme rested ultimately on private ordering
by labor and management, but just as surely the Act embraced the
idea of restructuring the institutional framework of wage bargain-
ing.10 4 The precise relationship between public power and party
103. The balance of this Article focuses on two of the four major areas of substantive
debate previously identified, see supra text accompanying notes 36-42, namely
"contractualism" and workplace participation. For reasons entirely unknown, Professor
Finkin ignores the problem of remedies. His sole comment on the "public right
doctrine" theme is that it "does not strike [him] as doing much to advance Kare's
claim" (F:25). This is an odd tack, given that the existence of the trend was one of my
claims, not a supporting argument. In view of this, however, I have leveled my reply at
the areas selected by Professor Finkin.
104. The "public power/private ordering" contrast often misleadingly connotes the
idea that, prior to the NLRA, the labor market was "unregulated," or that in some "nat-
ural" state the labor market is unregulated. Not surprisingly, I expressly disclaim any
such suggestions. Before the New Deal, government acted through labor injunctions,
antitrust sanctions, the law of torts, equity, and contracts, police and military deploy-
ment, and other devices to discourage and interdict a variety of approaches to labor
bargaining that otherwise would have commanded the enthusiastic support of employ-
ees. Indeed, key provisions of the first of the great 1930's labor reform statutes, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982), have a distinctly
"deregulatory" character. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 4, 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107
(1982) (withdrawing federal judicial power to enjoin certain labor activity). But see id.
§ 3, 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) (nonenforceability of "yellow dog" contract curtails "free-
dom of contract" as traditionally understood). The institutional structures and common
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autonomy, the precise contours of the newly reconstructed labor
market, obviously were not specified in the Act's broad provisions.
Much was left to the subsequent course of interpretation. Yet, at
least by contrast to the preexisting situation, the Act clearly sanc-
tioned considerable changes in the legal environment and, there-
fore, the balance of forces in the labor market, and it was obviously
so perceived.
The legislative history speaks to the relationship between public
power and private ordering largely in general terms, leaving sub-
stantial leeway to decisionmakers in resolving particular cases. Ac-
cordingly, the issue provides an excellent case study in how a series
of specific and focused interpretations giving voice to a certain
mindset on industrial affairs can lend political tilt to a statutory
scheme. In particular, I argued that, as the Court was called upon to
give content to the rights and obligations outlined in the statute, its
interpretations might have reflected either enthusiasm for or disin-
clination toward the project of refashioning the legal structure of
labor bargaining. In important decisions, the Court evinced disin-
clination, bequeathing a theoretical and practical legacy prejudicial
to workers' interests. Rights granted by the Act to enhance em-
ployee bargaining power were given narrow interpretations. 0 5 The
justifications for these results led to further evisceration of em-
ployee rights in later years, linking the mentality of the early cases to
the current crisis of labor law.
Professor Finkin expresses no opinion on these problems. To
do so would concede the political context of statutory construction
that I evoked. Consistent with his unyielding commitment to the
complete autonomy of legal reasoning, Professor Finkin instead in-
sists that these decisions were essentially predestined. His commit-
ment to this view is particularly revealed by the fact that he cannot
find one among the many cases under discussion that he will say was
wrongly decided. For these and other reasons, this topic presents
law rules undergirding the so-called "free market" in labor in the nineteenth century
were socially constructed or conventional, not "natural," see generally K. POLANYI, THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION 33-219 (1957), as thinkers across the political spectrum have
agreed, see, e.g., Fried, Individual and Collective Rights In Work Relations: Reflections on the
Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1016 (1984).
105. Indeed, Professor Barron argues that, as a consequence of their restrictive inter-
pretations of employee rights, the early cases effectively created rights in favor of em-
ployers, although the concept of employer rights was not part of the original statutory
scheme. See Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 421, 422-23
(1981).
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our competing approaches in sharp contrast. I begin my discussion
with a brief restatement and clarification of the major substantive
issues.
B. The Meaning of "Contractualism"
In my article, "contractualism" referred to the conventional
philosophy of "freedom of contract" or "private ordering" and the
associated conception of an unregulated labor market. I argued that
many people in the 1930's believed that the NLRA was a threat to
freedom of contract and that those fears had a basis, congressional
rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. It was therefore a note-
worthy political development, with lasting consequences, when the
Court gave prominence to contractualist themes in early Wagner
Act jurisprudence. I identified several problems with the contractu-
alist emphasis.' 0 6 I will quickly reiterate them here without support-
ing argument (but not, I hope, without some refinements as a result
of rethinking the issues over the years).
First, contractualist thinking encouraged the attitude that the
statute should be interpreted so as to provide the minimum possible
interference with the pre-NLRA law of labor contracts, specifically
those aspects of pre-NLRA doctrine that favored the employer. In
cases reflecting the contractualist influence, the Court shunned
highly interventionist interpretations of the rights of employees and
responsibilities of employers, opting instead for readings of the stat-
ute providing for minimal incursions on the preexisting legal struc-
ture of labor bargaining. The alternative but foregone
interpretations might have had marked redistributive consequences
favorable to employees and conceivably even a destablizing political
impact. In this sense, contractualist (i.e., minimalist) decisionmak-
ing tended to ratify the existing distribution of social and economic
power. "Freedom of contract" is in many (although not all) respects
a procedurally rather than substantively oriented vision of justice.
Contractualist labor law assumes that "free" bargaining produces
just results, without regard to inequality in the starting point of bar-
gaining or to the distributive implications of the "background" re-
gime of legal rules.1"7 Indeed, our leading theorists of labor law
106. Professor Finkin complains that I was not specific about the meaning of "con-
tractualism" (see, e.g., F:33). In fact, the concept of "contractualism" was treated at
length in Judicial Deradicalization (see, e.g., K:295-98), and my points were developed in
some detail there and in subsequent work. See, e.g., Klare, Public/Private, supra note 24, at
1388-1415; Klare, Critical Theory, supra note 24, at 71-72, 79.
107. Conventional thinking takes this for granted, yet is not entirely comfortable with
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(unlike the most sophisticated tradition within contract law theory)
tend to assume that the results of collective bargaining are "volun-
tary" and therefore sensible and just without inquiry into inequality of
power or issues of substantive fairness."0 s
Second, and consistent with this approach, the private ordering
emphasis often meant that contract rights were given precedence
over rights deriving from the Act. This generally, although not al-
ways, allowed private power to undermine what had been thought to
be employees' political gains, as, e.g., when the employer's right to
stand on its contract was held to supersede the employees' statutory
right to concerted activity.' 0" The problem of private power nullify-
ing the democratic aspirations of the statute has been a continuing
one, with significant contemporary manifestations." 0t Similarly,
contractualism has nurtured a climate of opinion in which collective
it either, particularly in light of the stated policy of the Congress to safeguard commerce
by "restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees." NLRA,
§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (emphasis added). See also United Steelworkers v. NLRB,
389 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1967), overruled in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99
(1970): "Th[e] ideal of freedom of contract is both a noble and a practical one ...
But an equally important policy of the Act is to equalize the bargaining power of em-
ployees and employers ....
The typical way decisionmakers overcome their uneasiness is simply to declare
that the Act itself puts the parties on a fair or equal footing and then just to forget about
substantive outcomes. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S.
519, 552 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Congress intended to establish a "fair" balance
of bargaining power; "whatever agreement emerges from bargaining between fairly
matched parties is acceptable."); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317
(1965) (declaring labor and management to be "coequal adversaries" after enactment of
the NLRA).
108. For a striking example, see Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 420-21 (1950) (management rights
clauses in collective bargaining agreements based on "voluntary acceptance" by workers
and "mutual consent" of the parties); id. at 405-06 ("[T]he needs of the industrial world
can be determined most accurately by examining the arrangements which management
and labor have worked out through negotiation, trial, and error."). Professor Stone's
work has taken the lead on this point, particularly in her discussion of the impact of the
"premise ofjoint sovereignty" on collective bargaining theory. See Stone, supra note 2,
at 1544-49.
Contrast the lack of emphasis on inequality of power within post-World War II
labor law scholarship with its centrality as a concern to much twentieth century contracts
theory. See, e.g., Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Hale, Bargain-
ing, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); see also K:296
n.98 & 99 (citing Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law,
11 TUL. L. REV. 345 (1937); Hale, supra; and Weber, Freedom and Coercion, in ON LAw IN
ECONOMY AND SocIETrv 188-91 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954)).
109. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939), discussed infra notes 204-20
and accompanying text.
110. Two dramatic examples are employers' apparent power to undermine the NLRA
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bargaining law came to be seen as providing a "neutral" framework
for resolving conflicts between the "private" interests of employers
and employees. The alternative, suppressed view is that collective
bargaining is a democratic process valuable for its own sake, in
which the community as a whole has a stake."'
This leads to a third point. Under the contractualist emphasis,
the bargained waiver of statutory rights has become a central feature
of our labor law system. In effect, employers are permitted to de-
ploy economic leverage so as to coerce employees into giving back
rights they won in Congress. An obvious example is the no-strike
clause, a key provision in most collective bargaining agreements,
under which employees trade the statutory right to strike for con-
tractual benefits. Another example is the management prerogatives
clause, under which employees surrender for a term their statutory
right to "co-participation" in the adjustment of the terms and condi-
tions of employment.' 12
The conventional view is, of course, that the very sale of these
rights indicates that they are more valuable to workers when cashed
in for improved benefits and working conditions than they are sim-
ply as rights held. That, supposedly, is what modem collective bar-
gaining is all about. The problem with this complacent view is that
it entirely overlooks the deep and pervasive inequality in this
representation election process and case law permitting employers to transfer bargain-
ing unit work so as to evade collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment.
See generally K. Klare, The Application of the National Labor Relations Act During Union
Organizing Drives: How Well Are the Interests of Employers and Employees Balanced?
(speech to Wisconsin State Bar, June 21, 1984), printed in Oversight Hearings, supra note 6
at 749 (relying heavily upon Weiler, supra note 5); see also Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill.
Coil Spring Co. [Milwaukee Spring II], 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065
(1984) (holding lawful a unilateral midterm transfer of bargaining unit work to non-
union facility so as to avoid paying collectively bargained rates) (overruling 265 N.L.R.B.
No. 38, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1486 (1982)), petition to review denied sub nom. Int'l Union,
UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
112. Because the no-strike clause and the management prerogatives clause are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, the employer is privileged to bargain to
impasse in order to obtain them. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395 (1952) (Court allows hard bargaining for management prerogatives clause); see gen-
erally NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (discussing
difference between mandatory and permissive subjects). Clyde Summers has aptly sum-
marized the cumulative effect of Borg- Warner and American National Insurance (and their
respective progeny): "The effect of these two legal rules is that a union cannot use its
economic strength to expand the area of participation beyond that described by the
statute; but the employer can use his economic strength to limit participation to an area
smaller than that described by the statute." Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and
West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 367, 382
(1980).
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society, inequality reflected both in the social and economic context
of wage bargaining and in the legal and institutional ground rules
under which it takes place. To be sure, unions sometimes have the
upper hand in bargaining with some employers. But in by far the
more common case, employees routinely surrender their public law
rights in the face of economic dependency on the employer and the
employer's superior economic resources and maneuverability. The
fact that a waiver is "voluntary" does not, by itself, mean that it is
just. This is not an argument against waivers or trade-offs as such,
but an invitation to examine in social context the specific waivers of
NLRA rights the Court has allowed or implied. Here again the issue
is whether the NLRA would be given a strongly interventionist in-
terpretation, or one that produced a minimal restructuring of the
pre-NLRA law of labor contracts. It is simply not obvious that work-
ers should have to put their rights under the NLRA up for sale in
the marketplace to the extent and in the particular instances that
waivers are now implied or encouraged. 1i3 Congress may have as-
sumed that no-strike clauses would become commonplace, but the
statute and the legislative history provided little guidance on how
far the waiver policy should be pushed. Whether waivers should be
extensively implied or encouraged at the expense of workers' statu-
tory rights, or whether waivers should be viewed as inherently sus-
pect and permitted only within narrow limits, are questions about
which Congress said little in 1935.ii4
113. Indeed, some rights under the NLRA are deemed nonwaivable. For example, in-
plant leafletting rights may not be waived by collective contract. NLRB v. Magnavox
Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974). The right to resign from union membership, derivable from
the right to refrain from engaging in section 7 activities, NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982), is not waivable or subject to restriction by contract between the union and the
employee. Machinists Local 1414 [Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.], 270 N.L.R.B. No. 209,
116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257 (1984). The usual explanation of such rules, solicitude for
individual or dissenting employees, rings hollow given that unions can waive employees'
right to strike without their consent. The selection of particular NLRA rights for
designation as "waivable" or "nonwaivable" rests ultimately on social policy, i.e., polit-
ical, choices.
114. To take one example of a specific waiver question, the Reagan Board recently
held that a strike settlement waived the "fundamental" right of employees to strike with-
out fear of reprisal by the grant ofsuperseniority to strikebreakers. Gem City Ready Mix
Co., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 191, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1266 (1984). The Board ruled that
"even the fundamental right to strike . . . can be waived," id. at 1267, even though
strikebreaker superseniority is deemed "inherently destructive of workers' rights." See
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). The types of argument Finkin claims
support the result in Sands Manufacturing (F:40) could be urged in support of the result
in Gem City. Of course, the cases are also distinguishable, but the point of distinction
must ultimately be, here as elsewhere, a judgment of social policy as to which particular
labor rights should be waivable under what particular circumstances.
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As can be seen, the focus of my critique was that "free contract"
theory legitimated inequality by deflecting attention from concerns
of substantive justice. I continue to regard this as an important as-
pect of the ideology embraced in modem collective bargaining law.
My attack was leveled not at the idea of bargaining under any and all
circumstances, but on the undemocratic and authoritarian conse-
quences of labor bargaining under the regime of the so-called "un-
regulated market" championed in traditional contractualist
thinking, elements of which were carried forward as the statutory
scheme unfolded. Specifically, I meant to criticize the manner in
which the Court's decisions undermined the potential of the statute
to restructure the context and ground rules of labor bargaining. My
"anti-contractualism" meant taking seriously the statutory rights
that might tilt the balance of power in labor markets away from its
location under the common law. This was not an attack on the idea
of bargaining as such.
My treatment of "contractualism" was in some respects ambig-
uous, and this has, perhaps, led to a certain misreading of the arti-
cle. I did not argue, as some readers have suggested, that as an a
pnori matter I favor governmental determination of workplace con-
ditions to the exclusion of the ideals of autonomy, self-determina-
tion, and in particular, self-reliance by workers on their own
concerted activity to achieve their industrial goals. My article was,
and I remain, committed to the values of worker self-organization
and collective activity. These values are sometimes invoked and de-
fended under the banner of contractualism and freedom of con-
tract." 15 On such occasions, contractualist discourse can take on a
genuinely emancipatory content.
I have been particularly surprised that a number of thoughtful
readers concluded from my article that I meant to advocate that ex-
isting governmental institutions, such as the Labor Board, should
routinely set the substantive terms and conditions of employment,
or that I had thought that Congress had commanded such genera-
lized substantive regulation. These reactions have puzzled me,
since I expressly disclaimed such views (K:308 n. 151). A strong
anti-statist note is sounded throughout my writing, 116 particularly in
115. In reviewing the dilemma of employer first-contract intransigence, Paul Weiler
has aptly evoked this ideal of employee self-determination. See generally Weiler, Striking A
New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
351 (1984), particularly at 419.
116. See particularly the discussion in Klare, Critical Theory, supra note 24, at 83-84
(criticizing both "statism" and "anti-statism" in radical political theory).
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the emphasis on worker self-organization and self-activity. More-
over, I specifically identified dependency on governmental interven-
tion as a sign of the weaknesses and limitations of the 1930's
organizing upsurge (K:318 & 318 n. 183). Nonetheless, some read-
ers found this implication in my article, so I add another disclaimer
here.
American legal thought tends to see the world in terms of a
series of dichotomies, one of which is the sharp distinction between
"governmental regulation" and "private ordering." '" 7 If I was criti-
cal of the latter, some readers reasoned, I must be advocating the
former. In fact, one of the goals of my work is to criticize this entire
way of thinking and to demonstrate the empty and false way in
which these distinctions are conventionally treated in the prevailing
legal discourse."' Conventional labor law scholarship regularly
commits the error of simply equating "private ordering" with worker
autonomy and self-determination.
In our social and political context, general, a priori views on the
regulation v. private ordering question are often unhelpful and un-
convincing. The problem of social policy is not whether the organ-
ized self-regulatory power of society should be deployed to enhance
participation and equality, to serve our material and spiritual needs.
The problem is to determine the most appropriate forms and con-
tent of such interventions, consistent with the ideal of self-determi-
nation. To put it another way, both autonomy and collective
democratic organization are essential, potentially mutually reinforc-
ing components of human freedom. The task of social policy is to
simultaneously nurture both. Returning to the terms of the debate,
in specific historical and institutional contexts both governmental
regulation and private ordering can contribute to democratizing and
politicizing the workplace, although each can also have the opposite
effect in other contexts (see K:308-309 n. 151). Judicial Deradicaliza-
tion sought to expose the deleterious effects of contractualism in a
particujar historical setting. The article does not advance (and ex-
plicitly disavows) any general philosophical claim or proposal that
governmental determination of working conditions is preferable a
priori to collective bargaining.
C. Was Freedom of Contract An Issue?
This is not the place to debate these questions. I would
117. See generally Frug, supra note 55; Kennedy, supra note 55.
118. See generally Kare, Public/Private, supra note 24.
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welcome such a debate, but Professor Finkin shows no interest in it.
His point is more primitive: Such issues never arose, he claims, and
therefore there is no need to discuss them. No one ever imagined
or suggested that the early Wagner Act cases involved decisions
about the moral and poitical values of contractualism, for the simple
reason that Congress left no room for choice. In this Finkin betrays
an astonishing ignorance. His own evidence, let alone mine, refutes
these mindless claims.
American employers bitterly attacked and resisted what they
perceived as the anticontractualist aspects of the NLRA. Their de-
fense of freedom of contract had two distinct branches. First, em-
ployers claimed that the statute on its face violated the
constitutional guarantee of liberty of contract. Second, they argued
that specific features of the statutory scheme would foster govern-
mental control over the employment relationship and thus under-
mine managerial power and prerogative.
Professor Finkin's precise position is difficult to pin down be-
cause, as noted, he never expresses any substantive views on the
matter of contractualism. Regarding the constitutional issue, he
simply indicates that "the Court relied rather heavily on the law
under the Railway Labor Act" (F:35), and that the parallel provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act had been sustained by the Court
(F:34). Surely Professor Finkin would not seriously have us believe
that the due process challenge to the NLRA was unequivocally pre-
cluded by prior decisions. Whatever optimistic remarks Senator
Wagner placed on the public record, he knew full well that the
Court was striking down New Deal legislation right and left. The
constitutional issue was very much alive to employers and federal
judges, as this sections shows. The Board's attorneys certainly did
not share Professor Finkin's confidence that a finding of constitu-
tionality was a foregone conclusion." 9
With the exception of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 2 '
most of the cases and legislative intent issues in debate here touch
on the other branch of the employers' free contract concerns,
namely, the fear of governmental intrusion in the employment rela-
tionship and wage bargaining. Professor Finkin states emphatically
that the issues presented in two crucial cases I discussed, Jones &
Laughlin and NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 2' "had
119. See infra note 138.
120. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of NLRA).
121. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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nothing to do with 'contractualism' " (F:37). In order to refute my
claim that the statutory scheme contained anticontractualist aspects,
he produces a few quotations from the legislative history indicating
that one of the purposes of the NLRA was to encourage the making
of collective contracts (F:41-42). He seems to think this is the end of
the matter. He is oblivious to the fact that most employers did not
want to make collective contracts, viewed statutory pressure to do so
as an invasion of their rights, 22 and denied that Congress had the
power to enact such legislation.' 21
I suppose it is possible with the smugness of hindsight to be-
lieve that the Act did not raise concerns about contractualism,
although even today voices are raised against the NLRA's intrusions
on contractual freedom.' 2 4 But Professor Finkin does not really be-
lieve it himself, since he ultimately concedes my point. Under
NLRA sections 8(3)125 and 8(5),126 he writes, "employers cannot
circumvent the rights of employees to organize and engage in col-
lective bargaining by executing individual contracts in derogation of the
statutory scheme" (F:41, emphasis added). This clearly infringes the
employer's freedom of contract. (We might also add that NLRA
section 9(a) similarly restricts "private ordering" between the em-
ployer and individual employees).' 27 Still, Finkin tries to wriggle
out of this concession. For him, these provisions stand for the "ob-
vious principle" (F:41) that minor incursions on free contract are
necessary to make free contract work (F:41-42).' 28
Unfortunately, what is "obvious" in contemporary legal ideol-
122. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law For Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting employment discrimination on basis of
union activity or sympathy).
126. Id. § 158(a)(5) (1982) (requiring employers to bargain collectively with majority
employee representative).
127. Id. § 159(a) (1982) (majority representative is the exclusive bargaining agent of
all employees in bargaining unit, whether or not they are union members).
128. He states with apparent approval, that "[tihe government.., argued [injones &
Laughlin] that freedom of contract was constricted only by the reasonable anti-discrimi-
nation provisions of the Act." (F:34, citation omitted). This is what critical legal thinkers
sometimes call a "contradiction." The fashion among mainstream thinkers is to call
this, with somewhat less emphasis, a "tension" or a "paradox." For a classic example,
referring to the problem of governmental control over wage bargaining, see Cox, The
Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1416 (1958):
The employer (or union) must engage in negotiations with a sincere desire to
reach an agreement and must make an earnest effort to reach a common
ground, but it need make no concessions and may reject any terms it deems
unacceptable. One can argue that the formula is too self-contradictory to sur-
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ogy was not at all "obvious" or even vaguely convincing to Ameri-
can employers and their allies in the 1930's. The bill, and later the
Act, were relentlessly and bitterly attacked by politicians, business
people, academics and the press on the ground, among others, that
they violated constitutional guarantees of contractual freedom. In-
deed, it is a common view that the statute passed with comparatively
little debate because many congressmen, a multitude of lawyers,
much of the press, and the bulk of the business community took it
for granted that the NLRA would be swiftly declared unconstitu-
tional, in part for violating liberty of contract.129 The fifth and four-
teenth amendment due process clauses had long been held to
protect freedom of contract,13 0 and, while the commerce power is-
sue was central to claims about the Act's unconstitutionality, the due
process question was also in the forefront of debate. 13
Pro-business witnesses scored the bill for invading free con-
tract.' 32 Politicians picked up this theme in the debates. For exam-
ple, one Senator, typical of the bill's opponents, pronounced
himself quite certain from his study of the bill that it "denies
freedom of contract between an individual and his employer. . . as
vive .... But I think that the ambivalent statement has meaning even though
it borders on paradox.
It is sometimes deemed an emblem of professional maturity to embrace the ubiquity of
such paradoxes in the law. For an extreme view, see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34
J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227-28 (1984) (prominent law school dean questions moral fitness
to teach law of those who do not share his faith in the reconciling or secularly religious
power of legal principles transcending reason).
129. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 116 ("[Mlany Senators, convinced that the bill
was unconstitutional, shifted the onus of its defeat to the Supreme Court. . . . [T]hey
felt certain that the measure would not take effect since employers would withhold com-
pliance until the Court declared it void.");J. GROSS, supra note 33, at 149 ("[F]ew people
were anxious to serve on the NLRB in 1935 since the record of the Supreme Court...
left little doubt in most minds that the Wagner Act would not survive the inevitable
Supreme Court test.").
130. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
131. See R. CORTNER, THE JONES & LAUGHLIN CASE 150 (1970) (employer's counsel
asserted invasion of liberty of contract as a principal reason for constitutional invalidity
of NLRA).
132. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 853-54 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42,
2239-40 (testimony ofJames A. Emery, General Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.) (bill un-
constitutionally invades fundamental right of freedom of contract); Hearings on H.R.
6288, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 735-38 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 2),
supra note 42, 2809-12 (brief in opposition submitted by Associated General Contractors
of America) (citing Adair); see id. at 336, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 2), supra
note 42, 2810 ("[N]o sound purpose could be served by stripping business and indus-
trial management of its constitutionally conferred right to freedom of contract.").
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completely as any bill that has ever been proposed in the Con-
gress."1 3 3 The American Liberty League's notorious 1935 memo-
randum, designed to torpedo the NLRA in the courts, repeatedly
denounced the Act's intrusions on freedom of contract, placing this
concern even before the commerce power issue.' 3 4 Academics ad-
ded weight to such claims. The Dean of the University of Chicago
School of Business wrote in 1935:
It cannot be denied that the enforcement of the various
provisions of the Wagner Labor Act will substantially inter-
fere with the freedom of contract of both the employer and
of the employee. . . . From the point of view of due pro-
cess of law, the most doubtful aspect of the law is Section
8(5) . . . . This provision is intended to do something
more than equalize the bargaining power between em-
ployer and employee; it is clearly intended to force the em-
ployer to enter into collective agreements .... t35
Prior to the Supreme Court decision upholding the Wagner Act
against due process challenge,' 36 its validity was judicially ques-
tioned on liberty of contract as well as commerce power grounds. 137
And it seems worth recalling that four Supreme Court Justices voted
to strike down the NLRA on due process grounds (among
133. 79 CONG. REC. 7677 (May 16, 1935) (debates on S. 1958), reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42, at 2403 (remarks of Sen. Hastings, extended by
incorporating in the record, but not discussing, legal memorandum citing Adair, Lochner,
and other constitutional freedom of contract cases, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra
note 42, at 2403-11).
134. See NATIONAL LAWYERS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE, REPORT
ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, (Sept. 1935) [here-
inafter cited as LIBERTY LEAGUE MEMORANDUM] reprinted in 8 Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2242-43, 2280 (1939).
135. W. SPENCER, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: ITS SCOPE, PURPOSES, AND
IMPLICATIONS 66-70 (1935); see also id. at 66 ("far-reaching interferences with freedom of
contract"). Spencer cites the precise document which to Finkin clearly establishes Con-
gress's contractualist "intent," S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), cited in
F:40 n.71, 41-42. But Spencer cites it to support the view that in practical operation the
NLRA "means compulsory arbitration of a unilateral character." W. SPENCER, supra, at
24. Academic commentators continued for years to view the Act as an attack on contrac-
tual freedom. See, e.g., Dickinson, New Conceptions of Contract in Labor Relations, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 688 (1943) (treating the subversion of the employer's freedom of contract as an
accomplished fact).
136. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43-47 (1937).
137. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1937) (Wilbur,
J.), aff'd on rehearing on other grounds, 92 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 333
(1938). Indeed, even after Jones & Laughlin, some judges continued to view the Loch-
ner/Adair freedom of contract cases as compelling a narrow construction of the Act. See,
e.g., Mackay Radio, supra, 92 F.2d at 762-64 (Wilbur, J.).
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others). 13 8
In sum, as American employers and their sympathizers saw it,
the Act directly violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of
contract. To put it another way, this was an issue in the 1930's, to
which the Court was sensitive even as it upheld the statute. No
doubt supporters of the Act sincerely believed that its instrusions on
freedom of contract were minor and restricted in nature, and there-
fore fully consistent with the Constitution. But I was interested in
an entirely different question: What did the statute actually mean to
the people who enacted it and to the people whose conduct it was
supposed to govern? There is simply no inconsistency in saying
both that the Act's proponents were devoted to freedom of contract
and that its opponents-who looked at the world through different
eyes-were not persuaded. Professor Finkin supplies no rebutting
evidence on the real questions I raised: Were claims that the NLRA
impaired freedom of contract sincere (at least in part)? And, with
respect to the governmental intrusion aspect of employer opposi-
tion, did these fears have a basis in the legislative history? I discuss
the latter question in the next section, turning first here to the issue
of sincerity.
It is common to treat business criticism of the Act as mere prop-
aganda motivated by a more elementary desire to avoid unioniza-
tion. But employer opposition to unions was not an abstraction. It
was composed of a blend of fears, prejudices and calculations that
do not always make sense to contemporary collective bargaining ex-
perts. With a half-century of experience, we know today that collec-
tive bargaining does not mean employer loss of control over the
management of businesses. We now take for granted, sadly enough,
that "Congress had no expectation that the elected union represen-
tative would become an equal partner in the running of the business
138. "The right to contract is fundamental .... This right is unduly abridged by the
Act now upheld." Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 103 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). The
outcome of the due process issue was not a foregone conclusion. As Professor Cortner
notes, in preparing the Jones & Laughlin case the Board was haunted by the ambiguity of
the leading (and promising) precedent, the case upholding the constitutionality of reme-
dies under the 1926 Railway Labor Act, Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), namely that this case did not overrule the consti-
tutional liberty of contract doctrine of Adair and Coppage. R. CORTNER, supra note 131, at
96. Cf P. IRONs, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERs 232-33 (1982) ("However sound in logic,
[Senator] Wagner's exegesis of constitutional precedent [regarding due process] was
certainly speculative as prognostication.") Indeed, Jones & Laughlin itself did not pur-
port to overrule, but only to distinguish, Adair and Coppage. 301 U.S. at 45; see K:300
n.l1 4 .
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enterprise, 9"139 and that the law does not mandate collective bar-
gaining over issues "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial con-
trol."'1 40 But these things were not so clear in 1935 or 1937.
Employers took a while to learn them.
There is no question but that the Act, and specifically the incur-
sions on free contract, not only reached into employers' pocket-
books but threatened--or more precisely were perceived by employers to
threaten-their most basic assumptions about managerial preroga-
tive.' 41  The missing element in Professor Finkin's account is any
acknowledgement of the ferocity of early employer opposition to
the NLRA. Employer efforts between 1935 and 1937 to nullify the
law constitute a massive and ignominious instance of concerted civil
disobedience. Out of respect for the ordinary workers for whom he
claims to speak (F:89-90), Professor Finkin might have paused to
remember that brave men and women had to give their lives-both
before and after 1935-to secure NLRA rights. Whatever their sym-
pathies, historians have a duty to explain this, to try to understand
management's often almost fanatical efforts to resist collective bar-
gaining, to the point where some were prepared to countenance the
sacrifice of human life rather than give in.
Historians have recently emphasized that the intensity of the
desire to maintain managerial control is one of the distinctive attrib-
utes of American businessmen and, hence, of American labor his-
tory. 14 2 Businessmen did not deem the Act's incursions on freedom
of contract to be "obvious" or de minimis but rather to pose a poten-
tially unbounded threat to values and institutions they most held
dear. And this is at least a factor in explaining their intransigent
resistance to the NLRA. 143
139. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
140. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
141. Fortune magazine thus summarized the views of "business critics" on the NLRA:
It violates the right of free speech, the rights of property, the inviolability of
contract. It promotes lawlessness, destroys discipline, and encourages strikes
against society. It is in short a dangerous intrusion of a radical bureaucracy
into private enterprise.
[It is] a dangerous threat to the entire industrial structure of the U.S.
The G- D- Labor Board, 18 FORTUNE 52-53 (Oct. 1938).
142. See, e.g., P. Edwards, The Exceptionalism of the American Labour Movement:
The Neglected Role of Workplace Struggle (1983) (unpublished paper on file with
author).
143. Finkin implicitly admits the truth of my basic point. In the course of discussing
my views about the sit-down strikes, Finkin notes that all of the strikers' demands in-
volved "routine" subjects of collective bargaining (F:30). I am not certain this is entirely
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D. Was the Legislative Histoy Ambiguous?
Was the legislative history ambiguous on the question of the
degree of governmental intrusion on labor bargaining intended by
the statutory scheme? For Professor Finkin this question is not even
close. To support his stance, he lifts a few bland sentences from
3000+ pages and considers the matter closed: The legislative his-
tory contains no ambiguity on the subject of free contract (F:41-42).
It would be difficult to find many lawyers or legal academics whose
faith in the determinative character of legislative history is quite as
reverential as Finkin's, at least if one is searching among the genera-
tions since the rise of Legal Realism. Still, his references to legisla-
tive history are characteristic of conventional intellectual instincts
and argumentative strategies among many labor lawyers. As such
they are worth examining in some detail.
There are two fundamental problems with Professor Finkin's
approach. The first is the confusion of distinct levels of analysis or
of purpose in studying legislative history. Unable to see beyond the
technician's view, he is interested only in what might be called "law-
yer's legislative history." Its focus is on giving authoritative mean-
ings to the words and concepts in statutes by uncovering the
intellectual provenance of statutory language, particularly as it was
understood by the drafters. "Lawyer's legislative history" provides
useful tools to advocates in the form of stereotyped, mutually can-
celling arguments to which the courts habitually listen.' 44 The
method makes liberal use of fictions and conventions.' 45 It claims
the trappings of precision, although everyone knows that "[t]he
true, but, in any event, Finkin adds: "No doubt management thought of these demands
as serious threats to its power, even as a serious threat to capitalism, for these demands
challenged management's totally unconstrained right to manage" (F:30). If he concedes
as much, it is hard to see what is left to this branch of Finkin's critique. He goes on to
say, in effect, that management was mistaken to feel that its rights were threatened, since
in fact they weren't. The historian's role, however, is to attempt to determine what peo-
ple thought at the time, not what Professor Finkin now thinks they should have thought.
144. Years ago Karl Llewellyn catalogued many of the routine statutory intent argu-
ments, dramatically illustrating the stereotyped and self-negating character of the genre.
See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960).
145. See, e.g., L. FULLER & R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 149-50 (1964):
Th[e] ...relation between courts and statutes is commonly expressed by say-
ing that the "intention" of the legislature make[s] the law. Yet it is always rec-
ognized that the "intention" which the court must respect is a formalized thing,
and not the "actual, inner" intention of particular legislators. A statute be-
comes law only after it has been enacted in accordance with certain rules; when
these rules have been followed the statute stands as law even though Senator
Sorghum confides to his dinner partner that he was asleep when the bill was
read and did not know what he was voting for.
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hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible,
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation." 146
By contrast, one might be interested-as I was-in a wholly dif-
ferent plane of analysis, what might be called "historian's legislative
history." Here the focus is on what people actually thought and felt,
both inside and outside Congress, particularly insofar as they may
have been influenced by prevailing understandings of the language
of the bill and the legislative debates. For this purpose, although
perhaps not Finkin's, we might be as interested in the impromptu
railings of an obscure Republican Congressman or anti-union cor-
porate officer about the Wagner bill as in the considered reflections
of Senator Wagner and his closest aides. Let me emphasize that I
am not claiming, and never did, that anti-NLRA spokespeople were
correct in their understanding of Senator Wagner's intentions.
Often, they were not. Senator Wagner and his associates had no
intention of enacting governmental supervision of the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements, as I indicated in my arti-
cle (K:307). Accordingly, the statements of anti-NLRA legislators
may not reflect the "intent" of the Act in the technical sense. But
that is only the lawyer's view of statutory intent.
My article addressed both the lawyer's and the historian's views
of legislative history at separate junctures, but Professor Finkin sys-
tematically conflates the two. For example, referring in part to the
political complexity of the legislative process, I remarked that the
statute was "not a crystallization of consensus" (K:291). In context,
this was obviously a reference to the fact that the nation was pro-
foundly divided over whether the Act should have been passed and
what it should mean. Finkin denies this, arguing that the statute
expressed an emerging consensus on labor policy based particularly
on the 1933-1935 experience under the NIRA and Public Resolu-
tion No. 44 and reflected in the congressional debates and reports
(F:46-47).
Professor Finkin's and my comments are both true but they
refer to different levels of analysis. For him, "national consensus"
means what was agreed among Senator Wagner and his aides and
allies. This is said to be the "intent" of the Congress. This simply
confuses lawyer's fiction for the broader historical truth. It is an ab-
solutely standard observation that the NLRA built upon and
embodied an emerging consensus among a narrow but influential
146. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1201 (tent. ed. 1958).
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stratum of political, labor, 47 and academic figures on the need for a
federal collective bargaining policy, and that the statute represents
the triumph of ideas that had been slowly finding their way into pub-
lic policy since the beginning of the twentieth century.'4 8 This back-
ground is often very helpful in explaining particular concepts and
words in the statute. Accordingly, the background experience is
said, in conventional parlance, to supply a guide congressional "in-
tent" (F:46-47). But it is the purest fiction to say that as a nation we
actually achieved political consensus on these ideas in 1935.
Indeed, it is even fiction to assert that the Congressmen who
voted for the NLRA did so because they fully understood and/or
embraced Senator Wagner's ideas. There are obvious indications
that to some extent they did not. To cite one famous example, a
classic problem in Wagner Act interpretation is what to make of the
remarks of Senator Walsh, a supporter of the bill, on the duty to
bargain. Walsh's views are simply inconsistent with those of Wag-
ner.t 49 Lawyers usually resolve such difficulties by resort to fiction,
e.g., that in determining the "intent" of Congress, we should pro-
147. Chris Tomlins has argued that on at least one major point this elite consensus
departed sharply from existing AFL understandings, that is, with regard to the hitherto
sacrosanct area of "jurisdiction" and bargaining units. From the AFL point of view, this
was an issue that implicated the most fundamental concerns about the self-governance
of the trade union movement. The controversy over the Board's unit determination
powers rapidly pushed the AFL leadership into a position among the Board's harshest
critics. See C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LAW, LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985).
148. See, e.g., Statement of Senator Wagner, Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm.
on Education & Labor, 84th Cong., I st. Sess. 32, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 2),
supra note 42, at 1408 ("[T]he National Labor Relations Bill does not present a single
novel principle for the consideration of Congress."); I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 101
(Senator Wagner stressed in Congressional debates that the bill "involved no novel
principles but simply affirmed and extended concepts already established in the law.");
id. at 18 (New Deal labor enactments "gathered up the historical threads [of prior public
policy experience] and wove them into law.");J. GRoss, supra note 33, at 232 (almost all
provisions of Wagner bill can be traced to the 1933-1935 experience of the NLB and
"old" NLRB).
One of the poorly concealed tensions in the standard approach is that it simulta-
neously holds that the NLRA represents a more or less "natural" culmination of public
policy development, yet at the same time no one can really explain why it passed. See
supra text accompanying note 34. See also H.J. Harris, Responsible Unionism and the
Road to Taft-Hartley: The Development of Federal Labor Relations Policy, ca. 1932-
1947, at 13 (paper presented to the Colloquium on Shopfloor Bargaining and the State,
King's College Research Centre, Cambridge University, Sept., 1982) (on file with au-
thor) ("The fact of passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 ... was very largely
fortuitous.").
149. In a frequently quoted passage, Senator Walsh said:
The bill indicates the method and manner in which employees may organize,
the method and manner of selecting their representatives or spokesmen, and
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ceed as though Senator Walsh did not speak. 150 Afortiori, Wagner's
words take precedence over those of his opponents in determining
congressional intent, and anti-NLRA business sources such as those
cited above' 15 are not even considered. Such fictions are of limited
usefulness if we wish to pursue the historian's aim of ascertaining
what people at the time actually thought about the Wagner Act.
Because Professor Finkin is only interested in the stereotyped,
lawyer's history of the Wagner Act, for purposes of debate I turn
now to legislative history in the technical sense of the term. This
raises a second, fundamental difficulty with Finkin's approach, the
problem of "predestination."
As noted above, Professor Finkin believes that reasoned elabo-
ration of the values and policies found in the legislative history pro-
vides determinate answers to specific legal problems. That is, for each
problem in interpretation there is a correct solution-or range of
solutions-consistent with the core values of the statute; interpreta-
tions outside this core are incorrect (F:45). 152 A common attitude
linked to this view in the labor law context is that the course of inter-
leads them to the office door of their employer with the legal authority to nego-
tiate for their fellow employees. The bill does not go beyond the office door. It
leaves the discussion between the employer and employee, and the agreements
which they may or may not make, voluntary and with that sacredness and so-
lemnity to a voluntary agreement with which both parties to an agreement
should be enshrouded.
What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not
seek to inquire into it. It anticipates that the employer will deal reasonably with
the employees, that he will be patient, but he is obliged to sign no agreement:
he can say, "Gentlemen, we have heard you and considered your proposals.
We cannot comply with your request" and that ends it.
79 CONG. REC. 7659-60 (May 16, 1935) (debates on S. 1958), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42, at 2373-74.
These views cannot be reconciled with those of Senator Wagner, who took the
position (although not with total clarity) that the duty to bargain required employers at a
minimum to make counterproposals. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
Nor, by the way, are Walsh's views consistent with prevailing law. See Fibreboard Paper
Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 n.2 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing
Walsh statement, then noting: "[blut too much law has been built upon a contrary as-
sumption"); Cox, supra note 128, at 1403 (1958) ("[T]he law has crossed the threshold
into the conference room and now looks over the negotiator's shoulder."). The tension
between the Walsh and Wagner views is explored in Miller, The Enigma of Section 8(5) of
the Wagner Act, 18 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 166 (1965). Miller quotes Leon Keyserling to
the effect that "[t]he statement of Senator Walsh ... certainly did not express the in-
tent of the Congress in Section 8(5)." Id. at 184.
150. Miller, supra note 149, at 184-85 (so arguing, in effect).
151. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
152. Distinguishing between "core" and "penumbral" values is a classic strategy for
repressing conflict in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Hart, Positivism and the Separation
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pretation of the NLRA was more or less predestined. In essential
respects the structure of collective bargaining law follows logically
from the basic principles Congress decreed in 1935 and 1947.
Much of post-Realist American legal thought has been devoted
to a failed attempt to sustain the proposition that legal problems
give rise to determinate solutions, or at least to a fairly well-defined
region of correct outcomes. The main approaches are familiar: in-
stitutional competence theory, economic efficiency analysis, ration-
alist moralism, and Professor Finkin's approach, the most
widespread in our legal culture, namely, ad hoc, unsystematic tink-
ering.1 53 Though each of these approaches is more or less commit-
ted to the idea of a specialized "legal" method of analysis (as
distinct from general political or ethical discourse) through which
determinate solutions can be derived to legal problems, none of
these theories has come close to convincingly demonstrating the
existence of such a method.
There are many reasons why. Here are two that are particularly
relevant to this debate. First, most significant statutory schemes,
like most common law fields, embrace several conflicting social poli-
cies. This is particularly true of the Wagner Act. For fifty years,
NLRA interpretation has had to choose between (or, in polite fic-
tion, to "balance") well-known pairs of competing statutory values:
worker concerted activity vs. industrial peace; promotion of collec-
tive bargaining vs. governmental restraint and individual employee
rights to refrain; redistribution of bargaining power vs. private or-
dering; and so on (see K:292-93).
Second, even when a decisionmaker is self-consciously commit-
ted to a single principle or social policy, it usually turns out that
there are multiple ways within the confines of conventional legal ar-
gument to implement that value in specific cases, or at least to be-
lieve oneself to be doing so, given the limitations of present
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1958) (use of core/penumbra distinc-
tion to defend legal positivism against claims of inextricable linkage of law and morals).
"Interstitiality" is another standard concept used to depreciate the problem of judicial
legislation. Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting):
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A
common-law judge could not say "I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of
historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court."
Holmes's famous remark is cited and discussed in Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351, 392-94 (1973).
153. On the general contours of American post-Realism, see D. Kennedy, The Ameri-
can Critical Legal Studies Movement In A Nutshell 1-2 (pamphlet, June, 1984).
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knowledge. It is little consolation that some outcomes are "closer
to" and others "more remote from" core values of the statute or
legal order (see F:45). The meaning and weight of such values is
often sharply contested. Moreover, seemingly marginal interpretive
differences within the "core" often have profound political signifi-
cance over the long run.
This point is not exactly news. It is familiar among all who are
heirs to the insights of Legal Realism. 154 The energy expended by
American law academics in denying them is a symbol of the political
potency of these insights. In any event, statutory interpretation nec-
essarily involves politically significant choices between alternative
outcomes, each of which may find justification in the legislative his-
tory of a major enactment such as the NLRA, even when analyzed
within the framework of traditional legal argument.
Space considerations bar extended discussion of the indetermi-
nacy of legislative history.' 55 Happily, the point is amply demon-
strated by well-known examples in labor law. There are simply too
many crucial, split-vote labor law decisions, turning on competent
but diametrically opposed interpretations of legislative history, to
take seriously the claim that legislative history constrains political
choice beyond a certain point. One thinks immediately, for in-
stance, of the case of Justice Brennan, who has made a remarkable
career as a labor judge by "shaping" the materials of legislative his-
tory to accomplish his goals.' 5 6
In light of the weak constraints that legislative history imposes
154. See generally Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 20
(1979).
155. See generally Kennedy, supra note 152; Tushnet, supra note 154; Tushnet, Book
Review, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1982) (reviewing H. COLLINS, MARXISM & LAW
(1982)); Unger, supra note 18;J. Boyle, Critical Legal Studies: A Young Person's Guide
(Mar. 1984) (unpublished paper distributed at the Eighth Ann. Conf. on Critical Legal
Studies, Washington, D.C.).
156. In each case in the following sample justice Brennan wrote for the Court, relying
heavily on controverted renderings of congressional intent and legislative history. Bren-
nan's interpretations have sometimes provoked bitter response from otherJustices. See
e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (5-2 vote, with two Justices
likely to be opposed to Brennan view not participating) ("race conscious" collectively
bargained affirmative action plan consistent with Civil Rights Act). But cf. id. at 282
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[B]y a tour deforce reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale,
Holmes, and Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statu-
tory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent."). See also
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (Taft-Hartley
Act partially repealed Norris-LaGuardia Act sub silentio) (Court overrules its prior deci-
sion in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) on essentially same facts).
But cf. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Nothing at all has changed
• . . except the membership of the Court and the personal views of one Justice."). See
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on many politically significant interpretive decisions, most contem-
porary observers have come to understand arguments about legisla-
tive history-like arguments about precedent and institutional
competence-to be specialized, stereotyped rhetorical maneuvers
that lawyers habitually make, but not a distinct mode of "reasoning"
also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (5-4 vote) (fines of union
members for strikebreaking; both sides rely on legislative history); National Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) (5-4 vote) (work-preservation agreements;
both sides rely on legislative history); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58
(1964) (6-2 vote, but one of Brennan's majority agreed with dissent on interpretation of
legislative history) (secondary picketing); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961) (5-3 majority for Brennan view with sixth Justice agreeing with Bren-
nan's history but dissenting from remedy) (by exceptionally creative rendering of legis-
lative history, Court avoids ruling on constitutionality of political expenditures from
compelled union dues). But cf. id. at 784 (Black, J., dissenting) (" [Tihe very legislative
history relied on by the Court appears to me to prove that its interpretation of [the
Railway Labor Act] is without justification."); id. at 799-800 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(citing dictum ofJustice Cardozo that principle of avoidance of constitutional adjudica-
tion should " 'not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion' "; Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan opine that "[n]o consideration relevant to construction sustains"
Brennan's reading of Railway Labor Act).
Sometimes Brennan has found himself on the losing side of the legislative his-
tory gambit. For two recent 5-4 decisions in which a dissenting Justice Brennan casti-
gated the majority for, among other things, misreading legislative history, see NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 705 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (scoring Court's
"overbroad and unwarranted" interpretation of managerial exclusion to NLRA cover-
age); NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act announced by the
Court today is not 'fairly possible.' "); id. at 518 ("[I]t is irresponsible [for the Court] to
avoid [the constitutional question] by a cavalier exercise in statutory interpretation
which succeeds in defying congressional intent."). Yeshiva was itself based on another 5-
4 decision turning on conflicting readings of legislative intent, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) ("managerial employees" are not employees within the mean-
ing of the NLRA). See also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984) (5-4 vote)
(rejection of collective bargaining agreements under Bankruptcy Code); id. at 1204-10
(dissenting in part, Justice Brennan criticizes majority for failing properly to accommo-
date congressional purposes in Bankruptcy Code and NLRA).
This is not the place to catalog all the 5-4 and 6-3 labor decisions that turn on
disputed renderings of congressional "intent." There are many, including important
recent cases. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (scope of Lan-
drum-Griffin Title I rights of union members) presents a classic 5-4 split in which the
two sides drew opposed conclusions from the very same legislative materials. One
should, of course, add Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (uphold-
ing seniority based layoffs in preference to Civil Rights Act affirmative action relief
aimed at racial balance). Without any need to do so in deciding the case, the Court
reached out to give Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982), a very restrictive interpretation. The Court split 6-3 on the result, with
Brennan joining Justice Blackmun's stinging criticisms of, among other things, the
Court's misreading of legislative history. Id. at 2609-10 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (Con-
gress endorsed race conscious relief under Title VII). Justice Stevens joined the Court's
judgment, but agreed with the dissent that the "case involves no issue under Title VII
... " Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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in a determinate manner from general principle to specific result.
In a word, most sophisticated modern lawyers understand, though
they do not always say, that reasoning from legislative history ulti-
mately rests on political choices. The importance of all this is that
over the long run, across many discrete contexts, isolated decisions
of statutory interpretation may accumulate so as to provide signifi-
cant momentum to some, but not other, political values.
Professor Finkin's belief that the NLRA's legislative history pro-
vided relatively sure guidance on the particular issues that arose in
the early years (let alone later on) is wholly mistaken. In fact, there
were numerous important issues as to which the legislative history
was at best ambiguous. In other cases the Board and courts disre-
garded fairly potent legislative signals in order to reach results that
Finkin presumably finds unobjectionable. Here are some examples
of subjects upon which the legislative history left considerable, po-
litically significant leeway; others are taken up below in the discus-
sion of the lead cases.
1. Company Unions.-Clearly the company unions posed a major
obstacle to genuine collective bargaining, and clearly Congress in-
tended to remove that obstacle (K:304-05). On this much everyone
agrees. Turning to specifics, however, "textbook" legislative history
is not always so illuminating. To take an example, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed an NLRB policy denying company un-
ions a place on the ballot in representation elections.' 5 7 This seems
sound, although surely for reasons of social policy, not clarity of
congressional intent. The best the Court could do on that score was
to cite from a House committee report15 8 some vague language con-
demning company unions. Finkin eagerly cites the experience of
the pre-1935 labor agencies as supplying a "relevant guide to judi-
cial interpretation of the Act" (F:46-47). However, both the Na-
tional Labor Board and the "old" NLRB allowed company unions to
appear on the ballot.' 59
157. Falk Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 654 (1938), enforcedas modifiedin relevant part, 102 F.2d 383
(7th Cir. 1939), modification rev'd, 308 U.S. 453 (1940). The Board's policy applied when
an unaffiliated union had been found to be "dominated" in a collateral § 8(2) proceed-
ing. (NLRA § 8(2) forbids employers to "dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of" a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).) Different rules
applied when no § 8(2) charge was filed or when the "domination" consisted of em-
ployer assistance to a union affiliated with a national or international federation.
158. 308 U.S. at 462 n.l.
159. See I. BERNSTEIN,, supra note 33, at 61, 85 (describing development of "common
law" by (old) NLRB). A leading case allowing a "dominated" union to appear on the
ballot was Kohler Co., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 72 (1934). The old Board's refusal to deny
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While these issues may have an antiquated ring, as it happens
this very question of congressional intent regarding company un-
ions and "dominated" labor organizations has recently re-emerged
as "hot" topic in light of the current interest in employee participa-
tion plans. A recent, careful review of the legislative history con-
cluded that it is susceptible to two opposing conclusions on the
question of whether Congress intended to allow employee participa-
tion structures outside normal collective bargaining channels. 60
Although the author found that one of the opposed interpretations
is "probably more reasonable,"'' it is clear from what she wrote
that the questions of contemporary importance were simply not re-
solved or even for the most part attended to by Congress. Sockell's
study provides a good example of the vague and at times contradic-
tory character of the Wagner Act legislative history on even the
most basic issues. 16 2
2. Represention and Race Discrimination.-In 1944, the Court ruled
in a landmark case that a majority union's privilege of exclusive rep-
resentation carries with it the correlative duty of fair representation
toward minorities within the bargaining unit, in that instance, black
workers denied membership in the union. 6 ' This was a Railway La-
bor Act (RLA)' 6 case, but the fair representation principle was
soon carried over to the NLRA. 165
ballot access was a judgment of principle, not merely a reflection of the absence in the
enabling legislation of an equivalent provision to NLRA § 8(2). The decision was criti-
cized in Note, The Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, 48 HARv. L. REV. 630,
647-48 (1935). Kohler was specifically discussed in the 1935 hearings on the Wagner bill,
S. 1958. See Hearings on S. 1958 Before The Senate Comm. on Education & Labor, 74th Cong.
I st Sess. 166-67 (1935), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42, at 2250-
51 (testimony of James A. Emery, General Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., referring to
electoral defeat of "outside" union by the company union). The House Report cited in
Falk is a general condemnation of company unions, but characteristically says nothing
about the precise issue at hand. Moreover, even this relatively straightforward area in-
volves a conflict between two "core" statutory values- "free choice" vs. promoting gen-
uine collective bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941)
(discussed at K:305 n. 135), in which the Supreme Court upheld a "disestablishment"
remedy over a claim that the "dominated union" was in fact a bona fide labor organiza-
tion despite that the employer preferred it to a CIO affiliate.
160. Sockell, The Legality of Employee-Participation Programs in Unionized Firms, 37 INDUS.
LAB. REL. REV. 541, 553 (1984).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., id. at 549-53.
163. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
164. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
165. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). That the fair repre-
sentation principle applies to the NLRA was already implicit in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944), decided the same day as Steele.
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Does the legislative history of either the RLA or the NLRA in-
spire confidence that unions, many of which followed Jim Crow poli-
cies, were intended to be under a duty to fairly represent black
employees? In an opinion said to turn on the intent of Congress,
the Steele Court failed to cite a single sentence of the legislative his-
tory of the Railway Labor Act. The only legislative history reference
is to a House and a Senate Report on the Wagner bill, which pur-
portedly indicates that Congress in 1935 understood the principle
of majority rule in the 1934 railway statute to require the employer to
provide equal working conditions to non-union members of the bar-
gaining unit.'6 6 The Court did not mention the embarassing fact
that managers of the Wagner bills, both in 1934 and 1935, failed to
include a provision barring unions from discrimination on the basis
of race.' 6 7 Civil rights organizations openly campaigned for inclu-
sion of a non-discrimination provision, and at one point in the 1934
process Senator Wagner was inclined to go along. But, under pres-
sure from the AFL, he proposed drafts that did not include such
provisions for fear that he could not otherwise obtain passage of a
bill. 168
The Steele Court's holding that Congress intended a duty of fair
representation, even one that, as in Steele, still allowed unions to
continue their whites-only membership policy, 6 9 is questionable.
To be sure, we can sweep this background under the rug with the
polite fiction that Congress could not have intended an unconstitu-
tional result and therefore the labor statutes must be interpreted in
conformity with equal protection norms. But this only reinforces
my point that statutory interpretations are not pre-ordained by the
legislative history, but depend crucially on the philosophical com-
mitments and moral sensibilities of the interpreting court. While
Steele represented enormous progress for civil rights, the Court's
166. See Steele, 323 U.S. at 202 n.3 (citing H. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-
22 (1935); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935)). The cited references do
not speak either of a general duty of fair representation or of the problem of race
discrimination.
167. See 1 H. HILL, BLACK LABOR & THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 100-06 (1977); see
also I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1941,
at 189-90 (1970).
168. H. HILL, supra note 167, at 104-06. As regards the Railway Labor Act, see Oli-
phant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D.
Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 935 (1959), reh'g denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959): "Apparently the Act itself would
not have been acceptable to the Congress if Negro membership in the [bargaining]
agent had been required." 156 F. Supp. at 93.
169. See Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
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timidity stopped it from striking an even deeper and more lasting
blow for racial justice by ordering non-discriminatory admission to
union membership, a result that would have been no less consistent
with the intent of Congress than the other remedies the Court cre-
ated in Steele.'
70
3. Foremen.-Did Congress intend to include foremen and low-
level supervisors under the coverage of the Act? This was a highly
visible and politicized issue, particularly during World War II, when
foremen joined unions in large numbers. 17 1 The Board ruled ini-
tially that foremen are statutory employees with organizational
rights,' 72 then reversed itself under political pressure, 73 then de-
cided that foremen are employees for some but not other pur-
poses,' 74 then reversed itself again,' 75 once more extending
organizational rights to foremen. This last decision was upheld by a
5-4 vote in the Supreme Court. 17 6 The majority found nothing in
the Act signaling a congressional intention to deny NLRA rights to
foremen. Justice Jackson thought the meaning of the relevant statu-
tory provisions "plain"'' 77 and lacking in any ambiguity requiring
clarificatory resort to legislative history.' 78 Justice Douglas wrote
for four dissenters that Congress's failure to speak to the issue im-
plied not inclusion, but an "absence of purpose to bring [foremen]
under the Act."' 7 9 I leave it to Professor Finkin to explain what the
"correct" answer dictated by the legislative history was. Congress
soon overruled the Court, "clarifying" its intention to exclude
supervisors.' 80
E. Legislative History and the Duty to Bargain
From these examples of problems in NLRA legislative history,
we now return to our initial question: Was the legislative history of
the NLRA ambiguous on the question of contractualism, in the
170. I discuss this aspect of Steele at length in Klare, Quest, supra note 24, at 185-98.
171. See generally Seitz, supra note 14; D. BRODY, supra note ***, at 180-81.
172. Godchaux Sugar, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942); Union Collieries Coal Co., 41
N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
173. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
174. Soss Mfg. Co. & Republic Steel Corp., 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944).
175. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 3 (1945).
176. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
177. Id. at 493.
178. Id. at 492.
179. Id. at 498.
180. See NLRA § 2(3), (11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (1982) (inserted by ch. 120, title
I, § 101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947)) (defining "supervisor" and excluding supervisors from the
definition of employee).
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sense of governmental intrusion in the employment relationship?
Senator Wagner and those close to him repeatedly reaffirmed their
faith in freedom of contract and saw the bill as making only minor,
prophylactic incursions on free bargaining. Specifically, the bill's
sponsors repeatedly stated for the official record that there was no
intention that the section 8(5) duty to bargain 18  would or should
interfere with freedom of contract.' s2 Thus far, Finkin and I are
(and always were) in agreement.
Many employer spokespersons nonetheless charged that the
NLRA, specifically section 8(5), would lead to government regula-
tion of the substantive terms of collective contracts. Were they per-
verse or was there a basis for their fears? For one thing, as I argued
above, some employers saw any invasion of free contract, even "ob-
vious" provisions such as the prohibition on retaliatory discharge,
as undermining their way of life. But, leaving this aside, did the leg-
islative history of section 8(5) itself, when read from the employers'
perspective, justify concerns about governmental incursion upon
freedom of contract?
The employers' fear was not an abstract one, nor was it con-
cerned primarily with Senator Wagner's motives. No one suggested
that Senator Wagner had deliberately set out to inaugurate govern-
mental control over wages and working conditions. The employers'
181. NLRA § 8(5) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982)) (unfair labor prac-
tice for employers to refuse to bargain collectively with majority representative). Sena-
tor Wagner's ill-fated 1934 bill contained a duty to bargain, see S. 2926, 73d. Cong., 2d
Sess. § 5(2) (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42, at 3, but his
initial draft in 1935 did not, see S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1935), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 2), supra note 42, at 1299-1300. Professor Gross notes, "Sena-
tor Wagner was particularly concerned that an explicit good faith bargaining require-
ment in S. 1958 would intensify and strengthen attacks on the bill by making it more
vulnerable to charges that the law would require an employer to reach an agreement
with a union ... , that is, a kind of compulsory arbitration." J. GRoss, supra note 33, at
137 (citation omitted). The (old) NLRB, with union support, urged inclusion of a duty
to bargain. See id. at 136-37; 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 2), supra note 42, at 1331 (draft
of § 8(5) submitted by Francis Biddle, (old) NLRB Chairman). It was inserted by the
Senate Education and Labor Committee, seeJ. GROSS, supra note 33, at 139-40; S. REP.
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra
note 42, at 2312, and adopted on May 16, 1935, 79 CONG. REC. 7650, reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42, at 2348.
182. For key legislative references see S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1935) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1),
supra note 42, at 2312; 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (May 15, 1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note 42, at 2335-36; 79 CONG. REC.
7659-60 (May 16, 1935) (remarks of Senator Walsh), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(pt. 1), supra note 42, at 2373-74. SENATE REPORT, supra, was actually prepared by Sena-
tor Wagner and Leon Keyserling and is generally deemed a particularly authoritative
source on statutory intent. See Miller, supra note 149, at 180-81.
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fear was a much more particularized concern about how section 8(5)
would work out in practice. Let me give a specific example of the
type of argument heard in 1935.13 Although the exact contours of
section 8(5) were, of course, unknown, it was certainly plausible to
assume that section 8(5) might at least require the making of coun-
terproposals. Here, I mean that this was "plausible" within the
traditional confines of the lawyer's understanding of the legislative
history. An employer who listened to the union, but made no
counteroffer, could easily be said to be avoiding good faith bargain-
ing, indeed not to be bargaining at all. In fact, the old Board had so
ruled in the celebrated Houde Engineering case. m"4 Now, once the em-
ployer has made a legally-required counterproposal, the union is
free to accept it. Since the counteroffer surely could not then be
withdrawn with impunity, so the argument went, the employer is ef-
fectively compelled to make a substantive agreement with the union.
Senator Wagner said in general terms that the duty to bargain "does
not compel anyone to make a compact of any kind if no terms are
arrived at that are satisfactory to him,"' 8 5 but his general statements
did not negate, and his specific references to Houde supported, the
possibility that counterproposals would be required, creating in
turn very real practical pressures toward the making of unwanted
agreements.
183. This example appeared in many places. See, e.g., LIBERTY LEAGUE MEMORANDUM,
supra note 134, at 2286. It was particularly forcefully argued in W. SPENCER, supra note
135, at 23-25. Though Spencer of course knew that § 8(5) "does not ... openly avow
compulsory arbitration," id. at 72, he felt that in practical operation the statute would com-
pel employers to agree to unwanted contract terms to avoid Board condemnation, id. at
24. Interestingly, Spencer cites the precise document upon which Finkin relies for the
opposite view, namely SENATE REPORT, supra note 182, at 12, to argue that it is "sheer
sophistry" to say that § 8(5) does not amount to "compulsory arbitration." W. SPENCER,
supra note 135, at 24 n.30. The fear that § 8(5) would create practical pressure on em-
ployers to agree to unwanted terms persisted for years. Indeed, some writers insisted
that such fears had come true. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 135, at 694-96 (NLRA seen
as subverting freedom of contract; legal constraints respecting content of collective bar-
gaining agreements deemed an accomplished fact).
184. Houde Eng'g Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934) (good faith bargaining, impliedly
required under NIRA § 7a, obligates employer "to match [union's] proposals, if unac-
ceptable, with counter-proposals"). Houde was cited approvingly many times by sup-
porters of the Wagner bill, as Finkin obligingly notes (F:47 n.94). Senator Wagner
himself quoted this language saying it "clearly set[s] forth" the meaning of the duty to
bargain, 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra
note 42, at 2336. The conventional wisdom is that the legislative history "incorporates"
Houde, but for a cogent argument that we cannot assume this, see Smith, The Evolution of
the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1084-89 (1941).
185. 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted at 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 1), supra note
42, at 2335-36.
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The counterproposal issue is but one example of how section
8(5) could reasonably have been seen to create legal pressure on
employers to "give in" to the union. To take another, why should
not employers have assumed that the duty to bargain would evolve
"practically" toward obligating employers to offer "reasonable"
terms to the union, despite Senator Wagner's assurances to the con-
trary? In the same passage Senator Wagner quoted, Houde held that
the duty to bargain required employers "to make every reasonable
effort to reach an agreement." ''"6 Given the patent inconsistency
and basically unilluminating character of the legislative history of
section 8(5), employers could plausibly have feared that, in search-
ing for "bad faith," the NLRB might in some cases explicitly or im-
plicitly review the reasonableness of the employer's offers. If so,
this would exert an indirect but potent pressure on employers to
extend better offers to unions than they would otherwise prefer to
do.
This is not the place to sort out the "correct" interpretation of
section 8(5). It is ludicrous of Professor Finkin to suggest that my
efforts in Judicial Deradicalization were directed toward constructing a
traditional, legal argument for the view that the Board should engage
in substantive review. I merely asserted that business fears were
grounded in the fundamental ambiguity of the Houde slogan ("make
every reasonable effort to reach an agreement"), which was incorpo-
rated in the (lawyer's) legislative history of the Act.
It is not news to the labor bar that scholars and practitioners
alike have wrestled with the ambiguity of the good faith bargaining
duty since 1935. Professor Cox's leading article on the subject 8 7
tried to strike the balance anew after more than two decades, yet he
conceded that his own careful effort to say what "good faith bargain-
ing" requires "borders on paradox" and is arguably "too self-con-
tradictory to survive." 188 Over the years, and particularly in the pre-
Taft-Hartley period, Board decisions have been bitterly attacked for
going too far in the direction of substantive regulation of bargaining
terms. By the same token, the Board's countervailing tendency to
resist even implicit scrutiny of the substance of employer offers in
section 8(a)(5) cases has recently led many labor supporters to con-
clude that the well-counseled employer can evade genuine collective
bargaining by engaging in "surface" negotiations. The NLRB's
186. Houde, 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934).
187. Cox, supra, note 128.
188. Id. at 1416. See supra note 128 for quotation of Professor Cox's conclusion. Cox
discusses the ambiguity in the legislative history at Cox, id. at 1404-09.
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inability or unwillingness to remedy the surface bargaining problem
has emerged as one of the central and lasting weaknesses of the stat-
utory scheme, 189 one at least in part grounded in the contractarian
emphasis that has prevailed over the years in NLRA interpretation.
This profound contemporary dilemma is at least in part rooted
in the ambiguities of the initial legislative scheme to which I
pointed. Professor Finkin's predestinationist proclivities prevent
him from seeing this. He is therefore necessarily myopic on the
depth of the problem and the scope of the reforms necessary to
tackle it. My article sought an opening to that broader perspective
by reminding us of the fluidity and discretion in statutory
interpretation.
F. Contested Cases
The contrast between our approaches to the issue contractual-
ism is highlighted by focusing on certain leading cases. Professor
Finkin's narrow perspective on the cases is essentially concerned
with how counsel's arguments and the "holdings" in each case add
to or detract from the rational implementation of congressional in-
tent. Any thought that the cases might involve implicit political
choices, and that therefore their underlying philosophical assump-
tions are worth studying, is foreign to his mentality. Most of what
he has to say about my reading of the cases is therefore wholly unre-
sponsive to the effort in which I was engaged. His criticisms are
directed to a different discourse. Moreover, as I will show, even in
technical terms his criticisms are misplaced or erroneous.
Finkin centers on three cases developing the contractarian
theme. The first point of my discussion of these cases in Judicial
Deradicalization was that the particular results were not legally or po-
litically foreordained, as shown, e.g., by the fact that the Board
sometimes disagreed with the Court. The second was that each case
was wrongly decided in relevant part, and that the cases as a group
(along with the others I discussed) left an intellectual legacy that has
disserved labor's interests. And the third was that the philosophical
underpinnings of these cases were slowly woven into an emerging
judicial ideology that was and is, in important respects, supportive
of hierarchy rather than democracy in work.
189. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 6, at 71, 174, 106, 6 (testimony, respectively, of
William Bywater, Bernard Jolles, James Kane, Richard Trumka) (prominent union lead-
ers and attorneys identify lack of effective remedies against surface bargaining as a cen-
tral failure of NLRA).
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By contrast, Professor Finkin appears to argue that the results
in question were legally inevitable, i.e., no real alternatives were
available within conventional legal analysis. Second, because
Finkin's perspective is seemingly informed by no values external to
the generalities of the conventional, textbook version of legislative
history, he ignores or even justifies certain baneful consequences of
these decisions. Third, he generally derides and belittles any alter-
native perspective that might be brought to bear on the problems to
which these and similar cases gave rise.
The form of Professor Finkin's attack makes it difficult to ap-
proach the cases on the level of social policy. His primary tack is to
avoid such discussion by focusing on a series of collateral research
and interpretive issues raised by the cases in question. Accordingly,
I will not here rehearse my arguments about the ultimate signifi-
cance of the three cases, but rather respond on the detailed level
Finkin has chosen for debate. The discussion is nonetheless worth-
while in the sense that it permits us to identify the types of informa-
tion and the perspectives that Professor Finkin's doctrinal
traditionalism has difficulty acknowledging and accommodating.
1. Jones & Laughlin. 9 0-- Finkin treats this great decision as
though it were an obscure nineteenth-century subterranean water-
flow case of the type used to teach first-year students the difference
between holding and dictum. One would never know from his ac-
count' 9 that Jones & Laughlin is one of the dozen most momentous
cases in American legal history. Besides being uninformed and pe-
190. NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The primary decision
in this case was, of course, to sustain the Wagner Act as a constitutional exercise of
Congress's commerce power. As such, it stands as a great victory for labor and collec-
tive bargaining. For purposes of this 'discussion, however, Finkin and I are concerned
only with certain less well-known aspects of the case, namely its treatment of due pro-
cess challenges to the NLRA and a certain dictum about the nature of the statutory
scheme.
191. Professor Finkin writes: "As the government was at pains to point out in defend-
ing the Act, the 'entire theory of collective bargaining' was not before the Court" (F:34,
citation omitted). Finkin is technically correct that only the non-discrimination provi-
sions of the Act were before the Court. (I never said anything to the contrary.) The
government's position was somewhat self-serving, however, since the NLRB pursued a
deliberate policy of holding back on duty to bargain cases so as to narrow the focus of
the Act's initial constitutional test. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. It is there-
fore hardly the telling point Professor Finkin deems it to be that the employer concen-
trated its arguments on the non-discrimination provisions of the Act. Despite this
"narrow" focus, the employer still argued that "all freedom of contract ... is gone" if
the non-discrimination provisions were constitutional. (F:35 n.48 (citing Oral Argument
on Behalf ofJones & Laughlin Steel Corp., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937)). But leaving this aside, would Professor Finkin seriously have us believe
that theJones & Laughlin case had no political or symbolic importance? It is school-book
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destrian, his reading of Jones & Laughlin repeatedly violates his own
admonition that we carefully heed what the lawyers involved
thought of their cases (F:90-91).' 92
Finkin's first point is that Jones & Laughlin did not involve any
issue of "contractualism" (F:34, 35, 37). This is simply wrong, as
his own evidence shows. NLRB reinstatement of union organizers,
such as was ordered and upheld in the case, forces an unwanted
contract of employment on the employer. The employer's attorney
so stated at the oral argument, which Finkin quotes (F:35 n.48).
Company counsel argued that, if the Board can order reinstatement
of discharged union activists, "all freedom of contract, all right to
manage your own business, is gone."' t9 3 Likewise, NLRB attorneys
conceded that the provision of the statute at issue in Jones & Laughlin
interfered with the employer's freedom of contract.' 94 Indeed, the
history that this was the fundamental case to test the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's commitment to collective bargaining as the foundation of federal labor policy.
Does Finkin think this wholly irrelevant to the concerns of the legal historian?
192. It bears mention that the brilliant and dedicated NLRB staff who steeredJones &
Laughlin to victory did not labor under Professor Finkin's illusion that cases are decided
solely on the basis of rational extrapolation from precedent and doctrine. To be sure,
the Board's team included superb legal craftsmen such as General Counsel Charles
Fahy, Thomas Emerson, and Philip Levy of the Board, and Charles Wyzanski in the
Solicitor General's office. See generally P. IRONS, supra note 138, at 280-89 (1982). But no
one seriously doubts that the primary explanation for the Court's turn in Jones & Laugh-
lin was "a tide of forces for change which the Court could no longer resist." Id. at 289.
As Wyzanski put it: -[T]he cases were won not by Mr. Wyzanski but either by Mr.
Roosevelt or, if you prefer it, by Mr. Zeitgeist." Id. (quoting interview with Nathan Witt,
Nov. 2, 1979). Cf. 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 47 (1937) (Court decision in Jones & Laughlin
showed "complete disregard for finely spun legal distinctions reaffirm[ing] the appropri-
ateness of the 'economic approach' " in brief).
Moreover, Board personnel were acutely sensitive to the fact that the political
climate crucially affects the success of novel statutes. Therefore, in the early years the
Board pursued a two-pronged strategy: a conventional legal advocacy approach and an
"outside" strategy to stir up the political waters and thereby generate favorable public
support. Pursuant to the outside strategy, Board personnel played an instrumental role
in bringing about the electrifying La Follette Committee Hearings and in ensuring their
success. To that end, some Board staff went so far as to approach and perhaps even
bribe janitors at the offices of various labor espionage firms to retrieve scrapped records
of anti-union activity. The records were laboriously pieced together by Board staff in
Washington to obtain evidence for Senator La Follette's hearings. This fascinating de-
tail of Wagner Act history is recounted in J. GROSS, supra note 33, at 211-23, under the
title "An Alternative Route to Constitutionality."
193. Oral Argument on Behalf of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), cited in F:35 n.48. Surprisingly, Professor
Finkin cites counsel's claim that if § 8(3) is enforceable "all freedom of contract . . . is
gone" for the proposition that the employer did not argue that the statute broadly at-
tacked private ordering.
194. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938):
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NLRB deliberately held back on section 8(5) duty to bargain cases
before 1937, attempting to insure that the inevitable Supreme Court
commerce power test would arise in a discriminatory discharge case.
This was done on the correct assumption that a duty to bargain case
would raise even riskier free contract issues.' 9 5
Because I was most interested in its latent philosophy rather
than its famous commerce power holding, I focused on an impor-
tant dictum of ChiefJustice Hughes to the effect that the Act "does
not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the em-
ployer 'from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring indi-
viduals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by unilateral action
determine.' "196 Insofar as the dictum suggested that employers
might continue to bargain directly with individual employees after a
union had attained majority status, it was firmly repudiated seven
years later. 97 I attached significance to the dictum as evidence of
the contractualist, anti-interventionist attitude of the labor jurispru-
dence that would soon emerge in the Court's cases. It evidences the
attitude, reflected in the other lead cases under discussion, that the
NLRA should be interpreted so as to make the least possible
The [Jones & Laughlin] Court upheld an order of the Board that discharged em-
ployees be reinstated with back pay, on the ground that it was a proper sanction
for the enforcement of a valid regulation. 301 U.S. at 48. This order interfered
with the freedom of contract which the employer would have enjoyed apart
from the statute.
This point was reiterated in similar terms in the Board's main brief, see Brief for Peti-
tioner at 44. Of course, the Board did not concede that such intrusions on free contract
were constitutionally infirm.
The Board's position in Jones & Laughlin regarding freedom of contract was con-
tained in its brief for the companion ase of Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937). See Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 18, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (referring Court to brief in Associated Press for arguments
regarding 5th amendment due process). In its brief in Associated Press, the Board ac-
knowledged that NLRA § 8(3) infringes the employer's liberty, but of course argued that
such interference is constitutional. See, e.g., Brief for the National Labor Relations Board
at 21-22, Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) ("Thus the present Act merely
safeguards the recognized and essential liberty of employees by a limited restriction on
the employer's power of discharge. Similar curtailments of employer's [sic] liberty have
repeatedly been sustained by this Court."); see also id. at 93-94.
195. J. GROSS, supra note 33, at 187; P. IRoNs, supra note 138, at 282.
196. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 45 (quoting from Court's own two-week-old deci-
sion in Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 548 n.6
(1934) (assessing constitutionality of Railway Labor Act), specifically from a footnote
reproducing a portion of the Government's brief)).
Professor Finkin accuses me of ignoring the railway cases (F:35, 47). Actually I
said that Court "lean[ed] heavily" on their authority in Jones & Laughlin (K:299 n.1 10).
197. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (majority rule precludes individual
bargaining in derogation of collective contract).
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incursion on the preexisting legal relationship of employer and em-
ployee, consistent with the statutory scheme.
For this purpose it is irrelevant that the quotation misstates the
law, that it is dictum, and even that the words are derived from a
misguided government brief.'98 What matters is that the Court
adopted the formulation, thereby straining to reassure employers
on the free contract point.19 9 "Straining" is an appropriate word
because regardless of what the government brief said, better in-
formed observers knew that the dictum was not consistent with the
legislative history. If anything is clear in the legislative record, it is
the importance Congress attached, despite fierce opposition, to the
concept of majority rule. The dictum is in plain conflict with that
principle.200 Moreover, it shows the Court making an unfortunate
choice to emphasize one legislative value (free contract) at the ex-
pense of others (e.g., majority rule, the promotion of collective bar-
gaining) at the very outset of NLRA interpretation.
Professor Finkin's fixation on the narrow holding blinds him to
the significance of the dictum. Its importance was well understood
at the time. NLRB lawyers regretted the concession in the railroad
brief.20 ' Distinguished academics like Calvert Magruder immedi-
ately called attention to the dictum, fearing that employers would
exploit the Court's words to resist genuine collective bargaining. 202
And other well-informed and insightful observers similarly criticized
the Court's formulation °.2 3 TheJones & Laughlin episode is an early
198. Though quick to accuse me of neglecting counsel's perspective on the cases
(F:90-91, 91 n.293), Finkin himself neglects to inform his readers that there was a strug-
gle within the government over whether this watered-down formulation of the duty to
bargain should be put before the Court. As Irons notes, Fahy "succeeded in excising
this concession from the Wagner Act briefs, but its inclusion in the railroad case brief
returned to haunt the Board." P. IRONS, supra note 138, at 282.
199. Other scholars have concurred on this point. See, e.g., J. ATLESOn, supra note 13,
at 113: "The language used [in Jones & Laughlin] is defensive in tone and indicates,
perhaps, the primary audience to which it is addressed. Do not fear, it seems to say,
private ordering is still the order of the day except insofar as narrow incursions are
required by the NLRA."
200. See Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556, 568-69
(1945) (citing the Jones & Laughlin dictum) (constitutionality of NLRA sustained "by ig-
noring the clear intent of Congress respecting the meaning of the majority rule
provision").
201. P. IRONS, supra note 138, at 282-83.
202. Magruder, A Half-Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargain-
ing, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1105 (1937).
203. See, e.g., Watt, The New Deal Court, Organized Labor and the Taft-Hartley Act (pt. 1), 7
LAw. GUILD REV. 193, 202-04 (1947); Weyand, supra note 200. Pro-business commenta-
tors later deplored the Court's retreat from the dictum. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note
135, at 694-96.
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symbol of the Court's reluctance over the years to probe the outer
boundaries of section 8(5), which is in turn connected to the law's
impotence respecting the cancerous problem of union avoidance
through surface bargaining. Yet because ChiefJustice Hughes's un-
fortunate words are technically classifiable as dictum, Finkin closes
his eyes to the baneful significance of the incident.
2. Sands Manufacturing. 24-This case is often cited for the fun-
damental proposition that a strike in violation of a contractual no-
strike clause is unprotected, so that the employer may discharge the
strikers.2" 5 In fact, the contract in Sands did not contain an express
waiver of the right to strike.
The situation in Sands is hard to grasp because it runs counter
to today's basic assumptions. A dispute arose during the contract.
The union claimed that it was an honest dispute over contract inter-
pretation, as the Board later agreed. The employer claimed the
union actually sought to modify the contract, as the Court eventu-
ally agreed. Today we have a straightforward solution to such diffi-
culties. We look to the grievance-arbitration process to resolve
interpretation disputes, and the parties are forbidden to use eco-
nomic weapons either to effect midterm contract modifications or to
enforce a particular interpretation. 20 6 But the contract in Sands con-
tained no binding arbitration procedure of the kind now typical, and
the statutory bar to midterm strikes and lockouts was not added to
the statute until eight years later. Inefficient as it may sound to our
ears, Sands actually typified the effective industrial relations system
in a significant portion of basic industry at the time. While many
204. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
205. E.g., R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 306 (1976). Professor Barron has
pointed out that, even if the employer should be entitled to stand on its contract, it does
not follow, and Sands gave no reason, why the employer should be permitted to discharge,
as opposed to permanently replacing, the strikers. The then recent case of NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), would have seemed to suggest the latter
remedy. See Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 421, 429
n.29 (1981).
206. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), forbids strikes or lockouts to modify
existing contracts during their terms (or until 60 days after statutory notice, whichever is
later). Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), holds that a strike
over an arbitrable grievance is an implied breach of the contract.
Note that under recent Board doctrine the employer is free, despite § 8(d), to
"modify" existing contracts by transferring bargaining unit work to non-union locations
in order to subvert the contractual wage scale. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring
Co. [Milwaukee Spring II], 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (.1984)
(overruling 265 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1486 (1982)), petition to review
denied sub nom. Int'l Union, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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believe there are sound reasons of social policy to bar midterm
strikes, Sands reminds us that it is not impossible to run a complex
enterprise upon other assumptions.
The Court in Sands validated the employer's use of its economic
strength-namely, ownership and control of the business-to get its
way on midterm disputes, subject to the duty to bargain. But it im-
peded the union in using its chief economic resource, the concerted
withholding of labor power or strike.20 7 Even Professor Finkin
grudgingly concedes that this has something to do with contractual-
ism as I defined the term (F:38). Nonetheless, he says that he can-
not see that Sands had anything to do with social inequality,
describing as "drawn . . . from thin air" and "not mak[ing] all that
much sense" my claim that it did (F:38). Because the employees
were quickly replaced, he argues, they could not have won a strike
anyway (F:38), and therefore presumably the case is of little practi-
cal significance.
Professor Finkin's arguments simply confirm the points for
which I contended. Indeed, they represent a classic illustration of
the contractualist mentality I sought to criticize. For Finkin, the bal-
ance of power in the workplace is primarily a function of market
forces (F:38). He apparently assumes that the mission of the statute
is to inaugurate collective wage bargaining in markets that are
otherwise left largely untouched by the law. It is no wonder, then,
that he does not take seriously the possibility that the statute might
be interpreted so as to alter and restructure the labor market. In
Sands and other cases, the Court's interpretations of the statute rati-
fied preexisting imbalances of power rather than giving a sturdier
content to workers' statutory rights that might have enhanced em-
ployees' bargaining power. Professor Finkin apparently believes
this is natural and inevitable. In that he is wrong. As I will show
momentarily, the result in Sands was not legally preordained; the de-
cision expresses a political choice. There is, ultimately, no real dis-
pute that Sands confirmed rather than altered an existing pattern of
social inequality. We differ only in our evaluations of that develop-
ment from the standpoint of social policy.2 °8
207. The employee-concerted action in Sands arose in a somewhat untypical manner.
In response to alternatives put by the employer, the employees took the stand that they
would prefer a temporary close-down of the plant to operating under the employer's
reading of the contract. See Sands Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 546, 552 (1936). The Supreme
Court characterized the action as a "repudiation" of the contract, Sands Manufacturing,
306 U.S. at 344, and "a concerted refusal on the part of [the union] to permit its mem-
bers to perform their contract .. " Id. at 345.
208. It is worth noting that there is some tension between Professor Finkin's
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No doubt many readers regard the Sands decision as just, but I
believe they do so at least partly in light of inapplicable contempo-
rary assumptions about the no-strike/arbitration tradeoff. Sands is
considerably more questionable when it is recalled that no arbitral
alternative to direct action was available through which the union
could press its case. My attack on Sands does not rest upon or entail
the absurd position Professor Finkin attributes to me, e.g., that
workers should eschew contract grievance procedures and "engage
in sit-down strikes over any dispute" (F:89). I never said anything of
the kind. The Sands discussion is not about the theoretical issue of
whether and under what circumstances a waiver of concerted activity
in return for an enforceable grievance procedure is a sensible, fair
bargain for labor. The Court in Sands did not rest on a bargained
waiver of the right to job action. It proceeded on the basis of a
much more rudimentary and unrefined distaste for midterm job ac-
tion, irrespective of the availability of due process alternatives under
the contract.
In so doing, the Court gave its blessing to and created intellec-
tual groundwork for a process of erosion and curtailment of rights
to concerted activity that has been going on ever since.20 9 Sands was
an early precursor of the judicial attitudes that brought us cases
that, in my view, grievously disserve workers' rights and interests.
For example, upon reasoning similar to that in Sands the NLRB later
held that employee concerted activity aimed at pacing work on a
basis fair to the employees is unprotected because in conflict with
the inherent contractual right of the employer to command
lukewarm defense of Sands and his lukewarm discussion of the right of employers to
permanently replace economic strikers. (This right was established in NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), discussed at infra text accompanying notes 221-
36). In discussing Sands, Finkin assumes that the employer should have the right of per-
manent replacement, a point that is actually in debate. But, given this assumption,
Finkin argues that, when workers face adverse market circumstances, there is no func-
tional difference between discharge and permanent replacement. (This claim is implied
in his argument that the decision to deny § 7 protection in Sands was of little practical
significance.) Of course, it is not entirely true that discharge and permanent replace-
ment are identical, even under the market conditions Finkin specifies. In some circum-
stances, replaced employees have significantly greater rights than dischargees, (e.g.,
rights to preferential recall). Finkin is quite correct, however, that often permanent re-
placement amounts to discharge for all practical purposes. But doesn't this cast some
doubt upon Finkin's defense of Mackay Radio? Doesn't this imply that Professor Finkin
should join my criticisms of Mackay Radio rather than attacking them? Plainly the Act did
not contemplate discharge for the exercise of the § 7 right to strike, yet that is precisely
what he seems to say Mackay Radio effectively allows.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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obedience.2 1° Likewise, the Court's distaste for midterm concerted
activity is evident in cases finding implied contractual waivers of
statutory rights to concerted activity. 2 11 It is not obvious, indeed, it
begs explanation, why section 7 rights deserve such disfavored
treatment at law. Sands staked out some of the political bases of this
process many years ago and well illustrates the Court's comfortable
sense of its own important policy-making role in industrial affairs.
Professor Finkin's second point about Sands is characteristic of
the disregard for section 7 rights that is so widespread in contempo-
rary labor law thinking. He agrees that there might have been a
viable argument against the Sands result, namely that the union had
made a contractual reservation of the right to strike (F:40-41).
However, this provides little help to my questioning of contractual-
ism, he claims, because this is an "intensely contractual" argument
(F:41, emphasis in original). Finkin's fundamental assumption
seems to be that in order to exercise statutory rights employees must
win a contract that permits them to do so. That is, they must buy
back their statutory rights from the employer at the bargaining
table.
Besides confirming precisely the point I was trying to make, this
argument contains a perverse inversion of values. Assuming that
the right to strike is under some circumstances waivable, surely the
burden is on the employer to purchase a waiver from the employees,
not the other way around, as Finkin would have it. My argument
was not that employees had a contractual right to strike, but a statutory
right. Finkin's framework hinders him from acknowledging this sim-
ple point.212
210. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950). SeeJ. ATLESON, SUpra note 13, at 50-66;
infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974)
(explicit contractual provision required to preserve the right to strike against a judicially
implied waiver of that right); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-
06 (1962) (implied obligation not to strike); cf. Goya Foods, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1465
(1978) (explicit contractual provision required to preserve right to strike over midterm
grievances after the expiration of contract). On the Court's treatment of the implied
waiver issue in Gateway Coal, see Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help
Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647, 676-81 (1975).
212. There is a related aspect of Finkin's approach that is somewhat characteristic of
mainstream thinking. On the one hand, he chides me for not understanding that every-
thing ultimately depends on the parties' bargaining power (F:38). On the other hand,
he utterly ignores issues of power whenever it is convenient for him to do so. For exam-
ple, he offers the following remarkable statement: If the union thinks "traditional self-
help (the strike) preferable to resort to any outside party, all the union need do is so
provide in the collective agreement . . . reserving the right to strike over grievances"
(F:65). Surely Professor Finkin knows that labor agreements are not written by the
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Professor Finkin cannot seem to make up his mind about Sands.
He is reluctant to endorse it whole-heartedly, and he says with a
tinge of regret that the Company "out-lawyered" the Board (F:40).
On the other hand, his conceptual apparatus provides him no basis
to criticize the decision. He therefore escapes into the last refuge of
traditional doctrinal scholarship. He argues that the law compelled
the result. This claim is based on the view that "the labor Act's pro-
tection of bargaining was precisely to secure collective agree-
ments."2 3  Finkin's arguments are historically inaccurate and
logically untenable.
To begin with, Sands was one of the few cases under debate to
which the legislative history spoke with some specificity. From the
floor of the House (sitting as a committee of the whole), Represen-
tative Biermann moved to amend section 13 of the bill to restrict the
right to strike to the period before consummation of a collective
agreement. His proposed language read: "After that agreement
has been made, and so long as it shall be observed by the employer,
a strike shall be considered as a violation of the spirit of this act." '14
This amendment actually passed, but Congressman Connery asked
for tellers and rounded up some votes. On recount, the amendment
was rejected and found its way into oblivion.21 5
Surely under the customary usages of "lawyer's legislative his-
tory" this episode could, at the least, be said to suggest that Con-
gress considered the Sands issue and rejected the approach later
taken by the Court.2 1 6 I did not refer to the Biermann amendment
union but result from a compromise between the union and management reflecting the
balance of power between them.
213. F:40 (citing a single, albeit famous page of the legislative history). Well-in-
formed contemporary observers did not share Finkin's view that the legislative history is
clear on the Sands point. For example, Lloyd Garrison testified in 1940 that, prior to
Sands, he had advocated that the Act be amended to achieve the Sands result. Hearings
before Special House Comm. to Investigate NLRB, 76th Cong., 3d. Sess. 2962 (1940).
214. 79 CONG. REC. 9730 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (pt. 2), supra note
42, at 3226.
215. Id., reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORy (pt. 2), supra note 42, at 3227.
216. Further support for this argument might perhaps be drawn from the defeat of an
amendment proposed by Congressman Rich, which would, among other things, have
excluded from the definition of "labor organization" any union that would not file a
pledge with the NLRB not to strike in violation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. See 79 CoNG. REC. 9721 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORy (pt. 2),
supra note 42, at 3204-05. To be sure, the Rich proposal was undoubtedly part of a
shotgun effort to torpedo the bill by proposing unpalatable amendments. Accordingly,
under the prevailing conventions it would be given limited weight.
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in my 1978 article 2 17 because I was not there engaged in traditional
advocacy in which one uses a conventional repertoire of arguments
to "prove" what "the" legislative history "establishes." But from
Professor Finkin's perspective, the Biermann amendment should be
an all-important datum. One therefore wonders how he can possi-
bly say that the reasoning of Sands is "firmly rooted in the legislative
history of the Act" (F:40) without even mentioning it, if only some-
how to dismiss it.
But let us assume that the Biermann initiative never occurred,
and focus on the legislative history according to Finkin. The statute
was designed, he says, "to secure collective agreements" (F:40). For
this he cites a page from Senate Report No. 573.2 8 That page
speaks in general terms of the hope that employers and unions will
negotiate in a "bona fide effort to arrive at a collective bargaining
agreement. 1' 9 The passage says nothing, except by interpretive
construction, about the issues in Sands. Moreover, even assuming
that Senate Report No. 573 means what Finkin claims, he is still left
with the difficulty that the statute also embodies other, conflicting
values, such as protection for employees' right to engage in con-
certed activity. How the delicate balance between securing agree-
ments and protecting concerted activity should be struck in a
particular case like Sands presents a matter of choice that is not self-
evidently constrained by the legislative history and that might very
well be informed by underlying philosophical visions or policy pref-
erences held by the decisionmakers.
But let us set aside not only the Biermann incident, but also all
other statutory values except that of the policy of securing agree-
ments. Assume with Finkin that the legislative history unambigu-
ously promotes securing the agreement as the ultimate value.
There remains the problem of indeterminacy. 220 Finkin takes for
granted that the policy of securing agreements requires the Sands
result. This is not correct. To be sure, there is a sound legal and
policy argument that the goal of securing agreements would be well
served by the Sands result. But one could equally argue, remaining
well within the boundaries of traditional legal discourse, that the
217. My attention was originally called to the episode by Professor Bernstein's classic
study. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 124.
218. SENATE REPORT, supra note 182, at 2311-12. Actually the passage was cited by
the employer, then the Sands Court, 306 U.S. at 342 n.5, then by Finkin who cites the
employer's argument approvingly (F:39-40).
219. SENATE REPORT, supra note 182, at 2311-12.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
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Sands rule impedes the goal of securing agreements. The argument,
made by dozens of supporters of arbitration, was that absent any
sort of due process mechanism for resolving midterm disputes, un-
ions would have no incentive to enter contracts which deprived
them of their freedom of economic action, and therefore fewer
agreements overall would be made. This is the basic and familiar
"quid pro quo" idea that triumphed in the 1950's and 1960's.
In a word, the rule that wildcat strikes are unprotected does not
follow as a matter of legal logic from the 1935 Act. It represents a
choice of social policy, if you will, a political choice. It may be a wise
choice, as perhaps most labor lawyers today believe. But evaluation
of Sands then ought to be candidly grounded at the level of social
policy and judgment, rather than hidden behind the untenable argu-
ment that a broad and open-ended statute compelled a particular
result. And if so, then, contrary to Finkin, it seems a worthwhile
endeavor to attempt to uncover and explore the philosophical as-
sumptions, the "legal consciousness," that interpreting courts
brought to their task.
3. Mackay Radio.22 '-This famous case established the basic
rule that, while the employer may not discharge economic strikers, it
may permanently replace them without showing any business neces-
sity for doing so.2 2 2 The rule works particular hardship on low-skill
employees in times of high unemployment. Anyone who has ever
counseled employees on the eve of a strike knows the significance of
the rule and knows also that workers often tend to regard the dis-
tinction between discharge and permanent replacement as a law-
yer's absurdity. Vulnerable employees, wanting to know whether
they can be fired for exercising their statutory right to strike, fre-
quently take little comfort from learning that, because the law pre-
vents the employer from firing them, they can only lawfully lose
their jobs by being replaced.
Professor Finkin's treatment of the Mackay Radio case is extraor-
dinarily revealing of the limitations of his approach precisely be-
cause he has so little to say. His discussion entirely misses the real
point of the case and trivializes it by focusing on hypertechnical de-
tails. Finkin's evident discomfort with this case has two sources.
One is his eagerness to discredit the critical approach. This poses
an awkward problem with respect to Mackay because Professor
Finkin has elsewhere published a view of the case that is, in essence,
221. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
222. See id. at 345-46.
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not all that different from mine.223 One suspects that, when all is
said and done, Professor Finkin is as critical of Mackay as I am. In-
deed, the case has been the target of substantial academic criti-
cism. 2 24 On the other hand, Finkin's methodology contains no tools
for understanding or explaining Mackay other than hidebound no-
tions of holding and dictum in case law. Even Professor Finkin
seems dimly aware of the limitations of this conceptual equipment
when it comes to social analysis.
As with Jones & Laughlin, Professor Finkin insists that Mackay has
nothing to do with contractualism (F:35-37). But here it is some-
what more difficult to carry off this claim since, in another article,
Finkin has written that "Mackay Radio exacerbated any existing dis-
parity in bargaining power between employers and unions. ' 225 The
Mackay case stresses "free" market ordering over statutory rights by
exalting an "inherent," private right of employers to protect their
businesses over employees' statutory right to strike. It is therefore
perfectly consistent with the theme to which I called attention. It is
also consistent with the developing Supreme Court view in labor
cases that the final measure of workplace justice is the parties' rela-
tive bargaining power. Indeed, Finkin does not appear to dispute
that, as applied, e.g., in low-skill, high unemployment markets, Mac-
kay allows the employer's economic power to undermine the value
of the legal right to strike. It is just that, from his point of view, it is
inconceivable that employers would be denied the permanent re-
placement weapon. He seems unaware that other capitalist indus-
trial relations systems get along quite well with a different rule. 2 6
Eschewing substantial analysis of the case, Professor Finkin
largely restricts his argument about Mackay to the claim that the per-
manent replacement issue was not presented to the Court. (F:36,
223. See infra text accompanying note 225.
224. See, e.g.,J. ATLESON, supra note 13, at 19-34; Barron, supra note 205, at 440-442;
Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1967); Schatzki, Some Observations & Suggestions Concerning A
Misnomer- "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 382-89 (1969).
225. Finkin, The Truncation of Laidlaw Rights by Collective Agreement, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J.
591, 593 (1981) (citation omitted). Professor Finkin emphasizes, however, that
"[slubsequent cases ... considerably softened the effect of the Mackay Radio dictum."
Id. at 593-95 (citing cases beginning in 1963, 25 years after Mackay). See infra text ac-
companying notes 227-29. But see also infra note 235 and accompanying text.
226. In Ontario, for example, lawful strikers may return to their jobs for up to six
months from the commencement of the strike, even if replacements must be discharged
to make room for them. See ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 232, § 64 (1970), discussed in Weiler,
supra note 115, at 393 n.141.
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85). He labels the permanent replacement rule "dictum ' 227 and ar-
gues that case law decided three decades later, which I also cited
(K:302 n. 121), "deprive[s] the 'Mackay rule' of some of its vitality"
(F:37 n.59). If these arguments are intended to suggest that the
Mackay rule is not black-letter law or that it is not of continuing im-
portance to workers, they are plainly erroneous. The Mackay rule is
solidly embedded in law, despite recent cases enhancing the recall
rights of replaced strikers. Mackay plays a fundamental role in strike
counseling. It would be irresponsible to suggest to workers consid-
ering strike action that, because the rule is "dictum," it is anything
less than a full-fledged legal principle with which they must contend.
When market conditions are adverse, workers correctly attribute
great practical significance to the rule. As Professor Weiler has
noted, among the ordinary tactics in collective bargaining, perma-
nent replacement is "the most important economic weapon in the
employer's arsenal." 2 Nor was Mackay's practical significance lost
on contemporary observers. The textbook view was that "[t]he em-
ployer still retains the upper hand over the union in an economic
trial of strength." '229 It is hard to give serious credit to Professor
Finkin's dictum argument, since the Court indisputably decided the
issue and the rule has endured for nearly half a century. For pur-
poses of the arguments I raised, nothing turns on whether the rul-
ing was holding or dictum. In short, this seems an extraordinarily
picayune basis for discussion.
But, following this tack, was the issue "in" the case, as I indeed
claimed (K:301 n. 117)? In this footnote, of which Professor Finkin
makes so much, I noted explicitly that the Board did not contest the
employer's right to hire permanent replacements. This I found and
still find surprising. My statement that the replacement issue was
"presented in" the case, which may well have been an inartful way of
putting the point, was simply directed to urging scholars to examine
why the Board and Court took the approach they did.
Finkin seems to have read my footnote as a claim that certiorari
was granted for the express purpose of resolving the replacement
227. F:25, 36. The permanent replacement rule was not treated as a peripheral aspect
of the case at the time. It was immediately understood to be of central importance. See,
e.g., Case Comment, 27 GEO. L.J. 95, 95-96 (1938) (discussing employer's rights in strike
situation without treating Court's rule as dictum).
228. Weiler, supra note 115, at 388-89.
229. J. ROSENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WORKS 99 (1940).
Rosenfarb was an NLRB attorney. His book is graced with a preface by Senator Wagner
and a foreword by NLRB Chairman J. Warren Madden.
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question. 230  He is absolutely correct that this was not so, but
neither did I assert such a claim. I merely pointed out that the court
below rested on the antiquated theory that strikers voluntarily sever
the employment relationship. Moreover, the employer briefed the
case on the assumption that it was invulnerable to an unfair labor
practice finding because it had the right to permanently replace strik-
ers. The employer reasoned, incorrectly as the Court ruled, that
given this right, the maximum remedy for the discriminatees in Mac-
kay should have been reinstatement to the status of applicants for
employment. 23' These were not convincing arguments, since the
statute expressly provides that the employment relationship contin-
ues during ongoing labor disputes.23 Nonetheless, in order to an-
swer them, the Court predictably explored the rights of employers
vis-a-vis economic strikers. Indeed, the Board anticipated this in its
Reply Brief, which, in explicitly declining to argue against a right to
replace, showed an awareness that the employer's arguments,
rightly or wrongly, touched on the issue. 23 3 The Board's failure to
contest the point was not inadvertent. This is what I meant in say-
ing the issue was presented in the case.
23 4
Candidly, though, it is hard to see what Professor Finkin thinks
turns on this detail. The fact that the Board and the Court agreed
230. "Presented in" was an unfortunate choice of words. I meant simply that the
replacement issue was "posed by" or "lurking in" the case, or that the "case presented"
the issue. But Professor Finkin transposes the phrase to "presented to the Supreme
Court" (F:85) (emphasis added). That is, he attributes to me the view that this was the
issue upon which the Court set or heard argument.
231. See Respondent's Brief at 24-31, 35-36, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938).
232. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) ("The term 'employee' ... include[s]
. . .any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute .. ").
233. Reply Brief for NLRB at 15-18, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938).
234. I also referred to the policy of allowing permanent replacement as "[t]he issue
before the Court" (K:301). In context, this phrase is transparently a reference to the
issue before the Court once it had elected to speak on the question of permanent replace-
ment. It is not a reference to the narrower question of what issues were expressly raised
by the parties or properly lodged before the Court.
Professor Finkin somewhat misleadingly lifts my phrase from its proper context,
see F:36, text accompanying note 53; F:36 n.55, by treating it as equivalent to statements
made elsewhere to the effect that the permanent replacement issue was "presented in
the case" in a more technical sense of the term, see F:36 n.55 (citing K: 301 n. 117).
Professor Finkin purports to rebut only the claim that the issue was "presented" in the
narrower sense. He tacitly concedes, as he must, that the policy questions on which I
focused were in the broader sense "present" in the case, once the Court elected to pro-
nounce on the issue of permanent replacement. Professor Finkin does not, however,
substantially address himself to those policy questions.
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on the replacement issue is what needs to be explained. It is not a
reason to forego analysis. Nothing in the legislative history specifi-
cally supports the result, although nothing contradicts it either.
While the legislative materials contain references to the question of
whether strikers retain their status as employees, the precise issue
decided in Mackay was not, so far as I am aware, explicitly ad-
dressed. The Court cited no authority for its rule, which endures
today, though it now conflicts with other authority. 235 The Court
did not have to uphold the permanent replacement tactic. The leg-
islative history did not bar it from ruling, for example, that struck
employers may continue to operate but only with temporary
replacements (or, with permanent replacements but only upon a
substantial showing of the need therefor). Had the Court so ruled,
it would have enlarged labor's opportunities and might have in-
jected somewhat different concerns and themes into its emerging
industrial jurisprudence. Thus, as with the other cases, Mackay ulti-
mately reflects a political choice, a solicitude for traditional concepts
of managerial prerogative, that Professor Finkin's methdology does
not enable him to explain.23
6
V. PARTICIPATION
One of the goals of Judicial Deradicalization was to explore the
intellectual foundations of the circumspect, even grudging approach
of labor law toward employee participation. Of course collective
bargaining is itself a form of worker participation and, as such, an
essential component of industrial democracy. But it is also true that
the legal structure of conventional collective bargaining has not
been particularly encouraging toward either day-to-day employee
participation in managing the pace and flow of work or toward co-
235. For example, other cases hold that the employer must come forward with a legiti-
mate and substantial business justification for action adverse to employee status. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (reinstatement of strikers);
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (discrimination).
236. Finkin's second point on Mackay Radio deserves only a footnote. He conjures up
"a truly radical, anti-capitalist reading" of the right to strike, under which the statute
would guarantee workers "an effective strike under all circumstances" (F:37, emphasis in
original). He then shoots down this position I never advanced by saying that, even if this
were the law, collective agreements would still reflect the relative strength of the parties.
Hence, "contractualism" would still reign. I cannot imagine that Finkin really believes
that employers would regard as a system of"private ordering" in any traditional sense a
legal regime under which the government guaranteed labor success in all its actions and
forbade any efforts to resist a strike. Such a system would necessarily treat as legitimate
far more severe intrusions on freedom of contract than anything now accepted in Ameri-
can political and legal discourse. In a word, it is hard to take this argument seriously.
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determination by workers and management at the level of major
capital investment and product design decisions.2 37
Professor Finkin has nothing but scorn and ridicule for my in-
terest in expanding workplace participation. He regards only one
model of industrial democracy-the status quo-as possible, let alone
237. Professor Finkin does not address himself to the question of union or worker
participation in investment policy decisions, despite that unions have in fact sought such
participation though the law has often stood in the way, see, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (partial close-down not a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining), and that in other countries workers have sought and the law
grants a co-determination role.
As to day-to-day participation, my primary focus, Finkin repeatedly misattributes
to me the erroneous view that workers do not have significant, informal mechanisms for
exerting pressure on the organization and pace of work, both through and apart from
the grievance procedure, (see F:49, 52-54). I explicitly rejected exaggerated claims about
the co-optation of working class struggle (K:267 n. 10). And I never questioned the im-
portance of the phenomena Finkin cites, e.g., Kuhn's discussion of "fractional bargain-
ing" (see F:52-53, citingJ. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE POWER OF
INDUSTRIAL WORK GROUPS (1961)). Quite the opposite, I called attention to a similar
sort of pressure in the context of my discussion of the sit-down strikes (K:324-25). I
submit that Finkin's claims support the position for which I contend and which he op-
poses, namely that the actual practice and struggles of the working class evidence a
continuing desire for greater control over operational decisions and for more autonomy
on the job, desires that are not fully satisfied by conventional collective bargaining.
In one of the most egregious misattributions of his article, Professor Finkin tells
his readers, without supporting citation, that my argument "is built upon the assumption
of a fundamental disjuncture between the union and those who comprise it" (F:53) (em-
phasis in original). Really, this is a bit much. True enough, I discussed the muted but
powerful theme in some collective bargaining case law that conceives of the union as an
institutional entity apart from its members (K:319-20). But I clearly and unambiguously
identified this as a perspective implicit in some of the Court's views, not my views. The
point of my article was to criticize this assumption. Likewise, everything I have written
since Judicial Deradicalization clearly attacks the position Finkin attributes to me. In partic-
ular, see Klare, Quest, supra note 24, at 189-92 (criticism of Court's opinion in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), for assuming that union can fulfill duty
of fair representation toward black employees, while not permitting them to attend and
participate in union meetings).
In passing, I note that Kuhn's study has been recently and thoughtfully com-
mented upon by the English comparativist P.K. Edwards, who notes:
[O]n the question of the use of shopfloor bargaining, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the processes described by Kuhn were relatively small-scale and
marginalized compared with activities in comparable industries in Britain ....
After the Second World War American employers were able and willing to
make strenuous efforts to regain control of their factories which they felt they
had lost, or had been in danger of losing, during the New Deal and war periods.
There was a serious, and in some cases at least a carefully planned, attempt to
undercut shopfloor organizations, to sever their links with national union orga-
nizations, and to channel the shopfloor discontents on which they were built
through formal grievance procedures. The result was a closely regulated
system.
P. Edwards, supra note 142, at 12-13.
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desirable.2"' And he lambasts the idea of participatory democracy
in work as "an inchoate, primitive Rousseauism. "239 One would
never know from Finkin's article-indeed, he himself seems una-
ware-that the question of employee involvement in decisionmak-
ing is now a central preoccupation of both managers and unionists.
To cite but one reference from among the vast emerging literature,
the New York Stock Exchange, that well-known crowd of Rous-
seauian romantics-recently issued a widely-noted report on efforts
to increase employee participation in shopfloor decisionmaking.
24 °
The study found that while "employee involvement" is a recent and
still minority movement, it has already touched a huge portion of
corporate life: About 32% of workers in businesses employing 100
or more employees are involved in at least one "QWL" ("quality of
working life") or other "human resource" program. 24 1 Employers
have responded positively to employee participation programs, link-
ing them to increased productivity, higher morale, and improved
product quality.242 Unions have had a mixed response, with leaders
of the Communications Workers perhaps among the most positive,
and the Machinists' leadership among the most critical.243 But all
sophisticated union leaders now understand that they must develop
a program on employee participation issues. Many are considering
ways to respond to the QWL movement not just as a management
trap but as an opportunity, under the proper circumstances, genu-
inely to improve employees' lives on the job.244 In a word,
238. Finkin claims that "it is hard to see" how any system but representational democ-
racy on a majority rule basis could work (F:49), despite the fact that proportional repre-
sentation models have a widespread existence in Europe. Even American-style
collective bargaining does not always involve a united front of employees. There are
many instances in which an enterprise is carved up into a multiplicity of bargaining units
represented by different unions. Indeed, the AFL wanted the system of craft organiza-
tion to continue under the NLRA. And there is also the phenomenon of informal, "frac-
tional bargaining" to which Finkin himself calls attention.
239. F:49 (citing now dated remarks from D. BELL, MARXIAN SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED
STATES xi (1967)). See also F:25 (mocking characterization of my views on industrial
democracy).
240. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PEOPLE & PRO-
DUCTIvITY-A CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA (1982).
241. Id. at 23.
242. Id. at 28-29, 40.
243. See generally T. KOCHAN, H. KATz, & N. MOWER, WORKER PARTICIPATION & AMERI-
CAN UNIONS: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 153-83 (1984); Communications Workers &
Quality of Work Life Programs, 110 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 14-16 (1982); Kenefick, Going
"Round-and-Round" In "Quality Circles," MACHINIST, June, 1982, at 7.
244. See generally T. KOCHAN, H. KATz, & N. MOWER, supra note 243; Remarks of AFL-
CIO Industrial Union Department President Howard Samuel, Daily Labor Report
(BNA), at D-I (Jan. 13, 1984).
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employee participation now poses a fundamental agenda for the fu-
ture of American and Canadian industrial relations. The emphasis
in my article on the labor law treatment of employee participation
was in keeping with one of the most salient labor relations develop-
ments of the current period.
As will be seen, our debate about worker participation primarily
arises in the context of interpreting the 1930's sit-down strikes,
rather than contemporary developments. I turn first to a subsidiary
argument about the Court's famous sit-down strike decision.
A. Fansteel
1. The Signifance of the Case.-NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp. ,245 held that discharged employees whose concerted activity
involved tortious or criminal conduct are not eligible for reinstate-
ment by the Board.246 In the modern understanding, such con-
certed activity is said to fall outside the protection of section 7. This
is true even if the employee action is provoked by serious employer
misconduct.247 In general terms, Fansteel is still "good law": "It is
commonly understood that employees lose the protection of section
7 when they engage in violence, assault and trespass in contraven-
tion of clearly applicable state criminal and tort law." '248 Indeed, the
Fansteel principle has been greatly enlarged so that today section 7
protection is denied when employees engage in "indefensible"
(though lawful) conduct. On the other hand, the reasoning of Fan-
steel-which was blasted by distinguished critics at the time 249 -has
since been discredited. 25" And some tribunals have occasionally
245. 306 U.S. 240 (1939), discussed in K:322-25.
246. 306 U.S. at 252-61.
247. Id. at 253-54.
248. R. GORMAN, supra note 205, at 311 (citing Fansteel).
249. See Hart & Prichard, The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct and the Remedial Powers
of the National Labor Relations Board, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1275 (1939).
250. The Board in Fansteel considered the strikers' misconduct in light of the em-
ployer's blatant unfair labor practices. In effect, the Board argued that sustaining the
discharges would allow the employer to reap the fruits of its own wrongdoing. (This was
not, by the way, a simple "two wrongs make a right" argument. The issue before the
Board was whether the sit-down strikers should suffer the penalty of discharge in addition
to the punishments they had already received under the state criminal law.) The Board's
approach was firmly rejected by the Court. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 257-58. In more recent
times, however, the courts and the Board have revived the Board's initial reasoning in
Fansteel. See, e.g., Kohler Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 748 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965) (reinstatement of picketers who barred access to
plant so as to prevent employer from taking advantage of its own wrongdoing); Local
833, Auto Workers v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kohler Co. v.
Local 833, Auto Workers, 370 U.S. 911 (1962) (Board ordered to evaluate strike
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given Fansteel a narrow reading so as to afford protection to certain
sit-down activity.25 '
My article was primarily concerned with Fansteel's ideological
and symbolic significance. The case was a political bombshell. 25 2
More importantly, along with Sands, decided the same day, Fansteel
inaugurated in Supreme Court jurisprudence a theme of great im-
portance to modern labor law, namely, the distinction between le-
gitimate and illegitimate forms of militancy. The latter category was
later used to condemn a variety of forms of concerted activity that
have nothing to do with violence or trespass. Fansteel and its prog-
eny validated certain unarticulated but nonetheless pervasive under-
lying assumptions of modern collective bargaining law. Of course,
it is rare, if ever, that a single case entirely transforms the intellec-
tual landscape, and I did not suggest that Fansteel was of that stature.
Rather, I saw it as an emblem of the Court's emerging conscious-
ness or perspective on industrial politics (K:325).
In particular, Fansteel gave sustenance to two basic anti-demo-
cratic assumptions. The first is that there is a point at which con-
certed activity threatens management's fundamental authority and
legitimacy, and that, when that point is reached, those activities are
beyond the pale. In Fansteel the boundary line was said to be drawn
at tort and crime, and most lawyers might instinctively assume this
to be a reasonable initial boundary of statutory protection. But my
suspicion was that the real issue had to do with management's author-
ity and power, not the state's. If so, Fansteel and its progeny lent
weight to the justification of hierarchy and to a restricted vision of
workplace democracy.
The second assumption is that, in return for their legal rights,
unions are expected to keep their members on good industrial
misconduct in light of employer provocation); NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 755
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954) (in deciding whether to reinstate unfair labor
practice strikers, Board must "balance the severity of the employer's unfair labor prac-
tice which provoked the industrial disturbance against whatever employee misconduct
occurred during the strike"). But see Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 173, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (1984) (two members of Reagan Board vote to reverse balancing
policy).
251. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 449 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972) (Ninety-seven employees who "sat-in" to protest discharge
of co-workers held immune from discharge when no violence, no interference with non-
strikers, and no real usurpation of owner's right of possession occurred).
252. See J. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 83-84
(1981).
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behavior.2 53 This assumption, too, may seem natural and unobjec-
tionable on the surface, but I argued that its secondary conse-
quences have constrained rank-and-file participation. The good
behavior assumption has many secondary expressions today, such as
the arbitration/no-strike quid pro quo idea, and judicial efforts, par-
ticularly in the 1970's, to impose vicarious liability on unions for
wildcat strikes. Both developments, at least in my view, have some-
times intolerably restricted employee rights of self-organization and
concerted activity, or even forced unions to become disciplinary
agents for management. 254 Of course, many readers will not share
this assessment, but that is not essential for present purposes. The
relevant point here is more modest, namely that the case law is ines-
capably informed by judgments on the propriety and wisdom of var-
ious kinds of labor militancy, political judgments that Professor
Finkin cannot show (or at any rate has not shown) to be deducible
from the legislative history.
Fansteel's ideological overtones are not of mere academic signif-
icance. They have had a tangible, if sometimes subtle connection to
important later developments. The sit-down wave was over by then,
but the World War II years were nonetheless a period of intense
shopfloor struggle and wildcat activity. The attitudes expressed in
Fansteel endured in that context. They have resurfaced in recent
times in a condemnation of civil rights protest. 255 At another level,
the Fansteel mentality is reflected in numerous cases condemning
concerted activity totally unconnected with disruptive trespass. An
example is Elk Lumber Co. 25 6 In response to the employer's unilat-
eral changes in work methods and the pay system, the employees in
Elk Lumber agreed among themselves on a fair pace of work for the
253. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467, 479 (3d Cir. 1978) (The
union "simply must bear certain obligations if it is to continue to be entitled to the
rights and benefits accorded by our national labor policy.").
254. Thus, for example, I think Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (en-
joining safety strike), premised in part on the quid pro quo idea, was wrongly decided
and should be overruled. Happily, some of the vicarious liability doctrines, see, e.g., Ea-
zor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976) (million dollar judgment against union arising from wildcat
strike because union failed to exhaust all reasonable means within its power, including
disciplinary sanctions, to halt strike), have now been undermined by Carbon Fuel Co. v.
UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) (no liability on international union for failure to use all
reasonable means to prevent or end wildcat strikes), although questions still remain af-
ter Carbon Fuel.
255. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-04 (1973) (statutory
right to oppose race discrimination in employment does not protect disruptive, unlawful
protest).
256. 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950). See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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wages offered and proceeded to work at that pace. This was said to
contravene the employer's inherent authority to command the
workforce and, therefore, to warrant discharge as indefensible con-
duct.2 5 7 Elk Lumber is a vivid example of how prevailing legal images
of industrial justice legitimate and reinforce workplace hierarchy.25
2. Professor Finkin's View.-As with the Jones & Laughlin dictum,
Sands Manufacturing, and Mackay Radio, Finkin proves unable to take
a stand on Fansteel or to give us a sense of his views on the justice of
the result. Perhaps he thinks all of these cases were correctly de-
cided. But, assuming that he might view this case and/or some of
the others as wrongly decided, his theory provides him no concep-
tual apparatus with which to explain this succession of unfortunate
outcomes. He might cite a coincidence of lapses in analysis, but this
would induce terminal disbelief in the power of legal reasoning. He
cannot pass the decisions off as the product of an anti-labor Court,
because his position is that the Court's approach to the new statute
was generally a benign and straightforward elaboration of congres-
sional intent. To explain this series of decisions in light of the
Court's overall record in the period requires a methodological inno-
vation of the kind I sought.
That he has not grasped the methodological problem can be
seen by Finkin's misrepresentation of my approach. As previously
noted, 259 his analytical repertoire consists entirely of the categories
of formalism and instrumentalism. Obviously I was not engaged in
a formalistic analysis of Fansteel, so he naturally assumes I must have
meant to take the instrumentalist approach. He therefore attributes
it to me, even though I clearly rejected it. In concrete terms, Finkin
apparently believes that I was trying to prove that the Supreme
Court intended its Fansteel decision to bring an end to the sit-down
strikes. For example, he emphasizes that I suggest that the Court
condemned the sit-downs "because" of their unique political charac-
teristics (F:3 1). Likewise, he argues that I must be wrong in thinking
that the Court's decision in Fansteel was motivated by a desire to end
the sit-downs, because they had largely disappeared by 1939 anyway
257. Id. at 337. Elk Lumber relies in part on International Union, UAW, Local 232 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. [Briggs-Stratton], 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (intermit-
tent, unannounced work stoppages), which in turn relies in part on Fansteel. See 336 U.S.
at 257, 259. Briggs-Stratton was overruled in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n Machinists v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976).
258. Jim Atleson's work first called my attention to the significance of Elk Lumber. He
provides a thoughtful and illuminating discussion of the case in J. ATLESON, supra note
13, at 50-66.
259. See supra notes 17-18 & 57-58 and accompanying text.
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(in Finkin's words, the sit-downs were "eradicat[ed] . ..by collec-
tive agreement" (F:32)), and, presumably, shopfloor militancy with
political overtones permanently vanished from the American scene
shortly after the Flint strike ended (F:32-33).
The problem with this line of argument is that my analysis of
Fansteel was agnostic on the Court's motives, and my methodology
in Judicial Deradicalization explicitly rjected the instrumental approach
both in legal analysis and political theory. 260 The word "because"
does not appear in my text, either in italics or roman. I said only
that the Fansteel decision (not the Court) condemned a tactic with
certain political characteristics, a statement wholly consistent with
my emphasis on the symbolic and ideological level. My analysis at
that level may be erroneous or exaggerated. But I am at least enti-
tled to have my claims judged for what they were, not the substitutes
Finkin cares to invent.
B. The Sit-down Strikes and the Struggle For Shopfloor Control 261
This brings us to the sit-down strikes themselves. Broadly
speaking the question is, what can we learn from the sit-down expe-
rience about the aspirations of American workers of the time?
While answering this will involve us in a myriad of factual and inter-
pretive details, the sit-down discussion is also revealing of the most
basic assumptions about and attitudes toward rank-and-file efforts
to challenge management's unilateral control over the structure and
pace of work.
1. The Liberal Institutionalist Approach.-Professor Finkin's arti-
cle exemplifies what Nelson Lichtenstein has called the "liberal in-
stitutionalist" perspective on American labor history. 262 In this
view, "the establishment of collective bargaining on a legal, routine,
and unchallenged basis represents the goal toward which all labor
history moves. 2 63 Two features of this approach, readily observa-
ble in Finkin's article, are relevant here. First, although there is in-
terest in and sympathy for ordinary workers and their struggles,
liberal institutionalism tends to assume an identity between the
needs and aspirations of the rank-and-file and the outlook and goals
260. See, e.g., K:268 (denying direct causal links between legal decisions and social
outcomes); id. at 269 (rejecting determinism); id. at 292 (denying that result-orientation
explains legal outcomes); see also id. at 269 n.13 (questioning instrumentalism within
political theory).
261. This discussion is heavily indebted to James Green and Ruth Milkman, though
neither is responsible for the errors or omissions it may contain.
262. N. LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD WAR II 3 (1982).
263. Id.
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of union leadership. Second, liberal institutionalism so sanctifies
routine collective bargaining and the collective bargaining contract
that it often has difficulty seeing beyond them. For example, the
1930's sit-downs are appreciated primarily as a step in the inexora-
ble march toward normal collective bargaining.
Much of what we have learned about labor history in the past
decade or so casts doubt upon these aspects of the liberal institu-
tionalist approach. Judicial Deradicalization was written at a time of
very new beginnings in labor history, influenced in part by the Euro-
pean social historians practicing "history-from-the-bottom-up" (see
K:290). In the past decade a new labor history influenced by rank-
and-file perspectives has flowered in the United States, generating a
literature of great insight and promise.264
The new labor history has challenged conventional preoccupa-
tions. For example, we can no longer assume an equation between
rank-and-file aspirations and leadership agendas. Twentieth cen-
tury labor history reveals recurring tension and mistrust between
workers and union leaders. This was particularly evident during
some of the 1930's sit-down strikes, and the tension has often resur-
faced in the post-World War II period.
Likewise, twentieth century labor history provides little support
for the notion that workers have been single-mindedly fixated on
obtaining union recognition and contracts above all else and as dis-
tinct from the broader goal of humanizing their working lives. At
the very least, one can say that there is considerable contrary evi-
dence, in light of which the conventional view stands challenged.
For example, regarding the New Deal, the new labor history has
sought to uncover "the dimension of depression-era insurgency that
264. Contributions to this literature include: J. BRECHER, STRIKE! (1972); M.
GLABERMAN, WARTIME STRIKES (1980);J. GREEN, THE WORLD OF THE WORKER (1980); N.
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 262; D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUD-
IES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY & LABOR STRUGGLES (1979)_; RANK & FILE:
PERSONAL HISTORIES BY WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZERS (A. Lynd & S. Lynd eds. 1973);
Brody, The Uses of Power, in D. BRODY, supra note ***, at 173-257; Weir, The Informal
Work Group, in RANK & FILE: PERSONAL HISTORIES By WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZERS,
supra; Weir, Conflict in American Unions and the Resistance to Alternative Ideas from the Rank and
File, in WORKERS' STRUGGLES, PAST AND PRESENT: A "RADICAL AMERICA" READER (J.
Green ed. 1983). Before turning to law study, Professor Stone published a celebrated
contribution to the new labor history. See Stone, The Origins of Job Structures In the Steel
Industry, in LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION 27 (R. Edwards, D. Gordon & M. Reich eds.
1975).
Along with the new labor history, note should be paid to several exceptional
recent contributions to labor sociology. See H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPI-
TAL (1974); L. HIRSCHHORN, BEYOND MECHANIZATION (1984); C. SABEL, WORK AND POLI-
TICS (1982).
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sought a fundamental transformation of power relationships in the
factory, mill, and office,"' 26 5 and explores "unionization . . . as but
one step among many that altered the relationship of ordinary work-
ers to their job, family, workmates, and boss. "266
Professor Finkin apparently chooses to ignore these recent
reappraisals of American labor history. Uncritically devoted to lib-
eral institutionalist assumptions, he interprets all evidence in their
light.267 And because he can only see the sit-downs through the
conventional lens, he is unable to appreciate certain basic questions
that the experience poses. Herein lies a point that illuminates our
entire debate, from the "radical potential" of the 1930's, to the
meaning of "radical change," to methodology in legal and social
research.
Professor Finkin sees but two possible interpretations of the sit-
downs. His view, the conventional one, is that they were solely
aimed to secure union recognition and collective bargaining con-
tracts (F:31). The only other possibility from his perspective, one
which he rejects, is that the sit-downs had a "revoluntionary in-
tent, ' 2 6 " a purpose to shake the foundations of the capitalist order
(F:54). What Finkin means by the second, "radical" possibility is
that participants in the strike sought to challenge the system of pri-
vate ownership of the means of production and to operate the plants
themselves (F:29, 44).
2. Another Perspective.-There is a third alternative, the one I
actually advanced. In this view, the sit-downs were part of a struggle
that had been going on throughout the industrial epoch and which
265. N. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 262, at 5.
266. Id.
267. Symptomatic of this short-sighted view, Professor Finkin reduces his discussion
of the sit-down experience largely to a single strike, the General Motors strike at Flint,
Michigan, which he calls "the sit-down of the time" (F:27 n.18 (emphasis in original)).
He incorrectly implies that I restricted myself to the Flint case. See F:85 (Klare "makes
powerful claims for the Flint sit-down."). Finkin treats evidence regarding Flint as dis-
positive of any and all sit-down questions (F:27-30), but this assumption is unjustified.
The Flint strike was, of course, the most important and famous. But precisely for
that reason it was in many respects atypical. The MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW recorded 48
sit-downs in 1936, affecting tens of thousands of workers, not counting strikes lasting
less than a day. 44 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1234 (1937). There were 477 recorded sit-
downs in 1937, affecting nearly 400,000 workers, 47 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 360 (1938). In
March 1937 alone, that is, after the successful conclusion of the Flint strike, there were
170 recorded sit-down strikes. Id. at 361. There were 52 in 1938. 48 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 1129 (1939). These strikes exhibited a diversity of characteristics on issues ger-
mane to this debate.
268. F:29 (quoting S. FINE, SIT-DowN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936-1937,
at 174 (1969)).
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continues today. It is a struggle of and by workers on the shopfloor
to humanize labor; to gain direct control over the conditions and
pace of work; to broaden autonomy and dignity on the job; and to
challenge the hierarchy of industrial life. The goal was not owner-
ship of the plants and factories, but autonomy on the job and some
control over working life in the senses just mentioned. The sit-
downs reflected a fundamental challenge to management's unilat-
eral authority in the workplace. Put another way, the goal was de-
mocracy in working life, which I take to be "radical" in the sense
used in this and my original paper.
To be sure, unionization and collective bargaining were often
valued and sought by the strikers-not as ends in themselves, how-
ever, but because workers saw them as a means toward these
broader goals. But winning a contract clause on the speed-up was
not necessarily the sit-downer's only notion of how to slow the line.
They also knew, or learned in the course of the sit-downs them-
selves, that they could slow down production through their own di-
rect action. The fact that this is "disruptive" from Finkin's
perspective (F:31-32) hardly means that it was not part of the sit-
down experience.
I argued in 1978 that the sit-downs bespoke an authentic aspi-
ration for the democratic transformation and humanization of work.
Perhaps some of my rhetoric on the subject was exaggerated (see, e.g.
K:325). But, in the end, Finkin offers no persuasive evidence that
my assessment was fundamentally incorrect, and I happily stand by
it today.
By contrast, Professor Finkin's arguments are marked by an
elitist insensitivity to the democratic aspirations expressed in the sit-
down experience. He assumes that all the sit-down strikers wanted
was a contract, after which they were ready to turn the collective
bargaining process over to leaders and experts. He assumes that
industrial workers are only interested in bread-and-butter issues and
somehow do not share the academic's or the professional's concern
for autonomy, self-governance, and work-satisfaction. This attitude
is at the root of a series of specific historical errors upon which
Finkin's argument is built.
C. The Sit-Down Experience
This is not the occasion to provide a history of the sit-down
strikes. Nor, by the way, did I purport to be offering such an over-
view in my earlier piece. The short answer to many of Professor
Finkin's criticisms is that I was not writing a history of the sit-downs,
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but simply relating certain themes in the emerging legal conscious-
ness to certain aspects of the strikes pointed up in the new and in
conventional labor history.269 My purpose in this reply is the still
narrower one of showing, with respect to a few major issues, that
Finkin misapprehends the historical record and that his mistakes
show an unwillingness to come to grips with evidence challenging to
the mainstream view.
1. Agendas.-What were the goals of the sit-down strikes, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the one at Flint? Finkin's big point
seems to be that the strikes were solely and consciously directed toward
securing union recognition and collective contracts (F:27, 27 n.17,
31). Even on his own terms, he has a problem sustaining this view.
He says that once union recognition was achieved, the unions had no
further need of the sit-down strikes, but that the rank-and-file contin-
ued to engage in them (now dubbed "disruptive tactics") for other,
unstated purposes (F:31-32). But Finkin cheerfully notes that the
CIO unions "eradicated" the tactic by agreeing in the new collective
agreements to outlaw it (F:32). He therefore feels able to ignore his
own qualification and to stick with the view that the sit-downs had
exclusively recognitional and contract objectives.
Finkin implies that I failed to acknowledge the sit-downs' recog-
nitional and bargaining objectives (F:27), although at one point,
quoting contrary language from my article, he narrows the charge to
the claim that I mention such objectives "obliquely" (F:27). This is
nonsense. I described the Fansteel sit-down as a response to the
employer's effort to block unionization (K:322). I described the sit-
down movement as "essentially" a reaction to employer refusals to
meet their collective bargaining obligations under the Act (K:324).
(In retrospect, this statement may have gone too far toward ac-
cepting the conventional view.) I unambiguously extolled the sit-
downs as a device workers used to secure compliance with the Wag-
ner Act and to make industrial unionism and collective bargaining a
widespread reality, at a time when the Board and the unions them-
selves proved unable to enforce the Act (K:266, 324). I credited the
Flint strike for the first GM-UAW agreement and for U.S. Steel's de-
269. Professor Finkin betrays annoyance that I did not discuss a variety of topics on
his agenda for a sit-down history, for example, the ACLU's views on the legality of the
sit-downs as they reflect on the issue of Communist influence in that organization (see
F:28 & 28 n.20). While that and other items he injects might be interesting topics, Pro-
fessor Finkin enlightens us not at all on their relevance to my discussion. Ironically,
having impliedly criticized me for not writing a definitive history of the sit-downs, Finkin
himself discusses only one strike and relies almost exclusively on one source. See supra
note 267; infra note 270.
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cision to bargain with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(K:266 n.7). Finally, I said that at the level of overt political pro-
grams, e.g., as advanced by the left-wing groups and the articulate
rank-and-file militants, collective bargaining was universally viewed
as the working class's prime objective. By contrast, I noted a dearth
of explicit, socialist-oriented demands for worker or public owner-
ship (K:290-91 n.79). This may be Finkin's idea of "oblique" or no
acknowledgment of the collective bargaining objectives of the sit-
downs, but in fact he has simply created yet another extravagant
strawman.2 7°
270. Perhaps I was not as explicit as Finkin would like because I was not writing a
history of the sit-downs and, more importantly, because I took the collective bargaining
objectives of the sit-downs, particularly the Flint strike, for granted. My interest was in
whether there was more to the story as well.
Finkin repeatedly criticizes me (F:26-28, 85) for failing to cite Sidney Fine's clas-
sic book on the Flint strike, S. FINE, supra note 268, and instead quoting from Jeremy
Brecher's pamphlet, Brecher, The Sitdown Strikes of the 1930's: From Baseball to Bureaucracy,
in 4 ROOT & BRANCH PAMPHLET 23 (n.d.), cited in K:325 n.222. Finkin darkly hints that I
ignored relevant evidence: "[Klare] studiously ignores the leading study of the [Flint
strike] that flatly contradicts his claims" (F:85).
Fine's book is, of course, a superb contribution to the literature, although subse-
quent research has added and continues to add to our understanding of the Flint strike
and the sit-down movement. But, despite the nasty imputation, Finkin shows nothing in
Fine that contradicts my views. Indeed, Finkin himself says that "Fine confirms much of
what Klare says" (F:27). Fine says that the sit-downs were "primarily" aimed to secure
recognition, but he does not ignore evidence that other things were going on. S. FINE,
supra note 268, at 332. Fine confirms that the sit-downs were perceived as a radical
threat, see, e.g., S. FINE, supra note 268, at 332-33; see also F:29-30 (citing Brecher who
cites Fine). He confirms that the speed-up of the line was a crucial auto workers' griev-
ance underlying the Flint strike, S. FINE, supra note 268, at 55-59. He confirms that the
sit-downs continued after union recognition, id. at 321-29. Above all, Fine confirms the
profound psychological and emotional impact of the sit-down experience, id. at 156-77.
It is obviously true that I have a different focus and draw different conclusions than Fine,
but that, presumably, is another matter.
Professor Finkin's claim that Fine contradicts me boils down to two erroneous
readings of my work. Fine clearly argues that union recognition was the key objective of
the Flint and other strikes. My article does not purport to challenge this (though I also
pointed to other agendas), so I do not see Finkin's "contradiction." Second, Fine is
quoted to the effect that the Flint strike lacked "revolutionary" intentions, as contrasted
say, to the 1920 Turin factory occupations. Since I never argued that the workers had a
"revolutionary intent" in this sense, indeed, given that I explicitly denied it, K:290-91
n.79, Finkin's second "contradiction" also evaporates.
Had I been writing the sit-down history Finkin assigns me, instead of the article I
actually wrote, I surely would have cited Fine. I quoted Brecher for the unremarkable
reason that, given my narrower focus, Brecher best put the particular point I wanted to
underscore. In any event, Finkin notes that in relevant part Fine confirms Brecher
(F:27). I might add that three of the whopping seven quoted lines on the subject are
quoted not from Brecher but from Louis Adamic, a noted labor writer who at the time of
the sit-downs was close to the CIO. I also note in passing that, contrary to Finkin's
CRISIS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW
This strawman, that I denied the sit-downs' recognitional objec-
tives, is not the real issue. The controversial point is whether the
sit-downs had additional objectives and a broader context. Here I
include, although Finkin largely neglects, the large number of
"quickie strikes," brief protest actions lasting for a few hours or the
balance of a shift (as distinct from the longer, "stay in" factory occu-
pations such as occurred, e.g., at Flint). It is well known that even
excluding the "quickies" often utilized to press grievances, only
"slightly more than half of the sit-down strikes in 1937 were for
[the] purpose" of "gain[ing] recognition from recalcitrant employ-
ers." 2 7 ' In 1938, 36% of sit-downs (again, excluding quickies), were
aimed at grievances, whereas only 35% in that year were directed at
assertion (F:26), Brecher is not and has never been the editor of the journal RADICAL
AMERICA.
271. S. FINE, supra note 268, at 332. Fine relies on Number of Sit-Down Strikes in 1937,
47 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 360 (1938), which indicates that "[ulnion organization matters
were the major issues in 53.4 percent" of the 1937 sit-downs. Id. at 362. These data do
not include strikes lasting less than one day. Id. at 360.
Professor Finkin cites this reference from Fine for the proposition that "the gen-
eral goal of most sit-down strikes" (F: 27 n. 17, emphasis added) was "achieving union
recognition and, most importantly, a collective agreement" (F: 27). I assume that Finkin
is here referring to first contracts, since he says that "once union recognition and a
collective agreement were secured, the unions that had employed the sit-down as an
organizational tactic would have no need of it..." (F: 31). It is not clear that Finkin's
broad assertion is supported by Fine's more precisely worded discussion. Following the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, Fine notes that an additional 29.4% of the 1937
sit-downs were aimed at securing improved wages and hours, S. FINE, supra note 268, at
332. In support of his claim, Finkin might seek to add some of these strikes to the
recognition strike category. The BLS aimed to single out the major or dominant issue in
each strike, but recognized that characterization of the causes of strikes is necessarily
inexact, and that strikes often have overlapping causes. See F. Peterson, Strikes in the
United States, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 651 (1938), at 166-67. Wage-and-
hour issues seemed to arise frequently in recognition strikes, id. at 58, and we may as-
sume that some strikes launched over wage-and-hour issues developed into contests for
recognition. Nonetheless, it is not disclosed in how many cases within the wage-and-
hour dispute category, if any, these demands were sought to be embodied in a contract,
particularly a first contract. During this period, workers sometimes employed the sit-
down tactic even though a contract was or had previously been in effect, and, alterna-
tively, they sometimes deployed sit-downs to achieve benefits and working conditions
improvements even when they could not get or did not seek to achieve a contract. It
therefore cannot be assumed that all or even most of the strikes in the wage-and-hour
category were necessarily or directly linked to the goal of achieving a contract relation-
ship. Moreover, it appears that BLS included strikes that were over both recognition and
wage-and-hour issues under the "union organization" subcategory. See, e.g., Analysis of
Strikes in 1937, 46 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1186, 1200 (1938) (Table 10); Analysis of Strikes in
April 1938, 47 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 350, 354-55 (1938). Accordingly, there is considera-
ble reason to doubt Finkin's sweeping claim, at least on the basis of the evidence he has
urged in its support. In any event, even if his claim proved accurate as a description of
the non-quickie sit-downs, this would not undermine the argument in the text, which
accepts the recognitional goals of many of the sit-downs but is premised on the un-
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union organization matters. 2 72
Unionization and collective agreements are not abstractions,
desired for their own sake. They were viewed as means to larger
ends. To say that the employees wanted a contract begs the ques-
tion, what did they want the contract for? Finkin assumes that sit-
down participants had the same view of the goals and meaning of
collective bargaining agreements as was held by the CIO leadership.
There is considerable reason to doubt this.
Interpreting the sit-downs in light of industrial workers'
broader aspirations, the reasons why they sought unionization, the
evidence indicates that many sit-downs were revolts against the hier-
archy and authoritarianism of factory work, particularly as exper-
ienced in the speed-up and unjust discipline. The sit-downs were a
protest and challenge to management's unilateral authority over the
organization and particularly the pace of work. For example, Fine
writes regarding the Flint strike: "It was the speed-up in the view of
the principal participants that was the major cause for the GM sit-
down strike."'2 75 To be sure, having a strong contract is one of the
best ways to constrain management's authority. Finkin correctly
notes that the UAW asked for a prohibition on speedups as one of its
demands in the Flint strike (F:30), although he neglects to tell us
that the union conceded management's authority over production
speeds in the contract resulting from the strike.274 Unionization
also provided protection for rank-and-file militants in the ongoing,
post-recognition struggle over working conditions. As James Green
has written:
Workers in large mass-production industries, who were
mainly concerned with speedup, tried to use the occupa-
tion to gain some control over the process of produc-
tion. . . . [U]nion recognition allowed organized workers
to reduce speedup through concerted actions and to begin
to humanize their workplaces.2 75
remarkable notion that an important social experience may have more than one purpose
or meaning.
For an eyewitness description by steel union activist and leader John Sargent of
how direct shopfloor action was used in the late 1930's to secure wage and working
conditions improvements without a contract, see RANK & FILE, supra note 264, at 107-08.
Mr. Sargent, who was five times elected as president of a large Steelworkers local, point-
edly claims that conditions for labor were superior in the period without a contract.
272. See Sit-Down Strikes, 48 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1129, 1130 (1939). About 29%0 of the
1938 sit-downs were due to wage-and-hour issues.
273, S. FINE, supra note 268, at 55.
274. Id. at 325.
275. J. GREEN, supra note 264, at 157.
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Clearly the sit-downer's purpose to challenge hierarchy in work was
inextricably linked to their collective bargaining and recognition
objectives.
But the distinctive feature of much of the sit-down activity was
that it directly involved workers themselves in attempts to wrest
control of production conditions from management. In describing
the 1936-1937 sit-down wave, David Montgomery notes the use of
sit-downs, before and after union recognition, to revise piece rates,
slow the line, and reduce production quotas. He writes:
The power which unionizing workers won on the job at this
time was far more significant to them and to their employ-
ers than whatever wage gains they won. Shop stewards and
committee men and women, backed up (often physically)
by the employees in the departments they represented,
translated the inextinguishable small-group resistance of
workers into open defiance and conscious alternatives to
the directives of management. 27
6
And when workers launched sit-downs without a conscious objective
to fight for control over the production process, they often learned
their powers in the struggle for control in the course of the strikes.
The post-Flint quickies, for example, were a continuation of the
shopfloor conflict that in part had led to the big sit-downs, and they
reflected workers' unwillingness to rely solely on collective bargain-
ing institutions to press their struggles.
There is, then, a dimension to the sit-down experience that was
not and could not be neatly cabined within conventional collective
bargaining. For it is a basic assumption of collective bargaining as
we know it that the employer has the authority to interpret and en-
force plant rules, and it is ordinarily the duty of employees to obey
the employer's commands. To be sure, management's decisions in
violation of the contract are subject to correction by the grievance
procedure. But on a day-to-day basis, the collective agreement "is
understood as embodying the understanding that management acts
and the worker obeys, and that coercive force will not be used to
resolve disputes over whether management has complied with the
276. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 264, at 163-64. Montgomery and other practition-
ers of the new labor history carefully credit union contracts, where achieved, for cur-
tailing management power and strengthening employees' sense of collectivity. See, e.g.,
id. at 164. My views are in complete accord on this point, and I regret that I did not
formulate them in my earlier article with Montgomery's exacting sense of balance.
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rules. ' 7 7 To put it another way, "the essential characteristic of the
industrial agreement [is] an acceptance of the authoritarian nature
of the employment relationship. The rules contained in it are stan-
dards against which management's actions are to be measured, but
management retains the right to act, to manage the business and
direct the working forces." 278 That is, conventional collective bar-
gaining, whatever its many accomplishments in improving working
conditions, assumes the legitimacy of an authority relationship that
the sit-downs threatened, for a time, to undermine. To disregard
these aspects of the sit-down experience is to fundamentally misun-
derstand what they were about and to ignore the oppressively au-
thoritarian conditions of 1930's mass production industry which
gave rise to them, particularly in auto.
There is another aspect of the sit-down experience worthy of
note. The sit-downs were a tactic through which, intentionally or
otherwise, workers put pressure on labor leaders. The sit-downs
sometimes emerged as a way in which workers organized themselves
in situations in which union leaders lagged behind and seemed un-
able to accomplish organization. Moreover, the sit-downs effec-
tively made a statement to CIO leaders about worker dissatisfaction
with prior, ineffective union efforts in the mass production indus-
tries. In this sense, the sit-downs were connected with the massive
explosion of rank-and-file militancy in 1934-1935 which was, in one
of its elements, a rebellion against the old-style AFL leadership.
2 79
The sit-down put greater control over strikes, negotiations and
grievance settlements in the hands of rank-and-file workers, who
were anxious to insure that their own union leaders would not cede
too much to managerial prerogative. The AFL experience with
mass-production workers, such as it was, did not inspire confidence
regarding union leadership understanding of such paramount issues
as controlling speedup.2" ° Little in the attitudes of top union offi-
cials, certainly in the AFL but also including many top CIO leaders,
suggested a central emphasis on workers' control issues (as the term
is used here).
2. Spontaneity:2a ' This brings us to the issue of the origins of
277. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663,
770 (1973).
278. Id. at 737.
279. See, e.g., Nelson, Origins of the Sit-Down Era: Worker Militancy and Innovation in the
Rubber Industry, 1934-38, 23 LAB. HIST. 198, 204-05 (1982).
280. See, e.g., J. GREEN, supra note 264, at 153.
281. "Spontaneity," in this context, means that the initiative in precipitating a strike is
taken at the plant level, with or without local union leadership support. It is meant to
824 [VOL. 44:731
CRISIS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW
the sit-downs. Professor Finkin portrays the sit-downs as a tactic
controlled by union officials on the outside, turned on or off like
electricity in the calculated service of union objectives (F:27, 31-32).
The crucial decisions were made by non-striking union leaders,
which, from his point of view, is as it should have been. This de-
scription is not supported by the historical record. Accounts of the
period stress the spontaneous, rank-and-file origins of the sit-down
strikes. For example, David Brody tells us that the 1936-1937 sit-
downs "were generally not a calculated tactic of the union leader-
ship. . . . Spontaneous sitdowns within the plants accounted for
the initial victories in auto and rubber. ' ' 2 2 In many instances union
leaders initially opposed pre-recognition sit-down strikes, or sup-
ported them only with grave reservations.2" 3 The CIO never offi-
cially endorsed the sit-down tactic, and the AFL explicitly
condemned and disavowed it.2 8 4 CIO leaders condemned post-rec-
ognition sit-downs. 28
5
Even the Flint strike belies Professor Finkin's view, as Fine's
history clearly demonstrates. Other sources place greater emphasis
on rank-and-file initiative than does Fine, 28 6 but for simplicity I will
distinguish strikes called or other union actions taken by higher level union officials.
The key issue is the degree of rank-and-file participation in the process of deciding to
act. The term "spontaneous" does not imply that the action involved lacks the character-
istics of planning, direction, coordination, and leadership. Likewise, "spontaneous"
does not imply that the particular strike is or was an elemental, instinctive, non-func-
tional protest, as distinct from a rational response to the employees' situation.
282. D. BRODY, supra note ***, at 103. See also J. GREEN, supra note 264, at 153; J.
WALSH, CIO 175 (1937); Cary, Institutionalized Conservatism In the Early CIO: Adolph
Germer, A Case Study, 13 LAB. HIST. 475, 487 (1972).
283. D. BRODY, supra note ***, at 103;J. GREEN, supra note 264, at 153.
284. S. FINE, supra note 268, at 331. Fine notes that AFL affiliates "did not necessarily
feel themselves constrained by this pronouncement." Id. (citation omitted).
285. H. HARRIS, AMERICAN LABOR 290-91 (1939) (quoting CIO officials); N. LICHTEN-
STEIN, supra note 262, at 15-16. See also F:32 (CIO unions agreed to contracts outlawing
the sit-down strike).
286. In a 1970 interview, Genora Dollinger (formerly Genora Johnson), organizer of
the Women's Emergency Brigade, insisted that her husband, Kermit Johnson, initially
formulated the plan to seize Chevrolet Plant Number 4. See "GM Strike Settled!" (oral
history interview with Genora Dollinger) in WIN, Oct. 15, 1970, at 8 (available on mi-
crofilm, "Underground Newspaper Collection," Bell & Howell Micro Photo Div., Reel
No. 48, Item 3). Kermit Johnson was a rank-and-file auto worker of leftist views who
worked in the Chevrolet plant. See S. FINE, supra note 268, at 6, 57, 221. The brilliantly
conceived and executed seizure of Chevrolet No. 4 on February 1, 1937, at a point in the
strike when the union's fortunes were flagging, is generally regarded as the crucial tacti-
cal move that won the strike. See generally id. at 266-312. Fine credits Robert Travis and
Roy Reuther as "the principal originators of the strategem," id. at 267, although he
notes that Travis himself acknowledged that "his own thinking had been influenced by
Kermit Johnson," id., and that Johnson advised him to create a diversion elsewhere in
the General Motors complex, id. The diversionary maneuver was, in fact, successfully
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rely here solely on Finkin's preferred text. According to Finkin,
"the basic tactical and strategic decisions governing the [Flint] sit-
down from its inception to the eventual contractual settlement with
General Motors were made . .. by union leaders. . ." (F:27).
Finkin would have us believe that the United Auto Workers (UAW)
in late 1936 was a well-oiled machine capable of planning, timing,
and executing the strike on a top-down basis. There is simply no
reality to this image of the inception of the Flint strike.
For one thing, the UAW was in a state of near-anarchy in the
period leading up to the strike.2 8 7 Many crucial decisions were
made at the local level, and factionalism was rife within the union.
Membership was low until just before the strike, and the greatest
surge in UAW organizational strength did not occur until after the
strike. While top leaders of the UAW and the CIO were aware that a
climactic confrontation was imminent, when the strike actually be-
gan in late December, 1936, they were still assuming it would occur
in January, and it is not clear that even that late in the course of
events they had consciously opted for a sit-down strike instead of a
conventional strike.288
Fine says that the conventional version, "assumed at the time
. . .and accepted ever since [is] that the CIO was caught unawares
by the sit-downs in Cleveland and Flint. ' '289 He questions this view,
but only partially, by suggesting that John L. Lewis understood the
crucial importance of the organizing drive in auto, and that CIO
leaders assumed that a major confrontation was brewing for Janu-
ary. 290 He adds that UAW leaders, notably President Homer Martin
and First Vice-President Wyndham Mortimer, played key roles in
the timing of some of the sit-downs that led to the Flint strike, 29 ' but
his detailed description of how the Flint strike actually came about is
employed by the UAW during the takeover of No. 4. I am indebted to my friend
Staughton Lynd for calling Genora Johnson's interview to my attention. I note in pass-
ing that the Women's Emergency Brigade played an important tactical role in the
seizure of No. 4 that is often overlooked or underplayed in traditional accounts of the
strike.
In addition to some skepticism on the question of rank-and-file participation,
Fine's account underplays the crucial role of the organized left in the Flint strike. See
generally R. KEERAN, THE COMMUNIST PARTY & THE AUTO WORKERS UNIONS 183-84
(1980).
287. See S. FINE, supra note 268, at 94.
288. See id. at 139, 143-44, 146-47. Curiously, in a set of goals for the automobile
organizing campaign announced as late as November, 1936, top UAW and CIO leaders
failed to include exclusive recognition. Id. at 97.
289. Id. at 146.
290. See id. at 147.
291. See id. at 147-48.
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totally inconsistent with Finkin's understanding that the union
called the shots in a calculated fashion to obtain recognition.
This is not the place to recite the history of the strike. I will
highlight several major points that emerge from Fine's account.
The crucial elements of the Flint strategy, particularly the idea of
militant strike action aimed at closing down the key plants in the
General Motors empire, emerged not from the heads of top union
leaders but from the thinking and experience of lower level union
activists in the "progressive" or "militant" wing of the union, partic-
ularly based in Cleveland and Toledo.2 9 2 (To be sure, certain key
figures in Flint, notably Mortimer, emerged from this wing of the
union to take on high union office.) The prelude to the Flint strike
included a series of spontaneous or unauthorized strikes, of which
the most important was an electrifying sit-down in the Fisher Body
Plant No. 1 on November 13, 1936. The strike was not called by the
union but by shop-floor militants, notably Bud Simons.
The main GM strike began with sit-downs, leading to a conven-
tional strike, in Atlanta. At the head was Fred Pieper, local leader
and a member of the UAW executive board. Pieper was a militant,
although not allied with the "progressive" wing. While the origins
of the Atlanta strike are somewhat obscure, it is clear that the UAW
leadership did not make a considered decision to precipitate the fi-
nal GM campaign at this time. Indeed, it is clear that the Atlanta
strike itself was not authorized by the union.29" This points up the
decentralization and organizational anarchy that prevailed in the
UAW prior to Flint. The GM strike spread in a similarly undis-
ciplined fashion, with another sit-down in Kansas City that turned
into a conventional strike.2 9 4 Rank-and-file militants next precipi-
tated a sit-down in Cleveland at the end of December. Fine notes
that, in the customary view, the Cleveland strike was entirely sponta-
neous in origin. 29 5 He questions this view, citing Homer Martin's
claim that he had ordered the Cleveland strike, but Fine's descrip-
tion emphasizes the militant, rank-and-file pressure that brought it
about.2 9
6
At this point Mortimer understood that the moment of truth
was at hand, and he told Travis to strike Flint. Fine notes that
"[t]here is no reason to think that Mortimer consulted with other
292. See id. at 72-81.
293. See id. at 135-36.
294. See id. at 138.
295. See id. at 142.
296. See id. at 142-43.
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UAW officers before advising this course of action. ' 297 Moreover,
rank-and-file workers played a role in choosing the moment for be-
ginning the Flint strike. "[T]he precise timing of [the Flint] strike
may have surprised even most of the UAW high command. ' 29 8 The
opening skirmish was a sit-down in Fisher Body Plant No. 2 on De-
cember 30, 1936, which appears to have been "entirely spontane-
ous" in origin. 299 Robert Travis took the initiative in calling the
strike in the more important Fisher Body No. 1, which occurred
later in that day, setting in motion the events we know as the Flint
strike. As Fine notes, however, it is not clear whether even Travis
himself had finally weighed the advantages and disadvantages of a
sit-down vs. a conventional strike at the time the sit-down began.300
In sum, the historical record yields a quite different portrait of
the origins of the strike than is given by Professor Finkin. The strike
did not come about simply as a result of a calculated decision of the
union to deploy a certain tactic to gain recognition. It was the prod-
uct of an extremely complex interplay of decentralized pressures
and local and national developments, in which rank-and-file initia-
tive played an important role and over which top leaders of the
union and the CIO had very little control. And once the strike was
under way, there was considerable participatory democracy in the
day-to-day administration of strike affairs inside the plants.301
3. The Aftermath.-Finally, there is the uncomfortable fact for
Professor Finkin that sit-downs and similar "disruptive tactics" did
not disappear with the coming of collective bargaining. GM em-
ployees, for example, expecting "radical change" after the Flint vic-
tory, " 'ran wild in many plants for months.' "302 Many local,
autonomous sit-downs occurred, 30 3 far too many to be passed off as
the work of isolated hothe4ds. There were 170 sit-downs in GM
plants between March andJune, 1937.304 Indeed, Roy Reuther later
declared that the post-Flint quickie grievance strikes were "the
greatest organizers, '"305 because successful grievance settlements
297. Id. at 143.
298. Id. at 144.
299. Id.
300. See id. at 146.
301. See, e.g., id. at 157-58. See also supra note 286.
302. S. FINE, supra note 268, at 321 (citation omitted); cf. I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT
YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1941, at 559 (1970) (persistent ap-
pearance of the sit-down in auto after collective agreement signed).
303. S. FINE, supra note 268, at 222-3 1; see alsoJ. WALSH, supra note 282, at 134.
304. S. FINE, supra note 268, at 329; I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 302, at 559.
305. Quoted in S. FINE, supra note 268, at 328 (quoting Roy Reuther).
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won in unauthorized sit-downs enhanced the union's prestige.3 °6
More generally, most accounts are in accord that sit-downs
(although not necessarily lengthy stay-in plant occupations) lasted
long after the Flint breakthrough or union recognition at other com-
panies. 30 7 As Professor Lichtenstein has written:
Few workers accepted the modern distinction between con-
tract negotiation and contract administration, so shop-floor
assemblies, confrontations, slowdowns, and stoppages
were endemic in the spring of 1937. These demonstrations
of collective strength legitimated the union's presence for
thousands of heretofore hesitant workers, at the same time
offering many their first sense of participation and control.
Such job actions extended the meaning of collective bar-
gaining left unresolved in the early, sketchily written,
signed contracts. . . . Through such tactics, the union se-
cured de facto recognition of the shop steward system and
a partial veto over production line speeds. 08
While factory occupations largely (although not entirely) disap-
peared by the time of Fansteel, high levels of shopfloor direct action
continued up to and through World War 11.309 In most instances
these involved "quickie" grievance sit-downs or wildcat strikes.
Many were led by militants "seasoned" in the earlier sit-down wave.
Indeed, wildcat and slowdown activity continues to this day in indus-
tries organized forty-five years ago (or longer).31 0
Post-recognition sit-downs were not an unmixed blessing. The
sit-downs themselves, and "the episodic and ephemeral conscious-
ness of the rank-and-file" they sometimes reflected, posed enor-
mous problems for unions and for the labor movement as a whole,
as Lichtenstein is quick to point out.31 ' For many reasons, CIO
leaders in this period worked hard toward achieving routine collec-
tive bargaining and institutional security, goals leaving little room
for sit-down tactics. 3 12  Virtually the entire CIO leadership
306. Cf. D. BRODY, supra note ***, at 97 ("Direct action was another expression of
CIO militancy. Sudden strikes and slowdowns, although often against official policy,
were frequently encouraged by local officers.").
307. See, e.g., C. GOLDEN & H. RUTrENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
51-52 (1942) (sit-downs after contract to push grievances).
308. N. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 262, at 12-13.
309. See generally M. GLABERMAN, supra note 264.
310. The case of coal mining is well known. For a revealing discussion of one other-
wise unremarked incident in auto, see Lippert, Fleetwood Wildcat: Anatomy of a Wildcat
Strike, RADICAL AM., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 7.
311. See N. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 262, at 13-16.
312. Id. at 20-21. For an exceptionally revealing source on the attitudes and thinking
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condemned the wildcats and unauthorized sit-downs. At one
point UAW leaders entered into a highly unpopular, subsequently
repudiated agreement giving GM sole control over production stan-
dards and the right to discipline employees who instigated unau-
thorized job actions. 314 The persistent problem of unauthorized
shopfloor action dragged on for years, intimately connected in un-
ions like the UAW with questions of local autonomy and internal
union democracy. 15
Ultimately, the question of post-recognition shopfloor action
merges into the larger question of how collective bargaining can be
organized on a stable, institutionally sound, and democratic basis,
while still retaining the sit-down virtues of spontaneity, participa-
tion, and direct employee control. I by no means think there are
simple answers to this question, and I regret if my earlier article left
some readers with the impression that I do. Neither I nor the labor
historians cited focused on the sit-downs because we think the tactic
should be routinely used to solve all labor-management grievances.
The point of the discussion is that our present industrial relations
system did not appear full blown when GM settled with the UAW in
1937, as Professor Finkin's account suggests. The system was
worked out slowly, over time, and always in the context of political
struggles between opposed interests contending over alternative in-
stitutional possibilities. And it is, to say the very least, a matter of
serious debate whether rank-and-file interests received optimal pro-
tection in the system that finally took form in the 1940's and 1950's.
In any event, prevailing collective bargaining rules and institutions
were not legally inevitable or technologically determined. They
were constructed of countless choices and actions in a lengthy, con-
tinuing process of struggle for and over the meaning of industrial
democracy.
The sit-downs expressed certain values that are worth remem-
bering in any effort to evaluate today's collective bargaining regime.
In particular, the sit-downs often reflected direct worker participa-
tion in and control over the work environment and the processes
of CIO leaders at the time, see C. GOLDEN & H. RuTrENBERG, supra note 307, particularly
the discussion of the conflict between disruptive tactics and the demands of mature col-
lective bargaining, id. at 43-61.
313. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
314. See I. BERNSTEIN, supra note 302, at 563; N. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 262, at 15-
16.
315. M. GLABERMAN, supra note 264, at 10-13; N. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 262, at 16-
17.
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utilized to resolve workers' grievances. They embodied an aspira-
tion that control over the nature and shape of jobs not be ceded
entirely to management. These values can get lost in routinized,
institutionally top-heavy collective bargaining. David Brody con-
cludes his brilliant essay on the emergence of modern collective bar-
gaining by quoting a union representative who said:
When the men settled things on the floor, it was something
they did themselves. . . . They directly participated in de-
termining their working conditions. When things are set-
tled legalistically, through the grievance procedure, it's
something foreign. They don't see it." t6
Professor Stone and I are deeply committed to the democratic
value of direct participation. Apparently this is a value of less im-
portance to Professor Finkin. For example, he has ill-concealed dis-
dain for the idea that strikers should make or be involved in making
strike decisions on a democratic basis, and he treats as natural a situ-
ation in which union officials control and dictate all strategic choices
(F:27, 31-32). It may be that Finkin is right and that my concerns
are misguided or overdone. Perhaps CIO leaders were wise in seek-
ing to curtail and clamp down on shopfloor militancy. But these are
not simple questions of fact or law; they return us, as always, to val-
ues, assumptions, and judgments of a political nature. I invite Pro-
fessor Finkin to make whatever argument he wants at that level. But
his apparent disinterest in or disdain for my democratic concerns
should not obscure the historical record of profound conflict be-
tween rank-and-file workers and top and middle-level union leaders
over when and how the sit-down tactic should be deployed, about
the proper locus of decisionmaking in labor conflict, and about la-
bor's direction and aspirations in collective bargaining.
VI. PROFESSOR FINKIN'S POLEMICAL TECHNIQUES: A BRIEF
REJOINDER
Throughout this Article, I have attempted to treat Professor
Finkin's critique of my work as a serious invitation to academic ex-
316. D. BRODY, supra note ***, at 210 (quoting interview in Strauss, The Shifting Power
Balance in the Plant, 1 INDUS. REL. 65, 90 (1962)). Professor Finkin paints an entirely
uncritical portrait of today's grievance procedures, ignoring the evidence-much com-
ing from workers themselves, not academics-of alienation and unresponsiveness in the
grievance process. See, e.g., C. SPENCER, BLUE COLLAR (1977) (steelworker and active
unionist speaks candidly about pathology of the grievance procedure in large plant; de-
scribes delay, depersonalization, unresponsiveness, overlegalism, and top-heavy manag-
ment control).
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change about issues of importance to labor law scholarship. This
has not always been easy to do. Unfortunately, Professor Finkin
deployed a variety of polemical techniques that, whatever he may
have intended, have the effect of discouraging meaningful contro-
versy on the issues and trivializing the dialogue between us.
Finkin's polemical style deflects attention from the fundamental and
often unspoken political and institutional choices assumed by his
approach to labor law scholarship. In addition, it creates an exceed-
ingly unfair portrait of my work. For the record, therefore, before
concluding this reply, I will briefly catalog the principle devices in
Professor Finkin's arsenal and show how his use of these techniques
distorts his rendition of my positions.3" 7
The primary characteristic of Professor Finkin's critique is its
misrepresentation of my views. We saw this most notably in his
strawman treatment of my arguments regarding the "intent" of the
Wagner Act."1 8 There are a number of variations on the misrepre-
sentation theme. Often, when Professor Finkin offers what he
deems a devastating refutation, it turns out that his point is wholly
irrelevant to the claim I advanced. For example, sometimes he pur-
ports to rebut my description of judicial perceptions of industrial
life by adducing evidence that these perceptions are inaccurate. His
observations are often true enough, but simply unresponsive to the
point under discussion, namely, what judges thought. Similarly,
Finkin treats my descriptions of other people's views as though I
were stating my own views.31 9 He imputes positions to me on issues
I did not address and then attacks his own speculations as though
they were my views.3 20 He attacks his extreme caricatures of my
317. I note with regret that Professor Finkin chose not to share his manuscript with
me until just prior to publication. This was despite my request for a copy and despite
that his paper was delivered as a public lecture and circulated within the profession (see
F:23 n.*).
318. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
319. E.g., F:49 (describing the "image of the American worker that Klare conjures up
with these sentences" where the referenced sentences refer not to my views on work-
place reality but views I ascribed, respectively, to conventional labor historians and to
prevailing legal doctrine); id. at 53 (evidence from "real world" said to be irrelevant to
Klare because his argument is built on basic "assumption," which I in fact do not hold);
id. (Klare posits "passive" industrial world, whereas I used the word "passive" only once
in passing footnote to describe the prevailing view within collective bargaining law on
employee's proper role in day-to-day industrial decisionmaking); id. at 88-89 (Finkin in-
correctly claims that my article identifies the law of collective bargaining with industrial
relations realities).
320. For examples of this technique, see, id. at 37 (attributing to me without basis a
certain position on the right to strike and then explaining purported difficulties with that
position "in terms of Klare's argument"); id. at 47 (speculating on and criticizing views
832 [VOL.. 44:731
CRISIS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW
positions, rather than the more modest formulations I actually
offered.3 2 1
Professor Finkin also claims that I ignored countervailing evi-
dence,322 although in virtually every instance it turns out that the
evidence he has in mind is either supportive of my claims, 23 irrele-
vant to them, or actually cited by me.3 24 One of Finkin's most frus-
trating techniques is simply to ignore what he does not understand,
and then to tell the reader that I did not address the particular ques-
tion or define the particular concept.3 25 His polemic twists quota-
tions out of context,3 26 and patches unrelated quotations together
on railway collective bargaining law that Finkin attributes to me without basis); id. at
51-52 (speculating on and then criticizing an argument I did not make, in light of the
"orthodox" theory of collective bargaining, which I did not discuss).
321. For example, when I question the loss by employees of certain legal rights to
engage in concerted activity, Professor Finkin ascribes to me the ludicrous claim that
concerted activity, indeed, sit-down strikes should always be launched by employees to
redress their every grievance (F:89). Likewise, in discussing Sands Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
306 U.S. 332 (1939), he suggests that my complaint about the case boils down to the fact
that workers do not own the means of production (F:38). Ultimately he acknowledges
that, with respect to this case, I made the somewhat more modest criticism that a con-
tract without a no-strike clause ought not be deemed a waiver of the right to strike (F:39-
41).
322. F:85, 91.
323. This is true with respect to much of the evidence regarding the sit-down strikes,
see, e.g., supra note 270.
324. For example, Finkin never establishes the relevance of the railway cases to my
argument (as opposed to his), and in any event I cited them. See K:299 n. 110. See also
supra note 196.
325. Professor Finkin ignores my development of the central category of "legal con-
sciousness" or "ideology," as he terms it. Compare F:84-85 n.278 (Klare and Stone do
not provide explanation of concept of "ideology"), with supra notes 24 & 54-58 and
accompanying text (describing how concept of "legal consciousness" was developed in
Judicial Deradicalization and subsequent work).
Here is another example of this technique: "Klare never explains what an 'anti-
contractual' interpretation of the labor Act would be, beyond a vague notion of collec-
tive bargaining as an ongoing 'participatory' process that is somehow distinct from col-
lective bargaining as we know it today" (F:33).
This combines caricature with denial. I discussed contractualism at length
(K:293-98 (citing literature)), and followed up in subsequent work, see, e.g., Klare, Critical
Theory, supra note 24, at 71-72, 79; Klare Public/Private, supra note 24, at 1399-1415. My
application of the concept to specific cases is discussed supra text accompanying notes
190-236. Professor Finkin is correct that I was not very specific in Judicial Deradicalization
about alternative models of workplace participation (see F:48). But he talks as though
this were some sort of far-out concept (F:49), seemingly oblivious to the fact that it has
now become a central concern of contemporary industrial relations debate. See supra
text accompanying notes 240-44.
326. Here are two examples:
(1) "Klare dismisses the obvious connection of the labor Act to prior law with the
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pronouncement that 'this was interesting as intellectual history, but politically disingen-
uous, given the extraordinary opposition that greeted the Wagner Act' " (F:47). Finkin
goes on to say that.I do not illuminate what I meant by "politically disingenuous."
I cannot imagine what I could possible have meant by saying (had I said it) that a
perceptible connection between the Wagner Act and prior law is "disingenuous." But
in any event, the quotation from my article is not, as Professor Finkin suggests, a general
statement about the origins of the Wagner Act. Rather, it was a specific reference to a
1935 letter from Felix Frankfurter to President Roosevelt, and to a passage in Frank-
furter's opinion in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), both of which
portray the Wagner Act as codifying prior labor relations experience. I did "illumi-
nate," in specific detail which Finkin ignores, why I thought Frankfurter's statements
were disingenuous. For example, I thought it was disingenuous for Frankfurter to cite
the Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1913), without mentioning that
the portion most relevant to Phelps Dodge had been declared unconstitutional in the cele-
brated case of Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). See K:330 n.251. And, in
both documents, Frankfurter tried to persuade his readers that a consensus existed
among all honest observers in favor of legal protection for employee self-organization
and legal prohibitions on employer discrimination. For example, in Phelps Dodge he
wrote: "Protection of the workers' right to self-organization does not curtail the appro-
priate sphere of managerial freedom; it furthers the wholesome conduct of business en-
terprise." 313 U.S. at 182. The problem is that many, if not most, American employers
did not see things that way. I commented that Frankfurter was less than candid in not
acknowledging this fact. Finkin is only interested in textbook legislative history. I was
clearly referring to something different, to the deeper politics of the Wagner Act. By
taking my statement out of context he misleads the reader into thinking that I espoused
foolish positions on statutory interpretation, which I then failed to illuminate.
(2) The second example is particularly unfortunate because of the emphasis Pro-
fessor Finkin places on his distorted rendering of what I wrote. Several times Professor
Finkin quotes (F:48, 54, 89) my words that the Court's labor jurisprudence rejected the
moral and political position that "workers' organizations ought to affirm and advance
the proposition that those whose collective efforts make social production possible
should have a decisive say in the decisions that affect the process .. ." (K:321). Finkin
takes great exception to the word "ought," using it as the basis for his otherwise unsup-
ported charge that I am an elitist who wants to tell the workers what is best for them
(F:89-90). See, e.g., F:89 ("The necessary if tacit assumption is that Klare knows far bet-
ter than those who live the reality of day-to-day life in capitalist society what is good for
them.").
As I will argue in a moment, see infra notes 339-41 and accompanying text, this
charge is without foundation and introduces a disappointingly ad hominem tone into the
debate. See also supra note 69 and accompanying text. For the record, I note here that
even the isolated quotation of which he makes so much does not support Professor
Finkin's strident rhetoric. Admittedly I made an unhappy choice of words in putting my
point. But on any fair reading of the relevant passage, the context of the quoted words
is an effort to outline a spectrum of alternative ideological premises, not to give advice
to the labor movement. And in proper context, the word "ought" clearly refers to what,
from one political perspective, workers are morally entitled to, what they deserve or "ought"
to get, as contrasted to what, within the judicial ideology under discussion, they were
said to be entitled to. This connotation of "ought" is markedly different from the one
Finkin attributes to me.
To be sure, even in the sense I used it, the phrase implies a value judgment or
criticism. But it is a criticism of the limitations of existing institutions and elite ideolo-
gies, not a criticism of the workers' efforts, as Finkin implies. Particularly in the context
of the high value placed upon worker self-activity throughout my writing, it seems per-
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in a misleading way.327
Easy victories over stawman arguments naturally invite over-
confidence. In Professor Finkin's case, this turns into a nasty and, if
I may say with all due respect, unjustified condescension. He dis-
penses aspersions freely, describing Professor Stone's and my work
as nonsense (F:86, 91), grandiose and silly (F:86), arrogant (F:90),
misleading at best (F:50), and immature (F:84-85). He says that we
debase language (F:85)
At his worst moments, Professor Finkin descends to purely ad
hominem argument. For example, his article is sprinkled with red-
baiting, McCarthyite innuendo. Finkin appears obsessed with the
Communist Party and refers to it constantly, even though his refer-
ences have no apparent bearing on the issues in debate. My article
had no occasion to discuss or evaluate the role of the Communist
Party. It contained one passing reference (K:290-91 n.79), the sub-
stance of which Finkin confirms (F:29 n.22). Despite its irrelevance,
Finkin brings up the Communist Party no fewer than seven times in
the roughly forty pages devoted to my work.328 For example, for a
reason never disclosed he advises us at one point that the American
Civil Liberties Union opposed the Wagner Act due to the Commu-
nist sympathies of some of its leaders. 329 Likewise, Finkin inserts
fectly appropriate to offer such criticisms, unless Professor Finkin wishes to adopt the
wholly apologetic position that any criticism of the status quo is automatically a denigra-
tion of the struggles of the American working class. Compare F:89-90 with supra note 69
and accompanying text.
327. In an egregiously deceptive case that sets the framework for much of his critique,
Professor Finkin writes: "Karl Klare argues that the labor Act 'was susceptible of an
overtly anticapitalist interpretation' which the United States Supreme Court could have
reached by 'employing accepted, competent, and traditional modes of judicial analysis
and remaining well within the boundaries of the legislative history of the Act' " (F:24)
(notes omitted citing, respectively, K:285, 292). Finkin makes it appear that I was argu-
ing that the radical interpretation was the "correct" or "true" view of the Wagner Act,
contrary to my actual position that the "legislative intent" was often unclear. See supra
text accompanying notes 76-86. What he has done here is very misleading. The first
quotation refers specifically to employerfears about the Act. I described these fears as
exaggerated, and I said that the radical interpretation was "not compelled by the legisla-
tive history" (K:285 n.62 (emphasis added)), The second quotation is on a totally differ-
ent point. It does not refer to the "overtly anticapitalist interpretation," but to the
"alternative results" the Court might have reached in particular cases, for example, a
result upholding the Board as opposed to overruling it. I obviously did not suggest, as
Finkin's patchwork quotation implies, that the Board's alternatives to the Court's rulings
were or could be expected to be "overtly anticapitalist."
328. See F:28 n.20; id. at 29 n.22; id. at 43-44 & nn.85-86; id. at 45; id. at 47-48 & n.98;
id. at 88 n.284; id. at 90 n.292.
329. See F:28 n.20. As long as Finkin deems this relevant, I should correct the misim-
pression he leaves. The membership of the ACLU did not support ACLU leader Roger
Baldwin's views. Internal opposition to Baldwin and his associates forced him to rescind
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discussions of Communist behavior in CIO unions (F:44 n.86) and
Communist Party attitudes toward the New Deal (F:48 n.98) into
portions of his analysis where these discussions have no apparent
relevance to the issues at hand.
It is possible that Professor Finkin's attention to the Communist
Party is the product of an honest confusion on his part. He thinks
that I was trying to show that the Act was "radical" in his sense of
the phrase.33 0 Perhaps he deems the Communist experience rele-
vant because he "presumes" (F:47) that the Communist Party spoke
for "a significant portion of the radical minority" in the labor move-
ment.3 3 ' Finkin apparently imagines that, by pointing out that the
Communist Party briefly opposed the Wagner Act, he will have
shown that it wasn't supported by "radicals," and that therefore it
wasn't "radical. 3
3 2
The problem with this logic is that it makes the erroneous as-
sumption that the broad concept of "radical social change" used in
my article3 3 3 can be reduced to or equated with the position of the
Communist Party at a particular moment in its complicated political
evolution. Surely Professor Finkin is aware that there have been
many currents of opinion on the Left in the past fifty years. My work
has been written within a democratic, non-Communist Left tradition
and from a frame of reference heavily critical of orthodox Marxist
categories.3 3 4 No one minimally informed about the relevant back-
ground could possibly read my 1978 article against my 1972 book3 3 5
and my more recent work3 3 6 and even vaguely imagine that I would
the anti-NLRA position, and by 1936 the ACLU had emerged as one of the NLRA's
most vocal defenders. See C. DANIEL, THE ACLU & THE WAGNER ACT 109-27 (1980)
(same author cited by Finkin). For a different perspective on the ACLU's position see
Lynd, Ideology and Labor Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1273, 1295-98 (1984) (reviewingJ. ATLE-
SON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983)).
330. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
331. F:48. It is not at all clear that this was true in 1934-1935. See, e.g., Lynd, The
United Front In America: A Note, RADICAL AM., July-Aug. 1974, at 29, 33-37 (suggesting
powerful rank-and-file labor pressure on Communist Party to alter its line on labor
movement issues).
332. Another detail that Finkin overlooks is that, with the end of the so-called "Third
Period" and the turn to the Popular Front in 1935, the Communists rapidly became
ardent supporters of the Wagner Act and the CIO.
333. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
334. Among other sources on my political ideas, I cited my own book on dissenting
currents in twentieth century Western European socialist thought (K:321 n.200, citing
THE UNKNOWN DIMENSION: EUROPEAN MARXISM SINCE LENIN (D. Howard & K. Klare
eds. 1972)).
335. See supra note 334.
336. See supra note 24.
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look to the 1934 Communist Party line as the touchstone of radical
outlook on the Wagner Act.337
There is, then, something more to Professor Finkin's references
to the Communist Party. Their effect is to dismiss and stigmatize
political ideas with which he is uncomfortable. This shows up most
clearly in his regrettable and unsupported accusation that Professor
Stone and I mirror radical intellectuals who, some argue, manipu-
lated and betrayed workers a generation ago (F:90 n.292). Finkin's
obsessiveness rises to bizarre heights with his contemptuous sugges-
tion that law academics find my work interesting because of a perva-
sive Left concern among the American legal-academic
intelligentsia. 38
In a second variant of ad hominem attack, Professor Finkin indicts
me as an intellectual and elitist (F:88-90). ("Intellectual" is a term
of disparagement and contempt in his lexicon .39) I deeply regret
337. This is not the place for a detailed and balanced assessment of the role of the
Communist Party and other Left organizations in the rise of industrial unionism in the
1930's. But I should note that any such assessment would necessarily credit these
groups with many critically important and valuable contributions. See also supra note 286
(role of the Left in Flint strike).
338. See F:87-88 & 88 n.284 (non-labor law legal academics pay attention to my work
because they are "intellectuals" who enjoy seeing the status quo attacked from the left;
"intellectual" contemptuously defined by reference to Daniel Bell's comments on Com-
munist penetration of American intellectual and professional life) (citing D. BELL, MARX-
IAN SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 152 (1967)).
339. This is apparent from Professor Finkin's effort to explain why non-labor legal
academics have paid attention to obviously meritless work such as Professor Stone's and
my articles (F:87-88). First, our articles appeal to academics because they are "intensely
ideational," and because a key concept I use is the "product of intellection" (F:87).
"Ideational" means "of the formation of ideas," and "intellection" means "the process
of using the intellect." Apparently Professor Finkin believes that it is a defect in a work
of scholarship for it to be a product of thought.
Second, he says we "make large claims ... for the practical effect of those who
think and write about law" (F:88). This is misleading. If anything, I stressed the role of
ordinary workers in translating the ideals of collective bargaining and industrial union-
ism into reality (see, e.g., K:266), and I drew Finkin's ire for attacking professional elitism
in the legal process (see F:88, questioning K:338).
Finally, Professor Finkin offers the view that his colleagues do not know anything
about labor law and therefore are not fit to judge articles about it (F:86-87). "[Sicholars
in their own corners of the law, but intellectuals outside it, would be intrigued [by
Klare's and Stone's articles]" (F:87), he tells us. Here clearly the word "intellectual" is
used with contempt. Professor Finkin tells us that an "intellectual" is one who " 'seeks
to understand and express the Zeitgeist . . . [who] creates intuitive knowledge about the
world.' " By contrast, a scholar " 'starts from a given set of objective problems and
seeks to fill the gaps'" (F:87-88, quoting D. BELL, MARXIAN SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED
STATES 152 (1967)). This choice of quotation aptly illustrates Finkin's assumption that
labor law scholarship operates entirely within a narrowly restricted field of profession-
ally acknowledged problems, of legitimate modes of discourse, and of recognized argu-
mentative techniques. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
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that Professor Finkin has permitted himself to question my back-
ground in and commitment to the labor movement. For one thing,
there is no substance to his charges; I write from a solid labor back-
ground.140 My ideas are very much the product of my experiences
in and around the labor movement.34 '
Moreover, Professor Finkin's "intellectual-baiting" evokes the
deep and unhappy tension between unions and intellectuals in
American labor history (although a less superficial discussion than
his would have rooted this tension not only in the misbehavior and
elitism of intellectuals but also in the labor movement's philosophy,
culture, and strategic situation)., 42 Whatever its origins, this ten-
sion is now simply a barrier to urgently needed progress on the
complex agenda of political, economic, and organizational issues
facing the labor movement. Academics and other intellectuals can
play a valuable, if appropriately limited, role in developing new
ideas and policy proposals for a revitalized labor movement. 43
Seen in this light, Professor Finkin's appeal to the labor movement's
most narrow-minded, anti-intellectual prejudices profoundly dis-
serves workers' interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial Deradicalization has many limitations. Professor Finkin
proved unable to identify most of them. His charges of factual and
340. I come from a union family, and I proudly acknowledged my parents' influence
on my article (see K:265 n.*). My father has devoted virtually his entire adult life to labor
organizing. My late mother was also an active union member or supporter thoughout
her life. After a brief career as a political scientist, I became a labor lawyer and practiced
with the NLRB and later with a union-side labor law firm. I continue to represent em-
ployees and unions pro bono, to work for labor law reform, and to support union organiz-
ing drives.
341. To be sure, this by itself is no guarantee of the accuracy or value of my ideas. I
may have drawn all the wrong conclusions from my experiences, and it is fair game for
critics to say so. But Professor Finkin is simply in error in implying that my ideas are
ungrounded in labor movement experience.
342. A thoughtful discussion of this historical background, with particular reference
to issues of workplace participation, appears in C. Heckscher, Democracy At Work: In
Whose Interests? The Politics of Worker Participation 184-99, 302-03 (1981) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
343. Organized professors themselves make up a part of the labor movement, even
though the Yeshiva decision has blocked faculty union growth in the private sector. See
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (classifying university professors at that
institution as managerial employees excluded from NLRA coverage). See generally Klare,
Yeshiva Decision, supra note 24. And professors have a valuable role to play in supporting
the collective bargaining efforts of clerical, maintenance, and other university personnel,
witness the important faculty role during the 1984-1985 strike by Yale University clerical
and technical employees.
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interpretive inadequacy are groundless, and his critique is itself
marred by consistent error and misunderstanding. Most of his "ref-
utations" are unresponsive to the arguments I made. On the key
substantive issues of this debate-e.g., whether the line of cases dis-
cussed served or disserved the cause of democratic collective bar-
gaining, and whether these decisions were legally and/or politically
inevitable-Finkin contributes nothing.
Professor Finkin's misreadings and inaccuracies are a product
of the ideological lenses through which he sees the industrial world.
He interprets all evidence and argument in the light of a series of
conventional assumptions and commitments. While I am anxious to
clear the air of Finkin's intemperate charges, the energy devoted to
this rebuttal is justified by a broader goal: to expose the values, as-
sumptions, and limitations that mark the kind of scholarship Finkin
represents. His approach substitutes stereotyped argumentation
within the accepted repertoire of legal analysis for an open-ended
search for truth. It has great difficulty acknowledging the compo-
nent of political and moral choice implicit in all legal decisions and
arguments. Itjudges research not in terms of its quality or imagina-
tion but its conformity to orthodox assumptions. And it is hostile to
any effort at fundamental reexamination or questioning of accepted
views. This approach to labor law scholarship disables itself from
seeking innovative solutions by ruling out of bounds the sort of diffi-
cult questions that point to the need for new directions.
As for industrial relations, Professor Finkin's version of ortho-
doxy adheres to an unstated but pervasive belief in the inevitability
of the status quo. It has difficulty imagining that history could have
turned out differently but for the choices people made and the ac-
tions they took. It treats established arrangements as natural and
just, and it copes poorly with evidence that prevailing arrangements
may not fully serve the needs of those they are intended to serve.
His perspective is skeptical about the capacity of workers to place
their imprint on history.
This is no time for such scholarly quiescence. As all who be-
lieve in industrial democracy know, American labor law is in a mo-
ment of profound crisis. This is a time for bold and imaginative
rethinking, in both the worlds of practice and of scholarship. In
these circumstances, the myopic close-mindedness Professor Finkin
celebrates is a hindrance to the effort to forge the new approaches
so urgently needed. By contrast, and despite its limitations, critical
labor law has taken a fresh, productive look at the assumptions un-
derlying labor law doctrine and our industrial relations system, in
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light of a deep-felt commitment to workplace democracy. In so do-
ing, it has sought to be and has been of service to the ideal of indus-
trial democracy and to the labor law community. That contribution
will endure when Professor Finkin's critique has long been
forgotten.
